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Impoliteness in Iraqi Arabic

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Impoliteness in Iraqi Arabic

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Dedication

Dedicated to:

To my father, who would have been ecstatic to witness this moment

To my mother, who counted every moment until she would see me again

To my wife, Ghamjin, and to my sons Hast and Austin, for their patience during difficult times.

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Abstract

Impoliteness in Iraqi Arabic

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This dissertation concerns impoliteness in Iraqi Arabic. It investigates the moral concept of *Usuul* as used by speakers of Iraqi Arabic in everyday interaction. It applies the analytical concepts developed in the literature of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to impoliteness in Iraqi candid camera programs. First, it describes the participants' conceptualization of *Usuul* according to their discursive negotiations in interaction. Then the study illustrates, through extensive examples, how pranksters invoke social norms of *Usuul*. I argue that the moral negotiations associated with *Usuul* are dynamic and unfold by degrees over the course of a conversation. Finally, the study shows that candid camera television shows can be utilized to examine the moral and cultural dimensions of everyday interaction.

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1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation studies impoliteness in Iraqi candid camera programs. It investigates how speakers of Iraqi Arabic produce embarrassing and aggressive reactions when pranked. Candid camera programs consist of pranks played against a target for the purpose of entertainment (Dedrick, C., & Takes, M., 1985). Iraqi candid camera programs constitute rich resources for investigating how participants invoke social norms for evaluating the pranksters.

Compared to other Arabic dialects, few studies of politeness focus on Iraqi Arabic. Most of them have concentrated on sociolinguistics (Mahdi, 1985; Murad, 2007) or dialectology (Blanc, 1964; Abu-Haider, 1988, 1991, 1992). However, research in discourse and conversation analysis in Iraq is still in its infancy.

There is a complete dearth of im/politeness research in spoken dialects in Arabic, particularly Iraqi Arabic. When researching politeness in Iraqi Arabic, researchers tend to investigate single speech acts such as apologies within speech act theory. No cultural conceptualization of local normative expectations in Iraqi Arabic exists. Using the social practice approach (Kádár & Haugh, 2013) that is influenced by conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, the current study attempts to investigate how Iraqis invoke normative expectations when encountering anti-social situations. It contributes to the growing body of impoliteness literature.

The existing empirical literature on impoliteness in interaction features very few contributions on Iraqi Arabic. By studying Iraqi Arabic, this project contributes to the discursive approach of im/politeness research.

1.1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Originally, the purpose of candid camera shows was to entertain the audience by humiliating the target. The questions, thus, that come to mind when observing these programs are as follows: How ethical are those programs? Or: What are the targets' responses to candid camera pranks? However, I use candid camera programs as the object of my inquiry. My focus is on impoliteness and inappropriate social actions and meanings. I interpret candid camera as a series of segments of impolite actions and activities. In other words, I look for the linguistic and nonlinguistic techniques deployed by pranksters when conducting their pranks. I believe that one could also effortlessly conclude that in the Iraqi pranks, "impoliteness" functions as an umbrella word that embraces the sum of the techniques used for driving the targets foolish. To recapitulate, this study approaches candid camera programs as a means for understanding Iraqis' behavior in terms of linguistic impolite manners by focusing on the participants' orientations towards immediate linguistics actions taking place moment by moment. Specifically, I intend to investigate the following questions:

- How do Iraqis perform impolite social actions and respond to them?
- What are the (social) grounds on which they build their evaluations?
- How do Iraqis conceptualize impoliteness? What are the linguistic practices they utilize for both performing and understanding impoliteness?
- What is the anatomy of impoliteness interaction in candid camera programs?

1.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, chapter two presents how politeness has been established as a subfield of pragmatics. It traces the developments of politeness theories from the 1970s until the present. It also shows how impoliteness gradually emerged as a distinct topic from politeness research after it was initially neglected by researchers in the field. Then the chapter presents the most important theories of im/politeness such as the discursive approach. Chapter Three identifies the linguistic methods deployed by the pranksters when offending the targets. It shows that they utilize various conversational practices to enrage them. Chapter Four investigates how Iraqis evaluate impolite actions by appealing to the notion of *Usuul*[1]. It shows how *Usuul* has been used for the purpose of self-defense and other-criticism. Chapter Five reflects on the anatomy of impolite interaction. It describes the identifiable elements of the conversational sequence. Finally, Chapter six presents the main findings of the dissertation.

1.1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPOLITENESS

The study of impoliteness plays an essential role in the investigation of social norms and their functions. In accordance with Garfinkel's breaching experiments (1967), I believe that in order to understand sociocultural norms, research has to depart from impoliteness first (instead of politeness). Unlike linguists, sociologists have used violations of social norms as breaching experiments (see, Milgram et al., 1986) and the like in order to understand the structure of social norms. Linguistically, recipients talk about breaching social norms explicitly when they encounter rudeness in interaction. This explicit talk is interesting both for sociologists and for the researchers

[1] *Usuul* will be explained later in Chapter Two section 2.7.

in the field of im/politeness research. My findings show that Iraqis rarely talk about *Usuul* where social norms are breached. However, I believe that studying impoliteness is more helpful than politeness studies for identifying how *Usuul* works in Iraqi Arabic.

Another factor contributing to the importance of impoliteness is that it has more implications than does politeness. Impoliteness is inherently interdisciplinary; it involves mediation or conflict resolution, legal and social consequences, and the psychology of aggression.

1.1.4 THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the present study is to investigate impoliteness in interaction as a first-order phenomenon referring to the way lay persons invoke normative expectations to evaluate social actions (Watts et al*.,* 1992, p. 3). In other words, to conceptualize Iraqi cultural norms, the analysis relies on the participants' methods of practical reasoning with regard to those tacit sociocultural norms.

The study also aims to offer a detailed analysis of the usability of candid camera programs for impoliteness research drawing on Garfinkel's (1967) breaching experiments. It also aims to discover how the pranks determine the social norms of what is called in Iraq *Usuul* in Iraqi culture and which interactional practices the participants use in evaluating those pranks. So far, because im/politeness research in Iraqi culture still in its infancy, a need exists for first-order studies to explore the nature of social norms in that particular culture.

Since impoliteness as a social practice has been mostly studied alongside politeness, the present study contributes to the fast-growing literature on impoliteness, in particular as it functions independently of politeness. The social practice approach can be viewed as a return to the literature

of talk-in-interaction or conversation analysis. It displays that conversation analysis alongside ethnomethodology can be fruitful for conducting im/politeness research.

1.1.5 IMPOLITENESS IN IRAQI ARABIC

Investigating impoliteness in Iraqi Arabic dialect is a relatively new topic of study. The tendency in linguistic research in Iraq is to focus on Classical Arabic. Iraqi linguists are still studying Classical Arabic for many reasons. One those reasons, I assume, is that Medieval Arabic linguistic schools were found in Iraq. There are still thousands of those ancient scripts in Iraq. Scholars in Arabic departments encourage graduate students to edit and publish those dusty scripts to further their graduate careers.

To the best of my knowledge, impoliteness has not been studied so far in Iraqi Arabic. I also have found that *Usuul* has never been touched upon in Iraqi culture, likely because it most often occurs in the context of everyday language and has never been theorized. While this fact puts an extra burden on the researcher, it also can be advantageous since it has been left open for new proposals. I feel obliged to mention that linguistic research in Iraq is still confined either to Standard Arabic or to comparing single speech acts between Iraqi Arabic and Standard Arabic.

I found that conversation analysis has not garnered interest in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular since conversation analysis focuses on analysis of everyday talk (spoken dialects) rather than on the standard language. Some scholars strongly oppose studying everyday language instead of Standard Arabic; they believe that those voices who advocate for researching everyday language instead of Standard Arabic have a political agenda aiming at eliminating the

Arabic-Islamic heritage through the removal of Standard Arabic, the language of that heritage[2]. For these reasons, many researchers have preferred approaches that use written texts as the basis of their scholarly investigations. For example, I have found many translations of text linguistics (cf. De Beaugrande, 1980, Fairclough, 2003 Arabic editions).

1.2 Literature review

1.2.1 TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF IM/POLITENESS

Ever since politeness research started as an academic field, im/politeness theories have been criticized and developed by various theories. Researchers from different fields have contributed to the theorization of im/politeness, including scholars in the fileds of pragmatics, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, anthropology, and sociolinguistics. In this section, I aim to present a brief summary of the development of im/politeness research.

Generally speaking, the development of im/politeness research can be divided into classical and discursive approaches. Classical theories of im/politeness include studies conducted from 1973 to 2000. Among the traditional theories of im/politeness three works were seminal: Lakoff (1973), Brown and Levinson (1987), and Leech (1983). The most important features of these theories can be summarized as follows:

1. These theories were influenced by what Culpeper (2011) called 'traditional pragmatic theories' (297), namely, Grice's (1975) theory of implicature and speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) (Culpeper, 2011; Fraser, 1990, p. 222).

[2] Kamal Jamal came up with a list of what he called westernized and "Plotters on the Arabic language": http://www.alukah.net/literature_language/0/723/

2. They were based on Goffman's (1967) notion of face.
3. Analytically, they studied politeness according to differences of linguistic strategies.
4. They are labeled as model speaker (or hearer) (Mills, 2003, p. 17, 2011, p. 22).
5. Intentionality occupies a central position in these theories (Mills, 2011., p. 27).
6. They are theory driven as opposed to data driven.
7. They mostly rely on the utterance as a unit of analysis, instead of interaction or discourse.

Previous research has particularly and extensively focused on politeness as social etiquette and personal manners overlooking impoliteness for a long time. This negligence was a result of either viewing impoliteness as less central to studies of interaction than politeness or portraying impoliteness as merely the dark side of politeness. The latter implies that investigations of politeness alone could yield a sufficient understanding of the functions of impoliteness.

Studying impoliteness separately began with Lachenicht (1980)'s studies of "aggravation". In this work Lachenicht begins by refuting claims by previous researchers that aggravation has been ignored because it is not central to linguistic research and "it does not constitute a proper object of investigation" (p. 610); "rudeness is simply the *absence* of politeness" (Lachenicht, 1980, p. 610). Believing that aggravation deserves more attention, Lachenicht viewed aggravation "as a rational activity", just like politeness. In theorizing impoliteness, Lachenicht simply reversed Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory to a theory of aggravation. Likewise, Austin (1987) reversed Brown and Levinson's theory to investigate 'the dark side of politeness'. The main difference he added is the use of principles of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) for

interpreting examples. Austin reversed face-threatening acts to face-attacking acts. Although it was Lachenicht who began to study impoliteness, but there is a consensus among researchers that impoliteness research started with Culpeper (1996), Culpeper also reversed Brown and Levinson's (1987), theorizing about impoliteness. However, he added the strategy of 'mock impoliteness' to Brown and Levinson's reversed strategies. After Culpeper, impoliteness became a subfield in pragmatics. However, researchers still integrate impoliteness and politeness by writing *im/politeness* or *(im)politeness* in combining them into a unified theory (cf. Terkourafi, 2008).

This study intervenes in this debate by framing impoliteness as different from politeness in a number of key ways: (1) Structurally: the examples in this dissertation show that impolite actions trigger further remedial moves consisting of phenomena like accountability, repair, understanding check, and intentionality. We can simply compare a gratitude sequence with an accusation sequence. (2) In terms of consequences: no doubt impoliteness in interaction has more complicated effects than politeness. When social norms are breached, for example, bystanders may become ratified participants as in cases of mediation. However, there is no conflict resolution or mediation in instances of politeness. (3) In terms of data collection: politeness is ubiquitous, but impoliteness is not. As such obtaining data for impoliteness is not an easy task. The question remains: how can a politeness theory account for how social norms function? And how are these norms interactionally formed through the participants' ongoing actions? It will be illustrated further in Chapter Two that sociologists hypothesized that social norms manifest themselves when there is a special motivation for violating them (Schütz, 1945; Garfinkel, 1963, 1967). This matter requires further investigation not for the sake of differentiation itself, but for pointing out that they cannot be considered two sides of the same coin.

The characteristics pointed out above are applicable to both Lachenicht and Culpeper's works. As such, researchers have considered these properties to be part of the theoretical limitations of traditional theories Cf. Mills, 2003; Watts, 2003; Geyer, 2008). To overcome these limitations, those scholars developed a number of theoretical principles and approaches known as the discursive approach or postmodern theories of im/politeness.

1.2.2 DISCURSIVE THEORIES OF IM/POLITENESS

The discursive approach is an umbrella term for a number of theories and analytical tools applied to the study of im/politeness in interaction and has been described by Mullany (2011) as a "fusion of different theoretical and analytical approaches" (p. 134). Its advent can be traced back to Eelen's (2001) seminal work *A Critique of Politeness Theories* (Kádár, 2009, p. 1). van der Bom and Mills (2015) describe the discursive turn in im/politeness research by suggesting that "The discursive approach, broadly speaking, focuses on the way that discourses inform what speakers think is possible to say, how they view their relations with others and with their communities, and how power impacts on these relations" (p. 180). They also explain that in the discursive approach im/politeness is seen and investigated as "local, context-focused, and qualitative" and always characterized by the variation of interpretation (van der Bom & Mills, 2015).

Lakoff (1989) drew attention to the limitations of im/politeness research and called for a shift in focus from single utterances to ordinary conversations or discourse types. Rather than viewing im/politeness as a meaning residing in an utterance or a word, the discursive approach views it as being formed over chunks of conversational turns (Haugh, 2007, p. 312). Chapter Four explains that in their initial reactions to impoliteness, participants show resistance to getting involved in conflict when they withhold their judgement by using repair-initiation in order to fully

understand the situation before responding to the impolite social act. Here, the conversational sequence becomes a vehicle for avoiding a direct conflict with the offender. Investigating impoliteness over chunks of turns means accentuating the paramount role of context plays and reveals the complexity of impoliteness as a phenomenon (cf. Mills', 2003 criticism of Brown & Levinson, p. 63).

Lakoff and Ide (2005) consider im/politeness phenomena as inherently interdisciplinary and for this reason advocate for broadening the horizons of im/politeness phenomena (p. 2). They also claim that the complexity of im/politeness phenomena may not be adequately conceptualized a single theoretical framework. This complexity is evident in the fast-growing interdisciplinary research in the field. Researchers have developed and deployed a wide range of sociological and linguistic theories when investigating im/politeness. Briefly, im/politeness cannot be reduced to instances of face-threatening acts because they are too complex to be captured by speech act theory.

Common among the discursive theories is the view of im/politeness as a commonsense notion which stems from everyday norms referred to by ordinary participants as sources for evaluating im/politeness (Eelen, 2001). On this basis, these theories distinguish first-order im/politeness from second order im/politeness. Watts et al. (1992) state,

> a distinction should be made between first-order and second-order politeness. We take first order politeness to correspond to the various ways in which polite behavior is perceived and talked about by members of sociocultural groups. It encompasses, in either words, commonsense notions of politeness. Second-order politeness, on the other hand, is

a theoretical construct, a term within a theory of social behavior and language usage. (p. 3).

Within first-order im/politeness, Eelen (2001) distinguishes im/politeness as an action which "refers to lay assessments *of* (one's own or other speakers') politeness in action" from im/politeness as a concept that "refers to lay assessments *about* politeness" (p. 32). The former involves the way participants use impoliteness as a social practice, namely, what they do with evaluations over the course of an interaction, while the latter involves how the participants use metapragmatics when they talk about im/politeness explicitly (p. 32). He also maintains that first-order im/politeness is normative and evaluative while second-order im/politeness is not (p. 47). By now it should be clear that unlike second order im/politeness, first-order politeness is interactional, and data driven.

The most prominent principles of the discursive theories of im/politeness can be summarized as follows (Sara Mills, 2011; Haugh, 2011; Culpeper and Haugh, 2014):

1. Taking discourse or conversation as a unit of analysis.
2. Im/politeness has various understandings and interpretations.
3. Participants' understandings, and interpretation occupy a central position.
4. Questioning and reviewing fundamental notions of traditional im/politeness research.
5. Focusing on first-order im/politeness.
6. Drawing from different theoretical backgrounds such as critical discourse analysis, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology in various theoretical notions such as frame-based analysis, habitus, community of practice and so forth.
7. Viewing im/politeness as emergent as opposed to predefined.

8. Im/politeness is inherently evaluative.
9. Im/politeness is inherently normative (cannot be separated from social norms).
10. Unlike traditional approaches, intentionality does not play a central role in discursive approaches.
11. Focusing on micro-analysis as opposed to macro-analysis.
12. Investigating im/politeness qualitatively rather than quantitatively.

1.2.3 CRITIQUES OF THE DISCURSIVE APPROACH

Even though discursive approaches have developed the study of im/politeness, a number of challenges face them. In what follows, I will highlight the most prominent critics of the discursive approach. Haugh (2007) believes that the distinction between first-order and second-order im/politeness requires further investigation. He further argues that it is not an easy task to define im/politeness precisely (p. 300). In addition, some scholars still use the speaker's intention as a central notion for recognizing im/politeness on the hearer's side (301). As an alternative, Haugh (2007) proposes that im/politeness be studied as instances of collective interactional achievements rather than through speaker's intention and hearer's interpretation (p. 306). He also suggests that the problem of analyst-participant understanding can only be resolved through an interactional model in which the participants' understanding serves as the cornerstone. To do so, he proposes that im/politeness should be seen unfolding over a course of interactional sequences taken as a vehicle for achieving interactional goals. Finally, he believed that we can never be certain about what counts as im/polite since im/politeness is inherently argumentative (2007, pp. 312-313).

In handling these challenges, Haugh (2007) suggests investigating im/politeness as part of a broader theory of interaction based on Goffman's (1967) notion of face work. Since face is not a structural concept, however, one finds Haugh's idea somehow unconvincing because face imposes analytical challenges. The fact that Haugh used face as a central category for studying im/politeness was incompatible with his later suggestion of using conversation analysis as an interactional approach for building an im/politeness theory. Indeed, in his later theory of im/politeness, he abandoned face in favor of morality as a central notion for studying im/politeness (cf. Kádár and Haugh, 2013).

Due to the theoretical confusion in the discursive approach (Xie et al., 2005, p. 449), some researchers have criticized it as lacking strong theoretical foundations. van der Bom & Mills (2015) have discovered a number of challenges in the discursive approach. One such challenge lies in the difficulty of both comprehending and applying the approach. In their point of view many researchers "have felt driven back to Brown and Levinson's work, because the discursive approach seems too difficult to use as an analytical approach. For many, the discursive approach seems nebulous and unsystematic" (p. 180). In fact, the social practice approach applied in this dissertation is the most recent and comprehensive, which makes it the most difficult theory among the discursive theories. van der Bom & Mills (2015) also describe discursive theories as nebulous. These theories do not concentrate on specific speech acts, for example. Others have questioned the possibility of integrating the theoretical and methodological achievements of the discursive theories into a unified theory (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 56).

Finally, to resolve some of these theoretical and other methodological problems, Kádár and Haugh (2013) have developed the social practice perspective of im/politeness. In the following

sections I will shed light of my reasons for choosing their theory and also explain the theoretical and methodological advantages of it.

1.2.4 IMPOLITENESS AS SOCIAL PRACTICE

Here, I will only very briefly explain what impoliteness is in "[im]politeness as social practice" as part of the literature review which I have adopted in this study. I will, However, elaborate on its methodological and theoretical principles in Chapter Two.

Kádár and Haugh (2013), and Haugh (2013) developed the approach of "politeness as social practice" from different sources. In their theory, they draw on the developments of the discursive approach discussed above. For example, within the discursive approach researchers have emphasized the central role of the community of practice for understanding im/politeness. According to the notion of community of practice, members of the same socio-cultural group have shared understandings of interaction and social norms. Kádár and Haugh, however, view community of practice as an overly broad notion inadequate for interpreting im/politeness. Instead, they shift focus to what they call "relational network" which holds that any group, including family, institutions, and society can share understandings of im/politeness (p. 47).

Another contribution of the social practice approach is that it draws on the literature of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to analyze examples of im/politeness. Ethnomethodology refers to "the study of practical actions" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 31) by paying attention to the members' methods of performing those actions. Conversation analysis, which originated in ethnomethodology, is "the systematic analysis of the talk produced in everyday situations of human interaction: *talk-in-interaction*" (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 13 emphasis

original). By relying on these two methodologies, the social practice approach places great emphasis on the participants' understanding of evaluating im/politeness in interaction.

The central notion that has been developed in this approach is that people perform actions and show attitudes though im/politeness (Locher & Watts, 2005). Keating (1998) argues that through "practices of honor" in Micronesian society

> people fundamentally construct, represent, and organize positive embodied attitudes (including affective displays) about individual social difference, particularly (1) those in which they positively value and rationalize acts of self- and other-subordination . . ., and (2) those in which they positively value structural hierarchy, including gender hierarchies. (p. 400).

According to Keating, using forms like "your [high status]" utilized by "the chieftess for the people's showing of honor, raising the status of the honor they have given" the recipient, while the form "my [low-status]" represents "the chieftess's own show of praise" (p. 408). As such, using politeness expressions involves realizations of social relationships (Lochor & Watts, 2008).

To recapitulate, im/politeness as social practice is the most recent theory in im/politeness studies. This theory locates im/politeness in the participant's interactional practices, which are achieved and co-constructed dynamically in interaction. Those evaluations rooted in the moral order and the participants' background expectancies vary according to many social and interactional factors. To better understand this approach, the following chapter will elaborate on what social practice is.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of my research methodologies and contextualizes the data collected for this study. The examples analyzed in this dissertation are extracted from Iraqi candid camera programs. The first section of this chapter will provide background information on candid camera programs and their usability in impoliteness research. This section compares candid camera programs with breaching experiments used in ethnomethodology, then discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using candid camera programs for the study of impoliteness. This section concludes with perspectives on data quality from other disciplines such as conversation analysis. Since data quality and the process of sampling are among the serious considerations of both conversation analysis and impoliteness research, there have been different and even conflicting perspectives and discussions among researchers around this issue, particularly in the impoliteness literature. The second part of this chapter will discuss the conversation analytic methodology in the analysis of data. It explains that conversation analytic methodology can be deployed for investigating impoliteness in candid camera programs. The third section of this chapter will illustrate the interactional approach adopted in this study and its theoretical principles, analytical implications, and compatibility with candid camera programs. The final section explains how *Usuul* has been conceptualized in Iraqi culture. In evaluating anti-social actions and meanings, participants systematically refer to *Usuul*, a concept widely used in Iraqi Arabic, when the moral order and social norms are violated. The current study takes *Usuul* as the moral ground of the participants' evaluative practices.

2.2 Data

2.2.1 CANDID CAMERA DESIGN

The examples presented in this study are extracted from Iraqi candid camera television programs. These programs constitute part of the special programs produced during the month of Ramadan in Iraq and the Arab world. During Ramadan, it is a cultural custom in Iraq and the Arab World for people to watch special television programs after fasting from dawn to sunset. The fatigue produced by fasting means the majority of people tend to watch television programs for entertainment, providing a good opportunity for television producers to increase their viewer numbers and increase their revenue by playing their commercials during those special programs.

I collected the candid camera programs over the last three years. Each program consists of thirty episodes and the duration of the episodes varies. I collected seventeen candid camera programs. Fortunately, Iraqi television networks make these programs accessible online. The programs contain different types of familiar scenes and actions yet they all share a similar spontaneity and aggressiveness. The data segments, however, have been extracted from the following programs:

- maqa:lib qana:t nnadʒaf lʔaʃraf (Al-Najaf Al-Ashraf practical jokes)
- jasirma:n (Yasirman)
- wa:ħat l-mubdiʕi:n (Oasis of Creators)
- dˁiju:f ramadˁa:n (Guests of Ramadan)
- ħalliq maʕa nnʤu:m (Fly with Stars)
- maqlab lwali:ma (Feast Candid Camera)
- maqlab lxtˁu:bah (Engagement Candid Camera)

- tawqi:ʕ (To Make Fall)
- tˤtag tˤagga:t (Tag Taggat)
- maqa:lib Ali dd-alawi: (Ali Addalawi's Candid Camera)

The transcription system used for transcribing the examples was originally invented and developed by Gail Jefferson in 2004. I did not, however, use all of the symbols available in her system. What distinguishes the transcription most is the aggressiveness of the interaction represented through qualities such as volume, quick speech and the like.

A candid camera program "consists of filmed records of people spontaneously responding to unusual and sometimes bizarre situations set up by the producer" (Milgram & Sabini, 1979, p. 72). The candid camera shows collected for this study mostly rely on linguistic practices to make the target appear foolish. The target's reactions usually range from initial resistance to responses and even emotive reactions. Once the target loses self-control which usually ends in a physical altercation, he will be shown the candid camera hidden somewhere and will be told that he has been filmed (p.72). The pranksters usually ask the target for permission to publish the episode.

Despite the spontaneity of pranks, they need to be played in such a way as to appear genuine. The pranksters have to collaborate with one another to achieve their objectives. They must create an undesired situation that provides them with a pretext or excuse for motivating the target to produce anti-social behaviors. These situations are typically extracted from 'familiar scenes' of everyday life (Garfinkel, 1967). It is the "ability of Candid Camera-like techniques to expose the usually covert processes of an actor's phenomenology that has made them an attractive tool for theorists of a phenomenological bent" (Milgram & Sabini, 1979, p. 74).

The idea of candid camera is compatible with the notion of reality. The idea of reality is germane to using language in the sense that the pranksters' speech is 'unscripted', 'unstandardised', and 'personal' (Culpeper & Holmes, 2013). Originally, candid camera programs were produced in the United States for the purpose of "stimulation anxiety- the ability to distinguish between the real and the manufactured in an age of technological reproduction- and Cold-War surveillance anxiety- the constant fear that one's actions were being secretly monitored" (Clissold, 2004, p. 33).

Because the candid camera functions as a joke, the audiences have technically been enabled to pursue what is happening and predict what might happen. (Milgram & Sabini, 1979, p. 74). The audience in candid camera shows is "offered an opportunity to see things to which it usually has little access" (p. 74). Sometimes the pranksters explain the design of the shows to provide the audience with context and prepare them to understand before the events take place. This is important for the audience's laughter because if they do not understand the scenes they may not laugh (p. 74)

2.2.2 CANDID CAMERA AND BREACHING EXPERIMENTS

Breaching experiments were a program created by Garfinkel (1963, 1967) to investigate how people react to breaching social norms. Candid camera and breaching experiments share a high degree of similarity, given that they both focus on everyday life. Milgram & Sabini (1979) believe that the whole field of ethnomethodology, including the breaching experiment, has been under the influence of the candid camera genre (p. 74). Despite the commonalities between candid camera and breaching experiments, however, they exhibit a number of significant differences. The most important of these is that candid camera shows frame misbehavior as genuine, whereas

breaching experiments do not. The target in candid camera shows is given a chance to understand the situation completely, meaning the pranksters always seek an excuse and tend to attribute the moral responsibility to the other person rather than themselves. In other words, the pranksters react to the target's action, while in breaching experiments it is the experimenter who acts or who is held responsible for the breach. Another difference is that breaching experiments are scientific experiments in the sense that they are controlled to some degree and designed specifically to find answers to the researcher's questions (Milgram & Sabini, 1979), while candid camera shows are not.

Now, are the conversations taking place in those candid camera programs real or authentic? To what extent are these exchanges suitable for impoliteness research in particular? These questions will be addressed in the following section.

2.2.3 THE CONVERSATION ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE ON DATA

The conversation analytic tradition offers divergent perspectives on what counts as naturally-occurring data. For theoretical purposes, I intend to divide the perspectives of scholars working in this tradition into two groups: those who require conventional forms of naturally-occurring data and those who hold a more lenient definition. As a member of the first group, Drew (1989) believes that naturally-occurring data should not be produced "for any pre-formulated investigative or research purposes . . . [nor for] an experimental setting, given any experimental task, nor . . . any specific activity" (p. 56). Heritage (1984) argues that in conversation analysis, Sack's (cf. 1984, p. 413) original perspective pertaining to naturally occurring data should be maintained, precluding 'interviewing techniques', 'field notes', 'the use of native intuitions', and 'experimental methodologies' (236). Other analysts, meanwhile, share a more moderate

perspective. ten Have (1999), for instance, states, “let me suggest that in many cases, there does not seem to be a sharp line separating ‘naturally occurring’ from ‘experimental’ data” (p. 69). Others appear more concerned with the researcher’s intervention in that data, defining naturally-occurring data based on whether the researcher produces the data for his research purposes (Have, 1999, p. 68; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 14).

The existence of different perspectives on naturally-occurring data implies a lack of consensus between researchers within the conversation analytical methodology. The emergence of recent technological advancements has rendered researchers more flexible with respect to their definitions of naturally-occurring data. Ian Hutchby (1996, 1997, 2006, 2011, 2003), for example, used the conversation analytic methodology for studying data collected from radio and television programs as well as texts. In this regard, the difficulty of obtaining naturally-occurring data may raise serious questions regarding the methodology of conversation analysis. I believe that candid camera shows could address the problem of naturally-occurring data for studies whose methodology has been influenced by conversation analysis. Now, we saw the perspective of conversation analysis with regard to data quality. Since I adopt Kádár and Haugh’s (2013) definition of naturally-occurring data for this project, however, it’s necessary to outline their perspective on this question here.

2.2.4 THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL PRACTICE THEORY OF POLITENESS ON DATA

While in their *Social Practice theory*, Kádár and Haugh (2013) see also Haugh, (2013) do not discuss their perspective on naturally-occurring data, one can infer from the examples presented in their book that they adhere to a flexible point of view regarding what constitutes naturally-occurring data. This flexibility becomes evident in their use of exchanges extracted from

a number of sources that do not count as naturally-occurring data, including movies such as *The Social Network*, comic strips, personal reporting, comedy television programs, social media, Skype, television series, documentary programs, and dramas, etc. The use of such texts for data collection suggests Kádár and Haugh's openness toward sources that might not be considered naturally-occurring data by traditionalist scholars of conversation analysis. Their use of data sources that do not count as naturally-occurring also means that these scholars' research questions and goals influence the process of data collection. Despite their reliance on non-natural data, one could say with confidence that they have developed a powerful theory of im/politeness (Ogiermann, 2015). That Kádár and Haugh do not show any concern for the quality of their data is intentional. They wanted to propose their model for research as well as for educational purposes (p. 22). This raises the question of why Kádár and Haugh hold a more flexible perspective with regard to naturally-occurring data on im/politeness? This question may be relevant to the collection of data on impoliteness in particular.

2.2.5 THE PROBLEM OF DATA COLLECTION IN IMPOLITENESS RESEARCH

Data collection is a more serious problem in the context of impoliteness research. Researchers have argued that obtaining naturally-occurring data for impoliteness research is imperative. Culpeper (2010) highlights the difficulty of obtaining data for impoliteness research by arguing that "data is a major problem for impoliteness research," (p. 3241) for, as he argues, "naturally-occurring impoliteness is relatively rare in everyday contexts and thus difficult to collect for analysis" (Culpeper, 2011, p. 9). This is particularly problematic, "since people are particularly reluctant to be recorded producing impoliteness, and there are ethical considerations as well. For the same reasons, it is also very difficult to collect naturally-occurring data" (p. 3241).

Because of the challenges of collecting naturally-occurring data, analysts working on impoliteness have resorted to various methods to obtain data. Culpeper (2011), for example, used data obtained from television, online resources, personal reporting, corpus data such an Oxford English Corpus, questionnaires, documentary programs, and the like (p. 8). Likewise, Bousfield (2008) used television serial documentaries arguing that "the major advantage of using data of this nature is that the extracts are readily available. Issues of access are, therefore, significantly diminished." (p. 7). For other researchers, televised data is considered natural. Furman (2013), for example, investigated data collected from a Russian reality television show called Dom Dva, which he considered "naturally-occurring talk-in-interaction" (p. 237). Given the difficulty of obtaining natural data for impoliteness, researchers have obtained data from television programs regardless of the question, in the field, of whether such data should be considered real.

For some researchers, data and methodology remain contingent upon the analyst's research questions and objectives. For example, compared to other types of data collection methodologies, corpus-based investigations may not be more effective, but they prove more practical for addressing certain types of research questions (Jucker & Staley, 2017, p. 403). Another example is that in order to focus on specific speech acts, methodologies of data collection such as discourse completion tasks, role playing, and elicitation may be more efficient, more accessible, and more convenient, in particular in cross-cultural pragmatics, than naturally-occurring data. In these methodologies, the analyst first outlines his goals and research questions, then collects data segments, not vice versa. (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989). In their work on request and apology, Blum-Kulka et al describe the necessity of a large amount of data in seven languages collected via

questionnaire, stating that it "would have been virtually impossible under field conditions" of naturally-occurring data (p. 13).

Unlike the conversation analytic methodology, Garfinkel (1967) relied on experimental tricks or what he calls 'demonstrations' (p. 38) in his breaching experiments, "which produced hilarious dialogues" (ten Have, 1999, pp. 68-69). The reason for this is that Garfinkel was not concerned about discovering the turn-taking machinery as Sacks and his colleagues were doing. Garfinkel was dealing with how members of society invoke common-sense knowledge methodically when encountering situations that breach social norms.

Recently, especially since the political changes that took place in 2003 after the fall of the previous Iraqi government, Iraqi television has come to rely heavily on hidden camera programs to distract viewers from geopolitical realities through entertainment. The networks also claim that Iraqis have grown weary of the large number of political programs on the one hand, and possess a psychological need for entertainment and diversity, on the other.

There exist a number of methodological advantages for relying on reality television programs (cf. Sidnell, 2010, p. 23) for impoliteness research. These programs constitute a rich source of impolite exchanges (cf. Culpeper et al, 2003, p. 1547), particularly instances of over-impoliteness, which has so far received scant attention in the field. Data-collection challenges contribute to this scarcity, as the difficulties of obtaining data for impoliteness in general suggest it would be even more challenging to collect data on over-impoliteness. By over-impoliteness, I mean aggravated actions perceived as highly offensive, such as an insult at the end of an argument. Such actions are also interactionally rich, in that those aggravated impolite actions are always multimodal behaviors. Bousfield (2008) illustrates this point:

> Observer's Paradox aside, the benefits here, (as in the use of the televised extracts), are that not only can the verbal data be viewed, transcribed and analysed, but the visual aspects, the non-verbal paralanguage, such as gestures, facial expressions, and even physical contact between interactants can also potentially be viewed and interpreted through analysis. (p. 15).

The style in which participants have been recorded in candid camera programs offers a solution for the well-known methodological problem, the so-called 'observer's paradox' (Labov, 1972), namely, the analyst has "to find out how people talk when they are not being systematically observed" (p. 209). Bousfield (2008), who investigated impoliteness on documentary television programs confessed that he could not avoid the observer's paradox (pp. 13-14). Culpeper et al. (2003) encountered the same problem in their study of impoliteness (p. 1547).

To avoid the observer's paradox, I have focused on interactions taking place behind the scenes, where the participants exchange blame for behaving improperly in front of the camera after they make sure that the cameras have been paused. However, the scenes outside the studio have been recorded by hidden camera. Despite this anonymity, avoiding the observer's paradox as a researcher remains challenging. In some of the scenes taking place in studios, the cameras are not hidden from the targets. The targets are aware, however, that those programs are not on air, and there is always an opportunity to prevent releasing or publishing them if the targets do not endorse the footage if they can be edited. In some cases, the targets do demand the removal of some scenes and most of the time they make sure that the cameras have been paused by asking the pranksters more than once during the program. But the pranksters lie to them by stating that the cameras have been paused. In these circumstances the observer's paradox may or may not take place.

Schütz (1945) mentions that in order to investigate the social norms of everyday life, which he calls 'the natural attitudes of daily life,' there must be a 'special motivation' that makes them available for the analyst (p. 550), because people normally do not talk about the background expectancies of normative frames. Following Schütz, Garfinkel (1967) expresses a similar perspective when he states, "for those background expectancies to come into view one must either be a stranger to the "life as usual" character of everyday scenes or become estranged from them" (p. 37). For this very purpose, Garfinkel came up with a methodological technique known as 'breaching experiments'. As explained earlier, breaching experiments are instances of deliberately breaking social norms for the purpose of social investigations as illustrated in the example below.

(S) How are you?

(E) How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my school work, my peace of mind, my . . .?

(S) (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look! I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don't give a damn how you are. (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 44).

This exchange does not seem genuine; everybody simply recognizes that 'how are you?' is an act of greeting. Taking it as a question would be a deliberate misunderstanding which does not sound accountable. In greetings, the content may not be meant, but the function or the illocutionary force (greeting) is intended. This understanding becomes evident in S's last response when he implies that he did not ask a question but tried to be polite (greeting). Normally, the occurrence of these kinds of breaches is rare. When these disingenuous breaches against social norms occur, the

victims usually criticize the experimenters by explaining and accounting for the proper way of behaving in accordance with social norms. For ethnomethodologists, the participants' reasoning is part of the social norms.

Candid camera programs also make this 'special motivation' available but through different strategies than those displayed in Garfinkel's breaching experiments. In my data, the pranksters always attempt to make their breaches interactionally reasonable so that the targets will not detect their falsehood. As presented in Chapter Three, the targets sometimes initiate impoliteness themselves, which suggests they don't realize that this provides a pretext to the pranksters for following up with aggressive next moves.

It is worth mentioning that this 'special motivation' acts as a major obstacle to the establishment of an impoliteness theory, for it poses a methodological problem. We saw that Culpeper (2010) mentioned the methodological challenge in collecting data for impoliteness because "people are particularly reluctant to be recorded producing impoliteness" unless there is a 'special motive' (p. 3241). I suggest that to solve this problem, candid camera techniques are worth reconsidering as a methodology for collecting qualitative data but in a more technical fashion. In fact, after Allen Funt's creation of candid camera, researchers working in the fields of sociology, psychology, and education held a seminar in 1963 to discuss the potential advantages of its techniques for academic purposes. The attendees emphasized the importance of such techniques for investigating human behavior (Evans &, Hildreath, 1964, p. 210). Even though candid camera programs are fruitful for conducting impoliteness research because they provide the special motivation, they are not necessarily void of limitations imposed on the researcher.

2.3 Limitations

There are a number of methodological limitations associated with conducting impoliteness. One such obstacle is translating the language used in the videos into English. Since impoliteness usually involves mundane and vernacular, conventionalized forms of language, translating impolite speech acts poses a challenge. Some of those problems pertain to pragmatic issues such as the difference between the linguistic form and the communicative act, which is part of the difference between language meaning and usage. For example, *ʔastaɣfirulla:h* in Arabic is a religious prayer which literally means 'may God forgive me'. In conversation, however, it functions as a pragmatic marker that indicates a state of anger in conversation. Fraser (1996) mentions that in English, "in God's name" is a pragmatic marker that "signals exasperation on the part of the speaker" (p. 169). In my data, *ʔastaɣfirulla:h* implies that what has been said so far is unacceptable and will likely lead to a negative reaction if the speaker does not stop. Translating such attitudinal expressions is not a simple task.

Another challenge involved in translating impoliteness is ungrammatical or unfinished sentences. The tension in grammar reflects the tension in personal emotions in interaction. This is the reason that we may sometimes see unfinished sentences in the examples of impoliteness.

Because this dissertation constitutes the first study to investigate *Usuul* as the moral ground for evaluating impoliteness, conceptualizing *Usuul* has been challenging. The best way to understand how Iraqis employ *Usuul* in their evaluation is to examine their conversational organization according to an ethnomethodological tradition in which methodology and theory cannot be separated (Lynch, 2001). Another limitation involves the difficulty in both analysis and organization. Discursive approaches have been criticized for their lack of analytical frameworks

and difficulty in application when it comes to data segments (van der Bom and Mills, 2015, p. 181). In order to study the ways impoliteness has been conceptualized, a researcher first has to observe data recurrently, unlike speech act theory in which a researcher may define impoliteness prior to the data collection (p. 192) This criticism certainly extends to Kádár and Haugh's (2013) theory. In Chapter Three I have organized all the evaluative practices into two categories: self-defense and other-criticism and a linguistic technique: invocation.

2.4 Other methodological considerations

For the analysis of impoliteness in interaction, this dissertation relies heavily on the analytical toolkit developed in conversation analysis. Have (1990) points out that in conversation analysis "the reader is confronted with a detailed discussion of transcriptions of recordings of (mostly verbal) interaction in terms of the 'devices' used by its participants" (p. 24). Heritage & Atkinson (1984) illustrate how one works according to the methodology of conversation analysis as follows:

> The central goal of conversation analytic research is the description and explication of the competences that ordinary speakers use and rely on in participating in intelligible, socially organized interaction. At its most basic, this objective is one of describing the procedures by which conversationalists produce their own behavior and understand and deal with the behavior of others. A basic assumption throughout is Garfinkel's (1967: 1) proposal that these activities - producing conduct and understanding and dealing with it -are accomplished as the accountable products of common sets of procedures. (p. 1).

Occasionally, I have shed more light on the interpretations of the examples by providing cultural context which would probably not be of interest to conversation analysts. Kádár and Haugh use 'there-and-then' for the analyst's contribution to interpreting instances of data besides participants, meaning the analysts interfere in the interpretation of data. This is possible when needed and can be done specifically with recurrent patterns of interaction historically known to members of the same socio-cultural group (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 7). For example, crossing legs in an official meeting in Iraq would be evaluated as lacking in courtesy or *Usuul*. Haugh (2001) explains that the researcher should not amplify the participants' descriptions. Instead, he has "to examine the categories which participants use in making those evaluations, and to investigate how those categories come to be used over time across communities of practice . . . and societies more widely" (p. 254). As such, "the place of the analyst in the discursive approach is retained despite its explicit focus on examining first-order politeness" (p. 254).

The methodology of im/politeness as social practice developed by Kádár and Haugh utilized a number of interactional principles developed originally in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. In what follows, I will present the most important principles and methodological aspects of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis used in this dissertation and explain how they have been utilized in the social practice approach of im/politeness.

From an ethnomethodological perspective, all interaction contains aspects of indexicality and reflexivity. According to Boyle (2000), "indexicality allows utterances to represent vastly more than is said and thereby makes mundane conversation possible" (pp--32-33). Silverstein (2003) argues that there is no single understanding of orders of indexicality (social norms). Those different understandings can only be identified in their interactional context (Kádár & Haugh,

2013, p. 94). Following Garfinkel (1967), Haugh (2012) argues that viewing orders of indexicality as external to interaction was criticized by Garfinkel. Those orders can be observed locally in conversation (p. 268). In conversation analysis indexicality manifests in, for example, repair-initiation (Schegloff et al., 1977). When someone initiates a repair, which involves displaying "a sensitivity of the actors toward one another's 'face' and 'feelings' (Rawls, 2008, p.712), he indexes the existence of an interactional problem. In im/politeness research, indexicality can be observed at the level of morality. It is widely recognized that impoliteness as social practice is argumentative (Eelen, 2001). This means that different understandings of the moral order exist (Kada and Haugh, 2013). Methodologically, one way to identify these understandings is by considering the participants' orientations towards the evaluation of social actions, in light of the moral order.

Another useful concept relevant to this study is reflexivity, which also yields more than one interpretation. According to one such interpretation, reflexivity in conversation means that some parts of speech interpret other parts. This sequential character of reflexivity will be examined in more detail later on in this chapter. Reflexivity also entails that participants not only interact by producing actions, they also interpret those actions through similar actions. In other words, social actions not only encompass the production of interaction, they also constitute resources of interpretation. Impoliteness complicates this point; evaluations are not only triggered by violations of the background expectancies of *Usuul*, but they themselves become sources of further evaluation and interpretation of ongoing actions. As Kádár and Haugh argue, "not only do social actions and meanings lead to or occasion, evaluations of politeness, impoliteness and so on, but such evaluations may themselves occasion evaluative social actions and meanings" (p. 66). Both

reflexivity and indexicality are intricately connected to the principle of sequence analysis in conversation.

Some relevant principles of interaction fundamental to conversation analysis are in need of explanation. Those principles have been carefully considered in the current study. One aspect of dynamics is what Heritage (1984) calls "context-shaped and context-renewing" (p. 242). These two principles can be explained by way of the idea of projection in conversation. The current action has been projected by the previous action and will project the possible next action, as well (cf. Heritage 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). In situations of impoliteness, a complaint can be occasioned by an impolite act and, in turn, occasion further arguments. Impoliteness in interaction, therefore, is a dynamic phenomenon (Bousfield, 2008). One of the implications of the context related to im/politeness is situating im/politeness (Davis et al., 2011), meaning locating offence in a particular utterance is argumentative; interpreting an act as offensive is subject to various contextual factors influenced by the participants' own interests. Kecskes (2017) argues that non-native speakers always encounter context-dependent confusion as to what is said and what is meant. He believes that evaluating impoliteness as offensive or not is a matter of context, and context in his view may include every relevant aspect of interaction. According to Heritage and Clayman (2010), context has the property of reflexivity:

> an action will be understood by reference to the context in which it occurs, but it will also, in turn, initiate changes in a person's understanding of the context itself. For example, a second person's greeting will be understood in context as a "return", but its occurrence will also transform the context from one in which engagement is unilaterally proposed to one in which it is mutually ratified. (p. 11).

Another principle of conversation analysis is the centrality of detailed analysis. Unlike Kádár and Haugh (2013), the current study adopted the conversation analytic methodology in transcribing examples, a practice that's essential to understanding multimodal dimensions of politeness. The examples in this dissertation show that transcription can capture some of the recipients' emotional reactions, including loudness, speech rate, and silence, etc. The detailed analysis is relevant to 'order at all points' explained above. Heritage (1984) states that, "no order of detail can be dismissed, *a priori*, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant" (p. 241). Because the evaluation of impoliteness is a sensitive matter, it can be occasioned by any small detail of interaction.

Because conversation analysis is attentive to data, the findings are possible results of data analysis. Conversation analysis rejects any imposition by the analyst onto the data, a principle that proves argumentative in im/politeness. This rejection is relevant to the problem of the analyst/participant, and the here-and-now/there-and-then. The difference between these dual problems is part of a bigger problem of micro-and macro-analysis in the social sciences. Apart from this problem, the organization of the chapters, sections, and categories in this dissertation are the results of constant observations of the data segments. Data-driven methodologies used for studying im/politeness are more complicated than, for example, studies drawing more heavily on speech act theory. This organizational difficulty is one of the differences between classical and discursive approaches to im/politeness. As explained earlier, discursive approaches which are data-driven have been identified as difficult for analysis and organization. I encountered the same difficulty when organizing the chapters and sections.

In terms of the interactional organization, numerous conversational phenomena have been utilized. In what follows, I briefly identify these phenomena.

2.4.1 ADJACENCY PAIRS

Sometimes talk is organized in terms of paired actions such as question-answer, invitation-acceptance/rejection, greeting-greeting and so on. Conversation analysis refers to these paired actions as adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 2007, p. 22). Adjacency pairs contain action projection and anticipation. In other words, an act has the potential to project a particular subsequent action. A question, for example, projects the act of answering (cf. Schegloff, 1984). Because of this projectability, adjacency pairs play a vital role in candid camera programs. The pranksters already know that certain impolite acts project similar ones. In addition, adjacency pairs are a powerful tool for the analysis of social actions. Below is an example of adjacency pairs.

S1 Well, thank you very much

S2 I don't thank you at all. (Bousfield, 2008, p. 123).

In this example, S2 does not abide by the adjacency rule by responding to a gratitude with such an impolite expression.

2.4.2 PREFERENCE/ DISPREFERENCE

Among adjacency pairs, some responsive acts are preferred for being pro-social and some are non-preferred second-pair parts in contrast. For example, an acceptance of an invitation act is preferred, while rejecting an invitation is dispreferred (cf. Schegloff, 2007). Since dispreferred (or non-preferred actions) are socially marked, they are usually delayed, mitigated, accounted for, hesitated and so on (Levinson ,1983, pp. 334-335). In this dissertation, the pranksters perform acts

that project a non-preferred response, and when presented with such reactions they take it personally (as pretexts) to prompt further inappropriate acts. In one candid camera interaction, for instance, the pranksters offer someone an opportunity to work with them illegally. When the individual rejects their offer, they doubt his rejection and interpret it as arrogance. In the following example, Al-Khalidy belittles one of the movie stars, and the latter responds to him with and a counter offence.

1. Al-Khalidy ʃnu: stiħqa:qak? ʔinta ʃnu: sawwe:t nqddirak? txalli:na hassah niħtʃi: kilʃi:?
   What is your achievement? What have you conducted
   to be respected? Are you pushing me to reveal everything?
2. Ferhan: jikfi: ʔinnu: ʔa:ni: ga:ʕid jammak
   You should be very proud that I am seated next to you

In this example, Al-Khalidy belittles Ferhan in a very offensive fashion that limits the recipient's next action. In return, Ferhan is expected to respond with a dispreferred counter attack in order to defend himself. If he does not respond with a dispreferred act, the content of Al-Khalidy's insult would be correct, revealing Al-Khalidy's statement as true.

2.4.3 AFFILIATION/ DISAFFILIATION

In conversation, responding actions (Pomerantz & Heritage, 2013) vary across conversation. Dis/affiliation can be understood as "an association between the formatting of an action and the stance taken" (Lindström & Sorjonen, 2013, p. 350). Dis/affiliation is also associated with social relationships and solidarity. By being an active listener and providing active feedback, for instance, a recipient shows affiliative attitudes toward the storyteller. Another

example of affiliation is when a request is met with a positive attitude (cf. Stivers, 2008). Preferred responses are affiliative, while dispreferred responses are disaffiliative (Heritage, 1984, p. 269). In most of the examples in this dissertation disaffiliation is a common practice for the targets to show negative evaluations of the pranksters' inappropriate acts. In the example above, the target disaffiliates with the speaker by responding with a dispreferred act in order to display that he does not accept the insult.

2.4.4 REPAIR

Repair "refers to an organization set of practices through which participants in conversation can address and potentially resolve problems of speaking, hearing, and understanding" (Sidnell, 2010, p. 110). Repair may also be, associated with im/politeness because of 'face' and 'feelings' (Rawls, 2008, p.712). In fact, repair can include any trouble in interaction beyond troubles of speaking (Vandergriff, 2016, p. 184). Haugh (2010) argues that certain acts such as jocular mockery can trigger affiliative or disaffiliative stances (p. 2110). The data used in this dissertation show a recurrent practice of repair initiation which is used to clarify the source of someone's confusion. By confusion I mean the recipients' initial exposure to an initial impolite act (cf. understanding checks in Heritage 1984b, p. 318) Before responding to that initial act, the participants initiate repair for remedial acts (see Chapter Five).

Deploying analytical tools invented in conversation analysis in the field of impoliteness studies is not an easy task. Debates surrounding the use of such tools for conversation analysis exist in the field as do challenges encountering researchers who apply these tools to their studies. First, a need exists for an introductory methodology that will merge moral issues with analytical

ones. In what follows, I will summarize the methodological background of impoliteness as social practice.

2.5 Im/politeness in interaction

This section discusses methodological issues about im/"politeness as Social Practice", (Kádár & Haugh, 2013). First, I shed light on the approach's key idea of evaluation and its central role in the study of impoliteness. Then I will explain how evaluations can vary across different participants through participation order and various understandings of im/politeness. Finally, I will elaborate on participants who perform interpretive evaluations by talking explicitly about impolite social actions (metapragmatics) and how they show their reflexive awareness of background expectancies.

In social practice theory, evaluation plays a vital role in understanding im/politeness because "[im]politeness does not reside in particular behaviours or linguistic forms, but rather in evaluations of behaviours and linguistic forms" (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 57). Evaluations are not only invoked by inappropriate social actions, they also count as social actions, themselves. Haugh (2013) states that, "the focus in conceptualising im/politeness as social practice is thus on what participants are doing through evaluations of im/politeness, and how such evaluations are interdependently interlinked with the interactional achievement of social actions and meanings" (pp. 55-56). Those evaluations are part of the participants' actions in interaction. By evaluating an act that seems inappropriate, for instance, a recipient may reconstruct a social relationship with his friend.

Because social practice primarily derives from the work of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, it views im/politeness as an interactional phenomenon. This means that the focus when locating im/politeness should be relevant to forms of expression. Other "discursive approaches have generally emphasized social aspects at the expense of close consideration of pragmatic aspects of politeness" (Culpeper & Haugh, 2014, pp. 228-229). In order to locate the participants' interpretation of particular expressions, we need to pay attention to the "speaker's packaging of actions" as summarized here by Pomerantz and Fehr (1997):

> What understandings do the interactants display. . . of the action? Do you see interactants treating the matter talked about as important, parenthetical, urgent, trivial, ordinary, wrong, problematic, etc.? What aspects of the way in which the action was formed up and delivered may help provide for those understandings? What inferences, if any, might the recipients have made based on the packaging? What options does the package provide for the recipient? (p. 73).

This implies that im/politeness as social practice is formed moment-by-moment in interaction, and the analyst has to rely, to a great extent, on the participants' understandings of social actions.

Conceptualizing impoliteness in everyday life (as a first-order phenomenon) means that the evaluative practices are commonsense knowledge. Commonsense knowledge is recognizable to members of the same relational network as there is a "shared agreement" between them (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 30). For Garfinkel, "shared agreement' refers to various social methods for accomplishing the member's recognition that something was said-according-to-a-rule" (p. 30; cf. also Schegloff, 1992). Accordingly, evaluations of social actions are "*occasioned* by social actions and meanings that are *recognisable* to participants" (p. 67). Here, the recognition involves 'the

normative practices' (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 67) that are known by members of the same sociocultural group because those practices are commonsense and 'taken-for-granted' (Garfinkel, 1967). Kádár and Haugh (2013) further assert that these evaluations are "*reflexively occasioned*": "not only can evaluations of politeness and the like be occasioned by social actions and meanings, but also that evaluations of politeness and so on may in themselves occasion evaluative social actions and meanings" (p. 66).

The participants' evaluations of social actions are rooted in multiple resources, including personal beliefs, interactional developments (in the moment or in the past), relational history, culture (Culpeper & Haugh, 2014, p. 230) and society. These evaluations target multiple entities and values, (Jayyusi, 1991) such as persons, relationships, practices, and meanings. Those evaluations are identified according to a range of metapragmatic descriptions developed within the so-called *relational approach* of im/politeness under the name *markedness* which includes, but is not limited to, appropriate/inappropriate, polite/impolite, overpolite, non-polite, and the like (Lochor & Watts, 2008, p. 79).

One question concerning evaluations is how they are achieved in a course of interaction. Chapter Four explains how the participants perform two main practices, *self-defense* and *other-criticism*, to portray their own conduct as normal and others' conduct as abnormal and, thus, inappropriate. They achieve this through a range of linguistic and interactional practices such as categorization, accountability, and disaffiliation. Chapter Five shows the reflexivity of evaluations; here reflexivity means certain moves in conversation are occasioned as evaluations of specific inappropriate acts. But those moves themselves trigger further evaluations and moves. In other words, evaluations are not only consequences of inappropriate acts and meanings, but they

also may cause other inappropriate acts that invite negative responses, as well. Evaluation thus becomes a social practice used to carry out multiple activities. Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that a boss may not criticize an employee directly. Instead, the boss "asks piece by piece whether it has been done, receiving a string of negative answers" (p. 233) over a course of turns. Here the boss is performing a face-threatening act indirectly through a chain of conversational moves. In other words, through negative evaluations he performs a range of actions, including interrogation and discouragement, among others.

Evaluating each other's actions is influenced by the participation order in interaction. Evaluations affect relational status among participants and thus change their participation statuses. When a bystander interferes in a conflict, for example, he changes his participation status from a bystander to a participant ratified for moral judgements. In addition, different participation statuses lead to different understandings of im/politeness. Those different statuses of participation illustrate that im/politeness is more complex than what has been conceptualized in other theories of the field.

2.5.1 THEORETICAL ISSUES

2.5.1.1 Participation order

Multiple participants usually collaborate in the production of candid camera programs. This is part of the affordances of candid camera programs. The producers of the pranks play multiple roles. If the prank is an interview, this individual would be an anchor. Sometimes there are two or more anchors in the same program. In addition to these participants, there are cameramen recording the pranks who are either visible or invisible and a director who usually does not participate. When tension develops between individuals, however, the director either becomes

an active participant explicitly or his participation is solicited urgently by the guest or interviewee. If the scene takes place outside of a studio, bystanders, eavesdroppers, overhearers and others will also be present. Programs accessible on YouTube receive responses from commentators who are either Iraqis or from other Arab cultures. These viewers also act as evaluators of the pranks. In sum, the data used in this dissertation includes multiple participants. Now, to better understand these different roles, let us take a look at the development of the participation order in the literature. But to comprehend the participation order, we must first take a look at Goffman's work on footing (1979, 1981).

According to Goffman (1981), changes in footing occur when a "participant's alignment, or set, or stance, or posture, or projected self is somehow at issue" (p. 128). Goffman's idea of footing is ambiguous (Levinson, 1988, p. 168). Footing can be understood to include various interactional concepts such as the participants' statuses, identities, and interactional roles (Levinson, 1988, p. 168). Goffman states that "a participation status, as in the case of a hearer, can be referred to as his footing". What is concerning here, however, is how a participant understands and evaluates the ongoing interaction.

Goffman refined the notions of speaker and recipient by assigning them various roles, including principal, author, and animator. A principal is "the party to whose position, stance, and belief the words attest" (Goffman, 1981, p. 226), while an author is "the agent who puts together, composes, or scripts the lines that are uttered" (p. 226), and an animator has been described metaphorically as "the sounding box" (p. 226). Recipients can be divided into two types: a ratified recipient who is an "official participant" and an unratified recipient who is not. Ratified hearers are either addressed recipients or unaddressed recipients (p. 132). An addressed recipient is "the

one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over the speaking role" (p. 133), while the unaddressed recipient is included among the rest of the 'official hearers' (p. 133). Unratified recipients are overhearers who can hear the talk "unintentionally and inadvertently" (p. 132), and bystanders who "have purposely engineered" their access to the talk (p. 132).

Researchers have expanded Goffman's face-to-face model to include mediated communication (mediated participation) (Kádár & Haugh, 2013; Dynel, 2014). The communications exceed the co-present level of interaction and "constitute a distinct layer for analysis in im/politeness research" (Haugh, 2013, p. 67). Noticing one of the differences concerning time and space pertaining to mediated communication, researchers have included notions such as meta-participation (cf. Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 91).



Figure 1: Meta-participation order (from Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 91).

In general, meta-participants are those "whose evaluations of politeness arise through vicariously taking part in the interaction by viewing it on television or on the internet" (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 268). Here, they used politeness in their book (even in the title) to include impoliteness, as well.

With vicarious participation, Dynel (2014) investigated YouTube videos at three levels of participation: "the level of the speaker and hearers/listeners in video interaction, the level of the sender (together with the embedded collective sender) and the recipient of a video, as well as the level of the YouTube speaker who produces a comment and YouTube hearers who read it" (p. 50). On the recipient's side, she conceptualized YouTubers as un/ratified participants, addressed and unaddressed, recipients (watchers), while at the production level YouTubers are speakers as they take the conversational floor, authors who create and upload the videos, and commentators when they comment on each other's comments (p. 51). My data shows that when evaluating the uploader or producer, YouTube commentators sometimes blame him for viewing the pranks as unethical. These commentators also evaluate the scenes by showing their support for the targets. Their comments are useful for revealing commonsense understandings of topics provoked in the pranks.

What concerns this dissertation is the variety of the statuses with respect to understanding *Usuul* and evaluating instances of impoliteness. The two models, face-to-face and meta-communication, have been employed in the pranks available online. Within the face-to-face model, there are active or actual participants such as un/ratified speakers, recipients, the cameramen and the director. Within the meta-communication model, however, participation order includes online recipients such as YouTube commentators who can also be ratified or unratified participants. These statuses yield different understandings of the moral order. Participation order pertaining to candid camera programs remains one of the research areas that needs to be investigated more carefully in future research.

The participants' different positions are closely tied to evaluation, which lies at the heart of the participation order. For Goffman, any shift in our footing indicates a shift in our relationship,

alignment, stance, or our understanding towards the ongoing interaction (1981, p. 128). We can have different or even contradictory understandings of impolite actions. This point is congruent with the notion of the argumentativity of impoliteness (Eelen, 2001). As such, evaluation and understandings of impoliteness are no longer confined to the dyadic model of speaker-hearer.

2.5.1.2 First-order and second-order im/politeness

As previously mentioned, the discursive approaches divide im/politeness into first-order im/politeness and second-order im/politeness. Kádár and Haugh (2013) and Haugh (2013) view this division as a simplification of the phenomenon. Based on the constructivist epistemological view of social research, they believe that "understandings of politeness are situated relative to the 'field' in which they are perceived" (p. 84). They built their theory of first and second-orders on the user and observer's understandings. The term "user" refers to the active participants engaged in interaction, while observers observe interaction but do not necessarily participate. From the user's conceptualization, understanding im/politeness is outlined as follows:

(i) First-order participant: Participant understandings

Metaparticipant understandings

(ii) First-order expectancies: Emic understandings

Etic understandings

From the observer's conceptualization, understanding im/politeness is divided as follows:

(iii) Second-order observer: Lay observer understandings

Analyst understandings

(iv) Second-order conceptualisation: Folk-theoretic understandings

Theoretical understandings (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 86)

To clarify our understanding of these different concepts, there are actual participation and expectations within the first-order. In evaluating impoliteness, participants can meet face-to-face or online, as in the case of YouTube commentators. Their evaluations and understandings of particular actions and meanings can be understood as emic (insider) or etic (outsider). The second-order understanding doesn't include actual participants in interaction, but it does include observers and analysts who observe and study impoliteness. In the case of observers, we, as analysts of a particular interaction, can conduct interviews and show a video to a lay observer (native speaker) to examine his understanding. Here, the lay observer does not participate in the interaction but observes it. Another example is that a meta-participant can engage in an interaction through, for example, Skype. Here, his interaction is categorized as first-order. However, the same meta-participant can only interpret or conceptualize an impolite exchange and his observation is categorized as second-order. My data does not contain first-order meta-participation but does include second-order meta-participants, i.e. YouTube commentators.

Emic understandings are defined as an insider's conceptualizations of the moral order, while etic understandings belong to outsiders. Geertz (1974) views emic as "experience-near" and etic as "experience-distant" (p. 57). A patient's description of himself is experience-near, while a specialists' description of the patient is "experience-distant" (p. 57). In Harris (1979)'s view, researchers have chosen to say emic and etic instead of objective and subjective views in order to avoid confusion (p. 32). Kádár and Haugh (2013) propose three methods for the recognition of an emic perspective: (a) Personal belief, which is "about what behaviour is expected in particular contexts" (p. 93). (b) What they call "relational networks" which range from "a group of families

and friends, to a localised community of practice, through to a larger, much more diffuse societal or cultural group". (c) metalanguage or explicit talk (p. 94).

In this study, *Usuul* has been investigated as a folk-theoretic understanding in light of the participants' conceptualization because their understanding constitutes mostly an emic or insider conceptualization of the phenomenon. This study is primarily concerned with an emic conceptualization of the moral order since it is not a cross-cultural study.

2.5.2 THE MORAL ORDER

Unlike Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, which is established on the notion of face, the social practice approach takes the moral order as a key idea for studying evaluation. For Garfinkel, the background expectancies of the moral order are "seen but unnoticed" (1967, p. 35), "familiar scenes of everyday affairs" (p. 35), and "socially standardized and standardizing" (1967., p. 36). Garfinkel also explains that the background expectancies are used "as a scheme of interpretation" (p. 36). This means that morality is part of the ongoing interaction because "for members not only are matters so about familiar scenes, but they are so because it is morally right or wrong that they are so" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 35).

In Kádár and Haugh's (2013) terminology, morality has been defined as "a set of expectancies through which social actions and meanings are recognisable as such and are consequently inevitably open to moral evaluation" (p. 6). For them, evaluating social actions and meanings according to the moral order is linked to relational networks. Emic perspectives of the moral order vary according to the participants' membership in a relational network (community of practice cf. Wagner, 1998; Mills, 2003). In their work on politeness in the workplace, Holmes et. al. (2012) divide the moral order into four distinct layers of norms: societal norms, organizational

norms, community of practice/team norms, and interactional norms (p. 1065). Kádár and Haugh modified the Holmes et al. model into three distinct layers of the moral order. First-order morality refers to those expectancies within the participants' "own history of interactions with others" (p. 94). Second-order morality consists of "semi-institutionalised conventions...that are shared across identifiable communities of practice, organisational cultures or indeed any social group recognised as such by members" (p. 95). Third-order morality encompasses those broader norms at the level of society or culture (p. 95). These layers of the moral order are understood by members of the same relational network.

2.5.3 ACCOUNTABILITY

Since impolite social actions are associated with normative expectancies, one is always held responsible by others for being cognizant of social norms. Holding someone morally accountable for his actions is called accountability, another theoretical notion introduced to the literature by the social practice approach of im/politeness (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 119). Researchers in sociology subscribe to different understandings of sociology. Here, however, invoking accountability is understood as a conversational practice for enacting *Usuul* over improper social actions. When an inappropriate social act occurs, the recipient often questions the accountability of that particular act by asking for explanations or motives. Initial observations of the data suggest that the pranksters are usually not content with the targets' accounts, and they problematize them. If, for example, a target provides an explanation for rejecting an offer initiated by a prankster, the latter remarks on the inadequacy of the explanation, and its failure to fully explain why he is disaffiliated with the offer. Briefly, accountability is a fundamental aspect of impoliteness in light of social norms and plays a vital role in impoliteness research.

2.5.4 MULTIMODALITY

Discursive approaches of im/politeness still rely heavily on verbal exchanges central to im/politeness research (cf. Brown & Prieto, 2017). The social practice approach, however, views im/politeness as multimodal (Kádár & Haugh, 2013). In this dissertation, it has been shown that aggravated impoliteness is usually accompanied by nonverbal movements. Bonacchi and Mela (2015) have found the necessity of multimodal analysis in investigating power struggles in televised verbal aggression caused by impoliteness. They also found that aspects of power struggle have been performed through "the strategic use of voice, lexical choice, gestures, facial expression, and proxemics" (p. 292). Multimodality plays an essential role in either explaining a communicative impolite act or in triggering it.

2.6 Analysis of impoliteness

2.6.1 SEQUENTIALITY

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the sequential organization proposed by conversation analysis. I talked about paired actions in the form of adjacency pairs (question-answer-follow-ups) and the fact that one action projects another. Now, I turn to the sequential character of impoliteness which also includes adjacency pairs, according to the social practice approach.

Impoliteness is a conversational phenomenon in the sense that it manifests not in a single utterance but in stretches of sequences. In other words, it is dynamic (Bousfield, 2008). The meaning of a particular turn in conversation is sometimes understood in light of what has been said previously (a retrospective understanding) or it will unfold in the coming turns (a prospective understanding). (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 41). Schegloff (2007) explains the role of adjacency pairs in relation to retrospective and prospective understandings:

> The *adjacency* pair relationship is a further organization of turns, over and above the effects which sequential organization invests in adjacency per se. Adjacency pair organization has (in addition to the backwards import just described) a powerful *prospective* operation. A first pair part projects a prospective relevance, and not only a retrospective understanding. It makes relevant a limited set of possible second pair parts, and thereby sets some of the terms by which a next turn will be understood – as, for example, being responsive to the constraints of the first pair part or not. (p. 16).

The sequential organization counts as an interpretive recourse for finding out what impoliteness is when later turns reflect and interpret what the initial ones meant. Rawls (2008) views the achievement of meaning and sense making through sequential and reflexive analysis as "Garfinkel's unique contribution to social theory" (p. 703). Once an impolite action is performed, it projects a responsive defensive or offensive (Culpeper et al., 2003; Bousfield, 2008) next action, such as accusation, denial, counter-action or the like. These actions are reflexive in nature in the sense that they evaluate previous actions and project further actions. As such, impoliteness projects a set of adversative responses which form a conflict conversation as will be investigated in Chapter Five.

Unlike politeness, which is characterized by "good manners", or "civility" (Blum-Kulka, 1992, pp. 57-58), impoliteness is always associated with negative characteristics or social actions (Eelen, 2001, p. 35) such as attributing responsibility, incivility, lacking knowledgeability and social intelligence, etc. This means that impolite actions often trigger disaffiliative responses, which will manifest in the conflictive character of impolite turns. An example of this would be a

blame exchange. Participants may hold different understandings and moral measures over each other's responsibility. This makes impoliteness sequential in nature.

One achievement of the discursive approach is that im/politeness is always situated (Davies et al., 2011) and thus must be studied in the here-and-now. For Eelen (2001), the here-and-now means that im/politeness equals "an evaluative moment" (p. 35). However, for Kádár and Haugh (2013), the here-and-now means what Garfinkel (1967) meant by retrospective and prospective features of interaction; actions throughout a course of interaction relate to and complete one another retrospectively and prospectively (p. 74). Earlier, I talked about indexicality and context (Heritage, 1984, p. 242) in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. The interpretation of the orders of indexicality are context-dependent, studied in the here-and-now (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 137; Haugh, 2012, p. 268). This means that normative expectations of evaluations are situated in interaction.

The here-and-now, however, represents only one theoretical way of investigating im/politeness. Kádár and Haugh (2013) articulated the necessity of the there-and-then sense, as well. This there-and-then manifests in one of two ways: recurrent, and historicity (p. 7). Recurrent norms of interaction are "pre-existing patterns of thought or behaviour used in recurrent ways that are readily recognisable to members" (p. 137). Instances of recurrent impoliteness can be observed in what Culpeper (2010) calls 'conventionalised impolite formulae' such as 'motherfucker' in British English (p. 3238) and 'ɣasˁban ma: ʕale:k', 'whether you like it or not' in Iraqi Arabic. For much of this study, I have used both methods. The use of the here-and-now, however, prevails over the-there-and-then.

2.6.2 METAPRAGMATICS

Sequentiality and metapragmatics are two methodological tools for observing the participants' evaluations in light of social norms. As explained earlier, meaning in interaction unfolds through conversational sequences. Another way of exploring the meaning of impoliteness is through the participants' explicit remarks about the ongoing interaction.

According to Verschueren (1999), "the systematic study of the meta-level, where indicators of reflexive awareness are to be found in the actual choice-making that constitutes language use, is the proper domain of what is called metapragmatics" (p.188). Participants' reflexive awareness refers not only to their conscious use of language but also to their awareness of using language (appropriately). Metapragmatics also provides access to the participants' conceptualization of social norms and impoliteness. Participants are held accountable for what they say, how they say it, and what in/appropriate linguistic choices they make (p. 187).

Kádár and Haugh (2013) and Culpeper and Haugh (2014) proposed a typology of reflexive awareness. For example, metacognitive awareness encompasses three types. First, "epistemic gradient" or the degree of participants' awareness, from "definitely knowing" to "not knowing" (Culpeper and Haugh, 2014, p. 246). The second involves given/new information with respect to the participants' common-sense knowledge (they have/not experienced a behavior). The third includes three types of expectations: deontic (concerning "what participants think *should* or *ought* to be the case"), probabilistic (meaning "what participants think is *likely* to be the case"), and finally violations ("what participants *want* to be the case" (p. 246)).

Metapragmatic awareness has become one of the growing areas in the study of im/politeness, because of its implications for accessing participants' meanings. This development

is congruent with the growing emphasis on first-order impoliteness (Fukushima, 2013, p. 21). When a recipient occasions an evaluation explicitly, it dispels any doubt about what is meant by participants in understanding impoliteness as a first-order conceptualization. Indeed, metapragmatics constitutes one of the methodologies that has enabled me to understand the functions of *Usuul*. Above all, not only are these types of metapragmatics constitutive of norms they also function as interpretive resources (Cicourel, 1973) in the sense that they also reflexively interpret those norms.

2.7 Conceptualizing *Usuul*

No consensus exists among sociologists regarding the nature of social norms (Gibbs, 1965). Likewise, *Usuul* is hard to designate for many reasons. I will focus on what the word *Usuul* means, originally and linguistically. Then I will present how Iraqis use *Usuul* in interaction.

2.7.1 *USUUL* IN CLASSICAL ARABIC

Usuul in Arabic is a plural form of the word *asl* which literally means 'origin'. *Usuul* has the same meaning in ancient and contemporary Arabic dictionaries. Abu Al-Baqaa Al-Kafawi (1998) in his ancient dictionary called 'ʔal'kullijaat', 'universals' defines universal concepts only. He provides the following meanings of asl:

- "ma: janbani: ʕalaihi ɣairuhu", "the base on which other things can be built"
- "ʔalruʤħa:n" "Preferredness": "ʔal ʔasˤlu fi lʔinsa:ni ʔalʕilmu", "the original state of humans is knowledge", meaning "ʔal ʕilmu ʔawla: wa ʔaħra: min al-ʤahili"", "knowledge is much more preferred than ignorance"

- "ʔal asˤlu fi lkala:mi huwa lħaqi:qah. ʔai ʔalkaθi:r ʔalraʤiħ", "the original state of speech is literalness, meaning the regular and preponderant"
- "ʔalʔusˤulu min ħaiθu ʔinnaha: mabna: wa ʔasa:s lifarʕiha: summijat qawa:ʕid", "Because *Usuul* is the foundation and base for its subsidiary, it is called rules" (p. 122).

We see that Al-Kafawi is concerned with *asl* more than *Usuul*. But we can see some linkages between some meanings he explained and the modern use of *Usuul* in Iraqi Arabic which will be explained in the section below.

2.7.2 *USUUL* IN MODERN ARABIC

In modern Arabic, Yunis Ali (2000), who works on Arabic pragmatics, found *asl* difficult to translate because *asl*, in his point of view, is a misleading notion. He translated *asl* as 'base' or 'principle', that is "the origin of something or the part on which something is based" (pp. 58-59). He found that *asl* presumably has four meanings: senses 'general rule', 'preponderant', 'outweighing', and 'presumption', all of which involve the notions of 'base' and 'principle' (p. 59). He also differentiated between 'bases' and 'principles', stating that "the former is designed to depict *discourses* in its ideal form . . ., whereas the latter are intended to describe the *behavior* of the interlocutors in the course of the communicative process" (p. 59).

Since Yunis Ali is mainly concerned with pragmalinguistics, which is focused on specific aspects of linguistic dimensions of language as opposed to social dimensions of language (Leech, 1983, p. 11; Archer et al. 2012, p. 6) he investigated *asl* (and *Usuul*) when he talked about the interpretation of linguistic expressions. He defined *Usuul* as the ideal (cf. Grice's, 1975, maxims of communication) bases or principles upon which recipients build their expectations in understanding the speakers' utterances. He mentioned that these bases are dominant and common

for which 'extra-linguistic elements' such as 'rational context' are evoked when the speaker's utterance is in breach with them because "violation of the principles . . . would lead to problems in communication" (p. 59). He compared those ideal bases to Grice's notion of conversational maxims (p. 60). Likewise, he believes that "muslim legal theorists presume that interlocutors follow certain norms in communication processes. Their model of communication involves a set of usul" (p. 235).

The focus of my research on *Usuul* differs from Ali's conceptualization of the phenomenon. In what follows, I will comment on three critical aspects of Ali's investigation of *Usuul*. First, I explained earlier in the chapter that discursive approaches differentiated between first-order and second-order understandings of a phenomenon. To recapitulate, first-order refers to the participant's understanding of a phenomenon, while second-order refers to the analyst's, which is merely theoretical. Yunis Ali's work on *asl* can be characterized as a second-order investigation which involves the analyst's conceptualization of the phenomenon. He does not draw his understanding of Usuul (and asl) from actual instances of interaction because he was concerned with historical comparisons between what he called medieval Islamic texts and Western pragmatics. Second, he traced *Usuul* historically when he is fully focused on making comparisons between Medieval Islamic pragmatics and western pragmalinguistics. Historically, *Usuul* has been defined and utilized in different fields within Arabic sciences, including as grammar, rhetoric, Islamic law and others. Finally, Yunis Ali's study does not involve studying *Usuul* in relation to social norms in moral situations. He was more concerned with informative pragmatics such as pragmatic inferences (implicature, presupposition) instead of interactional pragmatics influenced by conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics (Culpeper and Haugh, 2014). Instead

of tracing the history of *Usuul* as a second-order understanding, I will present, in what follows, the participants' conceptualization of *Usuul* in Iraqi Arabic.

2.7.3 *USUUL* IN IRAQI ARABIC

The way I identify *Usuul* is contingent upon the participants' methods in conceptualizing *Usuul* when making moral judgements. I will describe how *Usuul* has been construed by participants, namely, how they use *Usuul* and why they use it. One way to determine a participant's relationship to Usuul is through the participant's explicit reference (metapragmatics) to Usuul. I will also explain the linkage between Usuul and the participants' conceptualization of it in Iraqi Arabic historically. In what follows, I will explain the two most essential features of Usuul as it is used in everyday Iraqi conversations: the plurality of Usuul and its referent.

According to the initial analysis of the data upon which this study is built (and also according to my emic knowledge being a member of Iraqi society), there is not a singular use of *Usuul* when it is used for making moral judgements. When invoking the moral order for evaluative purposes, Iraqis never use the single form *asl*. On the contrary, *Usuul* is always used in the plural form. I will explain the rationale behind using it in the plural later. Another function of *Usuul* made clear through my data is that it is invoked as practical reasoning in situations where social norms are breached. When pranked, recipients refer to *Usuul* to navigate their judgement of others. In other words, *Usuul* has been referred to as self-defense and other-criticism. Here, *Usuul* is not a linguistic concept, but a sociocultural phenomenon referred to and invoked for the accountability of social actions.

The plurality of *Usuul* makes its referent inherently ambiguous. A participant's meaning when referring to *Usuul*, therefore, is not always obvious. To explain this point, I will address

Usuul linguistically. In the data used for this study, *Usuul* sometimes appears in the definite mode *al-Usuul*. *al* in Arabic is a definite marker. *al-Usuul* in English would be 'the Usuul'[3], but in Arabic *al* has various functions. One of them is *al-alʕahdijjah* 'familiarity.' The reference in the sentence *al-raʔi:s* 'the president', for example, is supposedly known or familiar for the recipient. What are those Usuul 'principles' or 'bases' when someone refers to them in situations of impoliteness? To answer this question, let us look at the following example. In this exchange, Kazem, Basim, Yasser, and Naif have a meeting in Yasser's house. Yasser is the head of the household. Kazem is sick and lying on the ground, in serious pain. The rest of his friends are helping administer first aid to him. Basim, meanwhile, fetches a cup of coffee for Kazem in order to provide him with relief. Yasser, however, criticizes Basim for bringing coffee only for Kazem and not for Naif. In return, Basim refers to Usuul.

1. Yasser: ha:ða ʃnu:? bas ʔilah?
   What is that? Only for him? ((to Kazem))
2. Basim: ʔi: bas ʔilah
   Yeah, only for him
3. Yasser: le:ʃ?
   Why?
4. Basim: bas ʔilah. ma: tʧu:f ga:m jikharbitˁ? wallah, ha:ða lmuka:n mu: muka:ni. ʔiða: ʔinta tuʕruf lusuul gu:m w ʤi:b lgahwa
   Don't you see he is suffering? Seriously, this house is not mine.

[3] In this dissertation Usuul is used in the analysis instead of al-Usuul for convenience.

If you know al-Usuul, stand and fetch a coffee yourself

5. Yasser: hassah sˤrna hitʃi:? [gmna nuʕruf al-Usuul ma: Usuul?

Come on. [Are we talking about whether or not

we know those Usuul stuff?

6. Basim: [tˤabʕan

[Of course

Yasser construes Basim's act of not bringing a cup of coffee for the other guest (Naif) as inappropriate. He criticizes Basim. This is a negative evaluation. In response, Basim mentions that he performed a favor when he prepared a coffee for Kazem as he is in a critical situation. Otherwise, it is not his duty to prepare coffee because it is not his house; he is just a guest. As head of the household, Yasser should have brought the coffee and therefore should not criticize Basim for doing a favor on his behalf. What Yasser is displaying ingratitude.

Now, to negatively evaluate Yasser, Basim refers to *al-Usuul*, 'principles'. It is not clear what *Usuul* refers to here exactly. Does *Usuul* refer to the orderliness of social norms (a set of background expectancies) or performing those norms, namely, an act of bringing a cup of coffee? Or does it refer to serving guests in one's house? It is quite clear, however, what Basim does with it.: he forms a second-pair part responsive act by referring to Usuul. He performs an act of self-defense/other criticism when he responds to Yasser's criticism. Not only does he respond to Yasser, he also criticizes him in return. Why does Basim refer to Usuul? And why does Yasser get annoyed by Basim's invocation of *Usuul*? The answer is clear, because Basim evaluates Yasser's behavior negatively.

What do participants do with the practice of referring to *Usuul*?

Bach (1994) states that, "to refer to something is simply to express an attitude about it" (p. 52). Here, Basim refers to *Usuul* because it is breached. Therefore, referring to *Usuul* in situations of impoliteness constitutes a practice for evaluating the interlocutor negatively. What is important here is the communicative act that the speaker performs instead of what he refers to. Bach argues that, "referring to something is always part and parcel of performing an illocutionary act" (p. 52).

The example above explains one feature of conceptualizing *Usuul* as a first-order understanding, namely that *Usuul* is used by the participants for evaluation as an aspect of the moral order. Another feature of using *Usuul* as a lay-person's everyday understanding is that it is used in interaction as "interpretive procedures" (Cicourel, 1973). That is to say, "the member of the society uses the background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36). The participants do not merely invoke *Usuul*. They do so to explain how the normative expectations operate. According to Garfinkel (1963), the meanings of the participants' actions come from the "idealization of the user's stream of experiences" (p. 214).

By now, we can recapitulate the conceptualization of *Usuul.* It involves a set of idealized presuppositions that are presumed to have normative features in everyday life. In this dissertation Usuul has been conceptualized as a facet of the moral order and as a central notion through which the participants evaluate acts as im/polite, in/appropriate, good/bad and so on. My analysis shows that referring to *Usuul* invokes bases or principles of social behavior in particular contexts. The fact that *Usuul* involves a set of those normative backgrounds explain both why *Usuul* is plural and why it does not have a specific referent.

It is not surprising that identifying background expectancies is challenging. Even participants may not be able to specify those idealized principles. Garfinkel states that

"demonstrably, he (a member of society) is responsive to this background, while at the same time he is at a loss to tell us specifically of what the expectancies consist. When we ask him about them he has little or nothing to say" (p. 37). Hymes (1970) echoes Garfinkel's perspective by pointing out that natives may not be conscious of their emic understandings, nor they can explain those background expectancies for the analyst (pp. 281-282). Part of the problem stems from a lack of unified understanding of those social sanctions among members of the same sociocultural groups.

A set of background expectancies or assumptions may also encompass what Ehlich (1992) called optionality, that is 'the actor's choice between alternative actions,' which is a feature of the first order of im/politeness. According to Ehlich, when a participant evaluates an action, he engages in a process of comparison between alternative possible actions (p. 77). That is to say participants always refer inappropriate actions to possible appropriate counter actions in the sense of it could have been done differently. Cicourel (1973) believed that participants negotiate 'possible actions in order to evaluate 'completed actions (p. 32). That inappropriate actions could have been done differently is an assumption and thus an idealization used for the purpose of evaluation. How could an action have been done differently? What are the possible alternative ways? Possible-alternative-appropriate-counter-actions may be understood in the practice of referring to *Usuul*. For example, when an Iraqi says, is *huwwa ha:ja l-usuul?* "this al- usuul?". It means that what the speaker is doing is not *Usuul*. As such, what the speaker is doing is inappropriate, and what the recipient is referring to is an alternative set of actions albeit not specified.

Here, I propose that im/politeness in Arabic is about *Usuul*. This proposal refers to two points. First, *Usuul* is a concept that has descended historically from usages of Standard Arabic in

medieval times. Second, *Usuul* allows a potential linkage between politeness and religious-descended culture[4]. I also suggest that im/politeness in Arabic may always involve two elements of historicity and religiousness. Taha (1998), for example, believed that according to (Arabic) Islamic culture, politeness should be based on the principle of truthfulness, i.e., what is said honestly matches what is actually done. In other words, someone can be polite only when he is honestly polite in both what he says and does (p.252).

Finally, how do participants invoke those normative expectations of Usuul? As part of the social norms shared among participants, *Usuul* constitutes the participant's tacit assumptions that each member is expected to know according to "his point of view [what] 'Any of Us' is obliged to know" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 275). The recipient holds the offender accountable in situations of impoliteness. Because of their taken-for-granted nature, the participants always suppose that there is no need for explaining these tacit assumptions (Hopper, 1981, p. 196) unless motivated by moments of disruption caused by impoliteness. Data show that the participants use the kind of expressions that reveal the taken-for-granted nature of *Usuul*. Garfinkel (1967) found that members always presume that their interlocutors are aware of rules and social norms. Therefore, they refer to those rules or norms tacitly, a practice which Garfinkel called "the documentary method of interpretation" (p. 77). A documentary method of interpretation "consists of treating an actual appearance as "the document of", as "pointing to", as "standing on behalf of" a presupposed underlying pattern" (p. 78). Chapter Four will explain more how participants do so.

[4] In this dissertation I do not include religious-related aspects of culture.

The following are some practices through which *Usuul* is made relevant by Iraqi participants. They give us a sense of how Iraqis conceptualize *Usuul* and evaluate inappropriate social actions and meanings.

- "Extreme case formulations" (Pomerantz, 1986; also see Wiggins & Potter, 2003, p. 521) such as "ʔaku: wa:ħid jixa:bir ssa:ʕah bilwaħda bille:l?", "Is there anybody who calls at one o'clock at night?"
  as "lkiba:r min tiħtʃi: sˁsˁiɣa:r tismaʕ", "when the elders talk, the youngers have to listen".
- Describing the participants' reflexive awareness (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, and cf. Clark, 1996, p. 95 for reflexivity pertaining to the notion of common ground) of social norms such as "haða kala:m ʕaxla:qi w ʕadabi: w tˁa:lama: ʔaku: mauʕid ʔiħna jaʕni: l-mauʕid la:zm juħtaram", "This is a common courtesy. One should stick to the given appointment"
- Expressions of being shocked or bewildered (Garfinkel, 1963) in response to others' violation of social norms such as "la:, la:, la:,↓ Abd Ab::::::d↓", "no, no, no,↓ Ab::::::d↓"
- Condemnatory categorization for violating norms as in "bas sˁadi:qi: ʔinta Abd la: tgabbaħ", "but you're my friend don't be rude"
- Expressions that show how to conduct social actions and activities as in "ja: ʔaxi mu:: mu::: ʃaɣl ha:ða", "Dude, this is not how it works"
- Expressions that show someone's agency in recognizing the social norms (self-defense) or not recognizing them (other-criticism) as in "ja: taʃtaɣlu:n sˁaħ ja: taʕrufu:n ʃʃaɣlah ja: ʔaxi:. ʔallah jixalli:k. ʔiħna mu: dʒha:l", "Hey, you have to know

how to work for God's sake. We are NOT kids"

- Expressions or questions involving accountability for violating social norms, as in "huwwa ha:ja l-usuul?", "is this al-usuul?".
- Expressions of commitment as in modals, you are supposed to, you must, you should: "qasˤdi: mu: ʔinta raʔsan xatˤtˤat::t w nuaddich. La:zm mqa:bi:lak ʃnu: ʃnu: ħaja:tah jaʕni: mnu:", "I mean, you are trying to finalize everything unilaterally. You should have information about your recipient's identity and life first"
- Metapragmatics as in "majsˤi:ːr. ʃlo:n majsˤi:r", "unacceptable, unacceptable"

These are some of the linguistic expressions that display the participants' invocative methods of social norms. We see that not only do these expressions invoke the normative expectations and discursively form them, they also constitute "interpretive procedures" (Cicourel, 1973) for making sense of interaction. These expressions clearly share some of the same features, such as shortness (cf., Garfinkel, 1967 for 'the documentary method of interpretation') and being "inference rich" (Sacks, 1992, p. 40). Through these types of expressions, the participants depict the offenders as, abnormal, irresponsible, failures, incompetent, ignorant, inconsiderate...etc., by forming a range of (verbal) pragmatic actions such as censuring, accusing, rejecting, standing off, threatening...etc., and nonverbal expressions such as facial, gestural, postural, prosodic...etc., as well as emotional states such as anger, shock, surprise, silence, laughter and so forth. Milgram *et al*. (1986) called the expressions that indicate the social norms of queue in their queue experiments 'defensive responses.' (689).

3. PRESENTING OFFENCE: IMPOLITENESS IN INTERACTION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter chiefly concerns the mechanics of performing pranks. It shows how the pranksters trick their targets moment by moment through the dynamics of interaction. It will explain how pranksters turn an interview or a normal conversation into a conflict and discuss which interactional practices they use to get their targets engaged in a conflict conversation.

Culpeper was among the first researchers to draw attention to the connection between reality television shows and impoliteness. He argues that impoliteness is associated with entertainment (2005). He believed that reality television shows such as The Weakest Link constitute rich resources for politeness research (p. 35). Culpeper and Holmes (2013) argue that "the rise of RTV [reality television] has seen a rise in impoliteness on TV" (p. 169).

The way the pranksters act, the kind of topics they raise, and the language they use leads to impoliteness. The goal of impoliteness is to entertain the audience. Culpeper (2011) found that impoliteness entertains in the following five ways

1. Emotional pleasure. Observing impoliteness creates a state of arousal in the observer, and that state of arousal can be pleasurable.
2. Aesthetic pleasure. Outside discussions of banter, little attention has been given in the literature to socially negative uses of verbal creativity.
3. Voyeuristic pleasure. Observing people reacting to impoliteness often involves the public exposure of private selves, particularly aspects that are emotionally sensitive, and this can lead to voyeuristic pleasure.

4. The pleasure of being superior. . .. here is self-reflexive pleasure in observing someone in a worse state than oneself.
5. The pleasure of feeling secure. (pp. 234-235).

Delivering offence can be performed in various ways. Overall, the pranksters violate the moral order of *Usuul* to cause offence to their targets. The violations of *Usuul* are achieved interactionally by means of conversational practices. Achieving pranks interactionally requires that pranksters act dexterously. This means that pranksters tend to show their impoliteness as genuine, as illustrated previously, by showing the impolite actions as accountable. In achieving their pranks, the pranksters sometimes cause offence discursively in interaction by looking for an excuse to justify their behavior. Sometimes they exploit the organization of the program. Some of the programs are organized in the form of a conflict that pushes the targets to get involved.

The pranksters choose the kind of topics that call for active participation and self-defense. The majority of the attacks are the type of speech acts that leave a negative effect on the targets: criticism, teasing, personal injuries, and sensitive topics that project disaffiliative stances. Culpeper and Holmes (2013) argue that using impolite language for creating impoliteness on reality television is the only distinction between exploitative and non-exploitative or standard programs (p. 169).

This chapter also shows that the pranksters are not always the only ones who initiate potential offences. Sometimes impoliteness begins with the targets. In other words, the pranksters design the programs in a way that they vindicate their impoliteness as self-defense. One way to motivate the targets to initiate impoliteness is by means of alignment in a multi-participant conversation. Sometimes the anchor plays a role in which he solicits an evaluation against the

prankster or he encourages the target to make fun of the other guest, but the prankster takes it seriously. Or sometimes the pranksters repeat normal actions which drive the targets to behave foolishly.

For theoretical purposes, I intend to use the terms *pranksters* and *targets*. The latter refers to the participant against whom the prank is designed. The pranksters usually possess the expertise and technological capacities to produce anti-social situations for the purpose of entertainment. By contrast, the target could be anyone, even movie stars and other artists. Sometimes the prank targets multiple people.

Unlike breaching experiments (Garfinkel, 1967), the pranks are usually long because they are produced for television programs. The pranksters usually present their provocation as accountable actions (Sacks, 1992). They invite the targets to get involved in the ongoing interaction in two overall ways. First, the pranksters create a conflict in front of the targets. For instance, they perform an impolite action to a female in front of a male (target) in a particular situation such as an interview setting to see how the target reacts. Second, they stage a direct conflict with the target by, for example, violating the normative expectancies of *Usuul* to make him indignant. This provocation invites the targets' attention to get involved for the purposes of self-defense (or other-defense) and other-criticism (which will be discussed in the next chapter). The analysis will also include how the pranksters dominate the conversation linguistically by using conversational practices to deliberately arouse moral debates. To better understand how the pranksters set up their pranks and drag the targets into a conflict by establishing a moral dilemma, let us take a look at the following example.

Context: In this example, a number of politicians have gathered for the purpose of a television interview. After the meeting, they gather for dinner at a park that belongs to the television building. After eating dinner, the waiter puts the bill in front of one of the participants, called Doctor, a prominent member of the Iraqi parliament. Khudair, an Iraqi actor who is among the attendees, criticizes the waiter for placing the bill in front of the Doctor. In this television building, it is expected that participants in a program be invited to the building and therefore not pay for their meals at the building restaurant. Nevertheless, a bill suddenly appears, requiring the invitees to pay for the meal because the restaurant operates separately from the television building and thus asks the invitees to pay. This bill is unexpected.

Example (1)

1. Khudair: dʒibta liddkto:r? >ʔaħd ga:llak ntˤi:h liddkto:↑r<?
   You gave it to the Doctor? Did someone tell you to give it to the Doctor↑?
2. Nadil:[5] la:, la:, la:. Ha:i mu: mu:[
   No, no, no. This is no:t[
3. Khudair: [laʕd ʃnu: flu:s huwa:ja maθalan↑?
   [Then what? His salary is too much may be?
4. Daif:[6] qa:hir nafsak le:↑ʃ? ʔiða: ʔinta qa:hir nafsak ʔidfaʕha: ʔinta =
   Why are you so concerned? You pay, if you are so concerned =
5. Khudair: = mu: qa:hir nafsi:. ʔiħna dˤiju:f jeʕni: maθalan
   = I am not concerned. I mean we are guests.

[5] Nadil is an Arabic word for waiter
[6] Daif is an Arabic word for guest. Here it is invitee.

6. Daif: ʔiħna ra:dˤijn ʔinta ʃdʒa:bak ʕalxatˤ? ʔiða:

ʔinta tʃu:fah hitʃ sˤaʕbah ʕale:k ʔinta ʔidfaʕha:

If we have no problem, then why do you interfere?

If you find it too unacceptable, then you have to pay it.

Now, let us see how Khudair exploits the situation for his prank. Khudair criticizes the waiter for placing the bill in front of the Doctor. In saying "You gave it to the Doctor? Did someone tell you to give to the Doctor?", we can notice two points. First, there's an inconsistency between the waiter's action and the Doctor's high social position in the relational network (Kádár & Haugh, 2013) in this gathering. Khudair, for example, never calls the Doctor by his name (for example, he could say Doctor X). Second, when he designs his utterance by asking the waiter, "did someone tell you to give to the Doctor?", he suggests that the waiter may have been aware that his act violates *Usuul* but behaved this way intentionally because he was told to give the bill to the Doctor. This latter understanding from Khudair is morally unjust, which is evident in his harsh language and anger.

Given the fact that Khudair criticizes the waiter harshly, his act may also be interpreted as rude. Those who negatively evaluate others are also morally accountable for doing so (Haugh, 2015, p. 36). Khudair's severe criticism (embarrassing the waiter) instigates the invitees to get involved in the conflict. Kudhair disrespects the waiter to show respect to the Doctor. Consequently, Khudair's action prompts one of the attendees to intervene, judging Khudair in the same way and suggesting that it would be better for Khudair to pay the bill if the latter wants to correct the situation.

This example explains how the pranksters violate explicit social norms for invoking moral judgments and invite targets to get involved in them. They are engaged in a moral disagreement for which they hold conflicting views. Khudair makes discursively visible a background expectancy of *Usuul*, namely that bills should not be given to officials or high-ranking figures. We also see that pranks resemble breaching experiments implemented through more sophisticated and technical methods. Finally, the example exhibits the affordances of candid camera programs which will be explained below.

3.2 Affordances of candid camera programs

Affordances enable pranksters to produce candid camera programs. There is a crew with the pranksters who facilitate producing such programs. I recapitulate those affordances in two points: co-construction and settings. These two interactional features show how the pranksters produce the organization of the conversations.

3.2.1 CO-CONSTRUCTION AND COLLABORATION

In order to prepare the ground for presenting genuine impoliteness and to show that the situation in the program is serious, especially behind the scenes, the interlocutors collaborate with one another. The collaboration appears in various forms, one of which is dis/affiliation or dis/alignment, when a target takes a moral stance towards the ongoing interaction. The pranksters sustain collaboration, including between the ratified and unratified participants such as the technical staff behind the camera. Sometimes collaboration is achieved by a number of participants. In the program called *maqlab ʔalxu:bah,* multiple participants represent the bride's

side and play the roles of the bride's relatives: father, brother, cousin, uncle from father's side, uncle from mother's side and so on.

Collaboration between pranksters scatters the target's attention, making him believe that the false scenario is a serious situation. An advantage of the affordances of candid camera programs is this collaboration which makes the conversation multimodal and rich. In the example above, we saw how Khudair and the waiter collaborate in producing the prank. Others seemingly did not read his actions as a prank.

Interactionally, collaboration is achieved by ratified participants when engaged in the same topic (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1976, p. 337). Maynard (1986) distinguished offering collaboration from soliciting it. Offering collaboration happens when an unratified individual offers collaboration to a participant by aligning with him, while soliciting collaboration takes place when a ratified participant projects it (267). Kádár and Cruz (2016) discovered a similar but different notion of collaboration. They found out that when an antisocial act occurs, an unratified participant may intervene voluntarily (becoming ratified) for moral purposes. They called this collaboration ritual outspokenness, which "refers to the recurrent and expected dramatic action of stepping up against the committer – or group of committers – of a seemingly immoral action" (p. 266). To better understand how the pranksters collaborate in setting up a conflict to trick the target, let us take a look at the example below. In this example, a director makes a joke from behind the scenes by calling Kazem a 'double actor' while talking to Basm. Shaimaa finds it funny and laughs out loud. Kazem pretends to be offended by Shaimaa's laughter.

Example (2)

1. Shaimaa: ehhh heh heh huh huh huh huh ((chuckling))
2. Kazem: ʃnu: lmubarrir tidʿħak

   What is so funny?
3. Basm ehh ga:l (h) mumaθθil damʤ. djiʃʃa:qa wijja:k ʃbi:k?

   Ehh he said (h) he ((Kazem)) is a double actor. He is joking with you.

   what is the big deal?

After Shimaa laughs, Kazem questions the accountability of Shimaa's laughter. Instead of Shaimaa, Basm takes the floor and responds that it is just the director's joke and it is not serious. This example displays how the pranksters, the director, Basm (the host) and Kazem (one of the interviewees) collaborate to broach a sensitive topic from which a possible conflict can arise. By sensitive I refer to topics that may project an alignment between two or more participants at the cost of another participant. Making fun of Kazem by calling him a 'double actor' may invite laughter, and a target may interpret the laughter as offensive.

In the scenes that take place in the studio, the hosts play an active role in setting conflicts under the veil of neutrality. The example below illustrates how the host plays an effective role in exacerbating an initial dispute. Kazem is a prankster who plays an interviewee's role. Basm plays the role of the host. Faiz is the target who has no idea what the other two are up to. During the interview, a conflict develops between Kazem and Faiz.

Example (3)

1. Kazem: kala:mah bi huwa:ja muɣa:latʿa:t.

There is so much fallacy in his speech

2. Basm: ʃbi:h jitʃaððib? =

   He tells lies?

3. Kazem: = ʔi jitʃaððib

   He tells lies

4. Basm: bas ʕe:b ʕe:b dgullah jitʃaððib. [ʕe:b dgullah jitʃaððib

   But it is rude for you to say he lies. It is rude to say that.

5. Faiz: [la:, la:, la:,↓ (.) la: la: fdwa.

   ʔtradʒdʒa:k ʔtradʒdʒa:k.

   No, no, no↓ (.) no, no please. I beg you ((not to say that)) I beg of you

By saying "There is so much fallacy in his speech", Kazem characterizes Faiz as a liar while using the less offensive expression, 'fallacy' rather than saying, 'Faiz is a liar' directly. But when Basm initiates a repair when saying, "He tells lies?" he makes Kazem express it directly. By saying, "But it is rude for you to say he lies" twice, Basm negatively evaluates Kazem for being rude. Here, Basm instigates Faiz to respond to Kazem. After Basm's evaluation, Faiz comes up with a strong response warning Kazem to stop being rude.

This exchange exemplifies the co-construction of impoliteness in candid camera programs. One of the forms of collaboration is repair organization (Goodwin, 2003, p. 168), especially when the repair-initiation aligns the speaker with one of the disputants. One could say that Basm's repair-initiation made Kazem's meaning clear. In other words, Basm caused an escalation in the degree of Kazem's rudeness. In response to Basm, Kazem had a chance to incrementally modify what he

said. He could have said, for instance, that he does not mean that Faiz tells lies. Culpeper and Haugh (2014) state that "an important consequence of the way in which pragmatic acts are co-constructed by two or more participants is that they can sometimes involve multiple possible understandings" (pp. 189-190). Here Basm pretends that he wants to make sure he understands Kazem's meaning correctly. To recapitulate, Faiz's reaction is an outcome of both Kazem and Basm's co-construction of meaning that has been achieved interactionally. Co-construction and collaboration are achieved through not only the conversational structure but also through the kind of activities and setting designed specifically to achieve the pranks which will be explained in the following section.

3.2.2 DESIGNING SETTINGS TO INVITE DISAFFILIATION

When responding to initiated actions, recipients either affiliate or disaffiliate with them. Affiliation is associated with social solidarity and support, while disaffiliation is not (Heritage, 1984, p. 268). In conversation analysis these two terms have been developed with preference organization. According to Lindström and Sorjonen (2013), "the claim is not that affiliative actions are invariably formatted as preferred but rather that the distributional pattern across data is such that turns delivering affiliative actions tend to be designed as preferred and vice-versa" (p. 350).

Researchers usually use dis/affiliation and dis/alignment interchangeably. Stivers et al. (2011) however, distinguished them when they "conceptualize alignment as the structural level of cooperation and affiliation as the active level of cooperation" (p. 20). For them, a recipient's response is affiliative when his evaluation matches the speaker's previous stance. This affiliation

can be discerned through aligning behaviors and linguistic resources (p. 21). For analytical purposes, this distinction is useful.

Stivers (2008) discovered that recipients showed their disaffiliation by nodding their heads, whereas they displayed their affiliation by verbal alignments such as backchannels. Stivers' study suggests that dis/affiliation is not confined to actions alone. Instead, it can be investigated at various levels. Lindström and Sorjonen have proven that dis/affiliation can be studied at the levels of "(i) the sequential place in which affiliation is to be displayed, (ii) the type of action to which the response should be given, and (iii) the larger activity in progress" (p. 253).

The pranksters usually behave in a way that invites the targets' disaffiliative responses. In one of the scenarios, Maajid, an Iraqi movie star, drives his car to the television building to conduct an interview. But before entering, the security guards, as usual, check his car in front of the building gate for security purposes. Meanwhile, Ali, a prankster who already knows Maajid approaches him and asks for help by delivering his message to the director of the building, claiming that he has been banned from entering for a series of candid camera programs he produced previously. He claims that he has encountered legal consequences because of that program. Maajid promises to help him. Later, during Maajid's interview, Ali suddenly enters the studio to solve his problem with the television staff. Ali claims that he wants someone to listen to him, seeking affiliation and help. Here, Ali weaves his story in such a way as to portray himself as the victim and expects Maajid's affiliation. As a result of the inappropriate way in which Ali enters the studio, however, Maajid not only does not support him, he also becomes indignant to the extent that he abuses Ali, as shown in the following example.

Example (4)

1.	Ali:	((jadxul l-stodio fudʒʔatan))
		((Enters the studio suddenly))
2.	Anchor:	Ali, Ali, ʃnu: lmuʃkilah?
		Ali, Ali, what is the problem?
3.	Ali:	ʔaħil lmuʃkilah
		I am solving the problem
4.	Maajid:	ʔagullak, ʔagullak, >ʔinta mutˤi:<? ʔiħna ga:ʕdi:n dansawwi: liqa:ʔ
		Listen, listen, >are you a donkey<? You see that we are having an interview

Entering the studio, Ali states that he wants to talk about his recent problem with the television staff in order to find a resolution. In other words, Ali's behavior expectedly projects a disaffiliative act on Maajid's side. As a result, Maajid abuses Ali for his interruption. Ali's interruption was a prank to enrage Maajid, and he succeeded by violating the social norms of *Usuul*. Even though he may seem correct in claiming his rights to enter the television building and express his concerns, the way he does this is incompatible with the norms of *Usuul*. This example shows how the pranksters design their activities to provoke disaffiliative responses from their targets.

Affiliative responses are 'pro-social' and 'display empathy and/or cooperate with the preference of the prior action" (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 21), while disaffiliative responses may have social consequences and may affect both the ongoing interaction and the participants' relationship. Researchers have discovered that disaffiliative and dispreferred acts are always delayed or mitigated (Pomerantz, 1984; Levinson, 1983). As such, disaffiliative responses constitute good

sources for the pranksters to exploit for behaving impolitely in order to enmesh their targets in a prank. In the following example, Haitham and BN are two pranksters pretending to be entrepreneurs. Hafiz is a movie star who pretends that he works with Haitham and BN and makes a great deal of money with him. They meet in a restaurant. Haitham and BN have no acquaintance of Rida, which means they have met through Hafiz by chance. Haitham and BN suggest that Rida, as a famous actor, should work for them. They attempt to display the job as ambitious. However, from their description of the job, it appears that they are working illegally through bribery and for this reason, Rida declines. Haitham exploits the negative side of disaffiliation to further move the conversation towards a conflict so Rida may appear foolish.

Example (5)

1. Haitham: jaʕni: ħabe:na tʃtɣul wjja:na: mθlma: Hafiz jiʃtɣul
   We would like you to work with us like Hafez
   (0.2)
2. Rida: jaʕni: ʃlo:n? ʃtʃtɣul? =
   I mean how? What work? =
3. Haitham: [= jaʕni: ndizzak
   [= We send you
4. BN: [jaʕni: ʔaku muza:jada:t ʃaɣla:t ndzzak ʕala: mudara:ʔ ʃi: bʕala:qa:tak
   [I mean through your connections with managers you can win biddings
   (Turns removed)
5. Rida: <u>ma:</u> ʔaqdar walla:h tʕðru:ni:. ʔa:ni: ma: ʔaqdar ha ʃʃaɣlah =

I cannot. I swear, please excuse me. I can't do this job =

6. Haitham: = le:ʃ ma:ku: ʃi: bi:ha? ʔaxa:f ʃnu:?

= Why? Nothing is wrong with it. You are not okay with it?

7. Hafiz: xe:r xo: ma:ku: ʃi:? =

Is there a problem? = ((returning from a phone call))

8. Rida: = ʤama:ʕ tˁraħu: ʕalajja ga:lau nri:d tʃtɣul wjja:na w kað:

= They made me an offer and suggested that I

work with them… etc.

9. Hafiz: ʔi: ʃaku: bi:h?

Okay, what is wrong with it?

10. Rida: >ºla:, la:< ma: ʔaqdar ʔa:ni: ʔabu karra:rº tdri: jaʕni: ʔa:ni: ʔhhh[

>ºNo, no< I cannot Abu Karrarº you know I am ahhh[

11. Hafiz: [ʃnu:?

ʃnu:? jaʕni ʃnu:? lʕe:b bi:ha:? hassah ʔa:ni: da:ʃtɣul wjjahum

[What? what? I mean

what is wrong that? See, I am working with them

12. Rida: ʔa:ni: tafa:ʤaʔt hassah bi:k tafa:ʤaʔt =

I am surprised by you now. I really am =

13. Haitham: = jaʕni: nta ʃnu: ʃa:if nafsak ʔaħsan min Hafiz?

= Well, do you think you are more famous than Hafez?

14. Rida: ha?

ha?

15. Haitham: ʔaħsan min Hafiz tʃu:f nafsak?

Do you think you are better than Hafez?

16. Rida: °laʔ, hija mu: qadˤijat ʔaħsan min Hafiz°. Hafiz ʔaxujah =

°No. It is not the case that I am better than Hafez°. Hafez is my brother.

17. Haitham: = laʕd ʃnu:ʔ tʃannak mara:dˤ:. jaʕni: ʃa:ijf nafsak fad ʃi:

Then what? You sound as if you are not satisfied thinking

you are a big deal ((Raising his hands upwards)).

18. Rida: [ʃwajjayah

[A second

19. Haitham: [fanna:n jaʕni ʕa:di: mu: fad ʃi:

[You are an actor [not a big deal

20. Rida: [°laħðˤah laħðˤah nta smaħli: ʃwajjayah. ʔawwalʃi: nta

ga:ʕid hna:nah ma: ʕindi: mawʕid wjja:k°

[°Wait, wait, let me explain a little bit. First of all, you are

sitting here and I do not have any appointment with you°.

21. Haitham: ʔe:h

ah.

22. Rida °faʕale:k ʧtarm dʒdʒalsa°

°Therefore, you must respect the meeting°.

After receiving an offer to work with them, regardless of the type of work, Rida forms a dispreferred action, namely a rejection: “I cannot”. Dispreferred actions are often mitigated

(Levinson, 1983, p. 335; Pomerantz, 1984, p.77) and Rida's rejection, too, is accompanied by an apology: "please excuse me. I can't do this job", which can be interpreted as polite. A rejection is a disaffiliative act that can invite negative social inferences. Haitham, paying no attention to Rida's polite way of rejection exploits the negative side of Rida's disaffiliation to pursue the accountability of the rejection "Why? Nothing is wrong with it. You are not okay with it?". Hafiz collaborates with Haitham in the prank by displaying that the job is fine when saying, "What is wrong with it?". Rida insists on his disaffiliation after which Haitham changes the topic slightly when he asks Rida if the latter sees himself in a better position compared to Hafiz. Rida says that this is not the case. In his disaffiliation, Rida does not provide accountability with regard to why he rejects the job. Eventually, Haitham becomes a bit aggressive when he not only portrays Rida as arrogant, but also denigrates him: "You are an actor, not a big deal". Haitham's offensive statement compels Rida to respond. Here, Rida invokes *Usuul* when he negates a possible account (see chapter 4) and he becomes angry: "sitting here and I do not have any appointment with you".

Two moral considerations relevant to *Usuul* should be noted here. First, what makes the offer incompatible with the expectations of *Usuul* is that Haitham and Rida did not know one another before the current meeting; they have just met and have no relational history. In order to achieve such an offer, the initiators must prepare the ground and the relationship has to be "activated when the need arises and the conditions are favourable" (Watts, 1991, p. 155). Rida implies this point in line 20: "Wait, wait, let me explain a little bit. First of all, you are sitting here, and I do not have any appointment with you," when he verbalizes an aspect of *Usuul*, namely the accountability of Hitham's behavior in terms of social relationships. With this statement, Rida

alludes to the fact that he has no relationship to him in order to prove that Rida's approach has no bases of plausibility.

The second consideration is that exploiting Rida's rejection in such a way violates *Usuul*. The pranksters insist that Rida provides a sufficient account (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 105 for reasonable causes) for his declination act. According to Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness, imposing on the recipient goes contrary to his desire "to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded. It is the heart of respect behaviour" (p. 129). The way in which the pranksters impose on Rida to offer a sufficient account hints at a power struggle between them. In lines (17) and (18) Haitham belittles Rida, denigrating his status by implying that Rida's position does not qualify him to be arrogant and to reject the ambitious offer from a powerful businessman. Haitham shows his surprise at Rida's unwillingness. This constitutes an underestimation of Rida and an exercise of power over him. Watts (1991) defines power as follows: "*A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*'s initially perceived interests, regardless of whether *B* later comes to accept the desirability of *A*'s actions". (p. 62).

Sometimes the actors succeed in forming a moral case where the target is the one who initiates impoliteness. In the following example, Yasser, a host, interviews Basm, an Iraqi national soccer player and Lolita, a poet and activist on social media as well as a prankster. Lolita meets with Basm in the make-up room before the programs starts. She behaves in an inappropriate manner by getting close to Basm even though they have not met previously. During the program, tremendous disagreements occur between Yasser and Lolita. As a result, Yasser impolitely requests that Lolita leave the program, and he also decides when to end the ongoing program. As

a result, Basm blames Yasser, claiming that the latter failed to run the program properly for many reasons:

Example (6)

1. Basm: ʔinta sˁutʃak

   It is all your fault

2. Yasser: ha:?

   ha?

3. Basm: sˁutʃak

   Your fault

4. Yasser: le:ʃ?

   Why?

5. Basm: wallah ʔawwal marrah ʃftha:↑ maʕruf ʃnu: sˁa:r bija

   I had a bad impression the first time I saw her

   (0.3)

6. Basm: wa:gfa jammi. ʔari:dha truħ matru:ħ. ʔagu:lha: [ba:ba gʕu:di

   She was standing next to me. I urged [her to go away and she did not.

7. Yasser: [ɣe:r dˁaifah Basm,

   ɣe:r dˁaifah

   [Is she not a guest, Basm? Is she not?

8. Basm: ʃnu: dˁaifah? ʔgullak raħmah ʕala ʔahlak. ʔinta la:

   glt dˁaif, la: glt ra:ħ ʔadʒi:b dˁaifah, la: gltni: jaʕni:

ra:san jaʕni: dʒbtni:. jaʕni: ɣE:R TGULLI: MAΘALAN WIJJA:K DˤAIF! ʔIÐA: ʔADRI: WIJJA:JA DˤAIFAH WALLAH MA: ʔADƷI:

Guest? Come on, man. You never told me about her being in this program. You brought me here straightforwardly. I MEAN SHOULDN'T YOU HAVE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE A GUEST WITH ME? HAD I KNOWN ABOUT ANOTHER INTERVIEWEE, I WOULD NOT HAVE COME.

In this exchange, Yasser and Lolita succeed in getting Basm involved in a moral debate. After Yasser 's expulsion of Lolita, Basm finds what was happening in his presence unbearable. He starts criticising Yasser by attributing the failure of the television program to his failure to manage it when saying, “It is all your fault”. Yasser asks “why?” Basm describes his first impression of Lolita when he met her in the make-up room. In his opinion, Lolita may not be qualified to appear on a television program with him because of her manners. In response, Yasser reminds him that Lolita is a guest “Is she not a guest, Bsem? Is she not?”, implying the *Usuul* of hospitality; guests should be respected. Then Basm explains in his complaint how Yasser failed and what moral expectancies Yasser violated when saying, “You never told me about her being in this program. You brought me here straightforwardly”.

We see how the pranksters have tricked Basm and involved him in a problem where he is the one who initiates a disaffiliative action of criticism first, providing Yasser with a pretext to establish an argument that triggers further negative assessments.

3.3 Impoliteness in conversation

3.3.1 IMPOLITENESS AND HOLDING THE FLOOR

According to Hayashi (1991), floor reflects "social considerations of power, solidarity, cooperation, conflict, competition, and the like" (p. 7). Holding floor while the other participant is trying to get it is in marked contrast with *Usuul*. Moreover, Hayashi illustrates that floor circulates collaboratively with what he called 'winding up' or transition preparation (p. 19).

May (2001) defines the floor as "the right to speak" (p. 139). After reviewing many works carried out by various researchers, Edelsky (1981) concludes that the floor "is viewed as the site of a contest where there is one winner and loser(s)" (p. 401). Refusing to pass the floor invites negative inferences and thus negative evaluations. In the following example, Jawad,a prankster, hosts an interview with Ghindan. From the beginning Jawad attempts to make Ghidan appear foolish. Ghidan is very overweight, and in this cultural context, talking about someone's body registers as a moral issue. Jawad explicitly mentions Ghidan's overweight body to find out to what extent Ghidan's body has helped him as an actor. Holding the floor is one of the various practices Jawad exploits to incite Ghidan's anger. Eventually, Ghidan becomes indignant after he tries to get the floor, but Jawad refuses to pass it to him.

Example (7)

1. Jawad: hal istaxdamt ʤismak liʕamalak l-fanni:?
   Jaʕni [ʔilak ka:[ra:kter xa:sˤ [ʔu ha:ði: jaʕni: ʤismak
   Have you used your body in acting? I mean [you have a special
   body [character [and this means your body
2. Ghidan: [ʔaki:d [ʔaki:d [ʔinta ʤA:WB BMAKA:NI:. TISʔAL

W ʤA:WB BMAKA:NI: ʔNTˤI:NI: MAʤA:L XAL ʔAʤA:↑WB

[sure

[sure. [You answer on my behalf. You are asking

and YOU ANSWER ON MY BEHALF, AS WELL.

GIVE ME A SPACE TO A↑NSWER YOUR QUESTION.

3. Jawad: ʔi:

Okay

4. Ghidan: hassah ɣE:R ʔA:NI: ʔAʤA:WB↑?

Now, AM I NOT THE ONE WHO ANSWERS↑?

5. Jawad: jallah tfadˤdˤal ʤa:wb

Alright, go ahead and answer

6. Ghidan: ʔiqtˤaʕ ʕammi: ʔiqʈaʕ daqi:qah↓

Cut dude cut it. Wait a minute↓

7. Ghidan: ʔISʔAL SSUʔA:L W ʔA:NI: ʔADʒA:WB

YOU ASK THE QUESTION AND I ANSWER IT

8. Jawad: hassah mu: saʔaltak?

Did not I ask you?

9. Ghidan: ʔi: SAʔALTNI: ɣE:R TINTAÐˤIRNI: ʔAʤA:WBAK

Yeah, you did, but should not you wait till I answer?

10. Jawad: ʔi bas da:ʔakammil [suʔa:li:

Okay, but I am completing [my question

11. Ghidan: [ʔAΣU: ʔINTA RAʔSAN TʤA:WB BMAKA:NI:

[YOU ARE ANSWERING ON MY BEHALF

RIGHT AWAY

In the excerpt above, a series of disagreements and conflicts have already occurred between the two participants. Jawad's question, "Have you used your body in acting?" is quite clear to Ghidan and may not require further explanation. Jawad's second utterance, "I mean you have a special body character and this means your body" does not add new information. After Jawad questions him, Ghidan attempts to take the floor through back channels, using "of course" twice in order to respond, but his attempts fail when Jawad refuses to pass him the floor. Hayashi (1991) argues that claiming the floor can be done by means of back channels (p. 11). What is interesting is that Jawad's second turn is pragmatically redundant (Watzlawick et al., 1968, p. 37), implying that the meaning of the second turn is presupposed by the speaker's first turn. Therefore, there is no need to further explain to Ghidan what he meant. Holding the floor is a powerful conversational practice for the pranksters to provoke the targets to produce mischievous behaviors.

Being offended by Jawad's refusal of passing the floor, Ghidan expresses his anger over Jawad's holding of the floor by means of reflexive awareness, namely metacommunicative awareness, which "involves communication about communicative events themselves, in other words, communication that focuses on the interpretation and evaluation of social actions and meanings in interaction" (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 194). Ghidan reveals those background expectancies concerning 'interactional awareness' (Culpeper & Haugh, 2014, p. 252) when he explains how conversation ought to be conducted and how the turns should be circulated, as

evident in the statement "YOU ASK THE QUESTION AND I ANSWER IT". This action here provides another example of emic understanding of interactional and normative expectations.

Ghidan's negative feelings become apparent during his turns. By employing metacommunication, Ghidan displays his "interactional awareness" (Culpeper & Haugh, 2014, p. 252), when explaining the background expectancies of interaction. Metacommunication "involves communication about communicative events themselves, in other words, communication that focuses on the interpretation and evaluation of social actions and meanings in interaction" (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 194). To negatively evaluate Jawad's behavior, Ghidan first describes what Jawad is doing and then explains how he should behave according to the normative expectations of interaction. This exchange can be understood within the professional relational group (second-order morality). Since Jawad is an anchor, the turn-taking management falls under his professional skills, even though Ghidan does not mention this.

3.3.2 IMPOLITENESS AND INTERRUPTION

Hutchby (1996) illustrates that "there is both a sequential and a moral dimension to interruption: Interruptions are violative on the level of turn-taking conventions and on the level of interpersonal relations" (p. 77). Interruptions are closely tied to impoliteness. Goldberg (1990) states that "on the assumption that interruptions violate the other's speakership rights, interruptions tend to be viewed as rude and disrespectful acts: indicative of indifference, aggressiveness or hostility towards the victimized speaker and/or the issues, values, and perspectives" (pp. 884-885). Interruption may also be exploited for the purpose of challenging the recipient. The example below takes place at an engagement ceremony in the bride's house, where all her family members and uncles have gathered to decide on Hafiz's official proposal. This meeting can be understood as an

engagement negotiation. Usually, an emic understanding of an engagement negotiation in Iraqi culture is that the groom does not negotiate. Instead, the groom usually selects a prominent figure or well-known person to speak on his behalf. This role has been given here to Maajid, the target, who is a movie star. To make Maajid appear foolish, Adel, the bride's cousin, instigates tremendous disagreements from the beginning. At one point, Maajid wants to make a point in which he explains the essence of marriage and how it will change the woman's situation, meaning that she will be tied more to her husband than to her family. Adel interrupts him with a disagreement for which Maajid criticizes him.

Example (8)

1. Maajid: lmara mn titˁlaʕ min be:t ʔahlha: ʔsˁsˁi:r bsm radʒlha
   As a girl moves out of her family's house ((marriage)), she will
   be counting on her husband
   ((after a while))
2. Adel: ɣe:r lmarah ham tirdʒaʕ lahlha:
   She is still tied to her extended family, as well
3. Maajid: ʔi:
   Yeah
4. Adel: ʔi: sˁaħi:ħ
   That is right
5. Maajid: ʔi:
   Yeah

6. Adel: bas mardʒaʕha: lahlha:

But she is referred to her extended family

7. Maajid: la:, la:↓ rradʒl ah ah hassah nta dʒi:blak mara zaʕla:nah w gaʕʕ ʔaxuha w radʒlha w[

No, no,↓ her husband, now you ask a woman in a broken relationship and seat her in front of her brother and her husband[

8. Adel: [ʔadri:. hassah nta martak mn tzʕal we:n tru:ħ?

[I know. Now when your wife gets angry where does she go

9. Maajid: hassah ɣe:r jintˁi:ni: nafas ʔaso:lf?

Should not he give me a space to make a point?

Twice, Adel disagrees with Maajid's point of view that a woman will be more connected to her husband than to her family after marriage. The first time, Adel says, "She is still tied to her extended family, as well". Because Adel uses the expression "as well", Maajid agrees with him through a backchannel "Yeah" in line 3. However, the second time Adel reinstances his disagreement and this time he does not use "as well," thereby changing the meaning. By saying "But she is referred to her extended family" in line 6, Adel contradicts Maajid's view that the bride would be more connected to her husband once she moves out of her father's house. This sequential modification of meaning is called incrementality in Kádár and Hugh's (2013) view, which refers to adjustments in the speaker's point of view in later turns (p. 112). This time Maajid disagrees with Adel in line 7, where he wants to make a point, but Adel interrupts his speech before he

completes the idea. Adel's turn "when your wife gets angry, where does she go" in line 8 is an example of an interruption for disagreeing with the prior act. Interrupting for disagreements may have a greater impact on the recipient. Maajid turns to the other audience and tells them that Adel should give him some space to make his point. By explicitly talking about Adel's interruption, Maajid employs his metacommunicative awareness (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 186; Culpeper & Haugh, 2014, p. 242) to construct his disaffiliative act of complaint. This example displays that interruption constitutes an interactional source for the pranksters to deliver their pranks by angering the targets.

3.4 Mock impoliteness

In impoliteness research, two types of impoliteness have been distinguished: impoliteness and mock impoliteness (Culpeper, 1996). Researchers use various names when talking about these two types. Bernal (2008) uses authentic and non-authentic impoliteness (p. 781). The distinction between the two types is built upon two factors, one of which is linguistic and the other social. First, impoliteness can be construed as mock-impoliteness based on the speaker's intention. According to Leech (1983) mock impoliteness refers to "what s says is impolite to h and is clearly untrue. Therefore, what s really means is polite to h and true" (p. 144). Second, mock-impoliteness is contingent on many other social factors such as the relationship between participants. For Culpeper et al. (2003) mock impoliteness (sarcasm, irony) is the off-record super-strategy for doing impoliteness (p. 1555). Culpeper (1996) describes mock impoliteness as "impoliteness that remains on the surface, since it is understood that it is not intended to cause offence" (p. 352).

Haugh and Bousfield (2012) speculate that mock impoliteness may be impolite because it is risky (p. 1101). In fact, the risk of mock impoliteness stems from the two conditions above because both of them can exploited and unilaterally alleged. A speaker, for example, may assume that the recipient is able to calculate an ironic meaning and the speaker's intention. Or a speaker may seemingly act as if he has a close relationship with the recipient while the latter does not think in the same way. In addition, the relation between the literal and the intended meaning can easily be exploited by speakers to deliver a disguised impoliteness. Moreover, the timing of doing mock impoliteness counts among its crucial interactional factors. Above all, there is a confusion pertaining to what mock impoliteness is and what it includes (cf. Haugh & Bousfield, 2012). One form of mock impoliteness is irony, which may be offensive at times. Dews and Winner (1995) view irony as:

> an especially nasty form of criticism, more insulting than a directly negative statement. Irony is often used to mock and thereby humiliate the 'victim' of the irony. Perhaps irony is assumed to be harsher than literal language because of the contrast between what is said (positive) and what is meant (negative). This contrast may emphasize how far off the behaviour is from what is expected. (p. 5).

Previously we saw that one way of doing impoliteness is the pranksters' exploitation of performing a dispreferred action over issues of accountability. Likewise, the preconditions of doing mock impoliteness can sometimes be exploited for the purpose of causing offence. Banter, for example, can lead to a real conflict between participants. Likewise, humor (teasing), as a form of mock impoliteness, can be unsafe (Kotthoff, 1996, p. 301) particularly when the recipient is not in a situation to welcome the teasing. Instead of characterizing mock impoliteness as such, it would be

more advantageous to look at the interactional situations and how the recipients construe them in their responses. What all these categories have in common is the presence of two elements in these social acts: provocation and playfulness (Haugh, 2010; Boxer & Cortés-Cond, 1997; Lampert; Ervin-Tripp, 2006). The following section illustrates how the pranksters exploit teasing and laughter as two forms of mock impoliteness to instigate rage in the recipients.

3.4.1 IMPOLITENESS AND TEASING

As mentioned above, teasing can be construed as mock impoliteness. Schieffelin (1987) found that in Kaluli culture teasing was always accompanied by shaming. According to him, in some Pacific cultures, including Samoa, "one of the major ways in which social control is achieved is through members' fear of being publicly confronted and shamed" (p. 165). As such, offence is achieved in these societies through teasing instead of physical confrontation (p. 165). Miller (1986) depicts teasing as a form of socialization which functions as a self-defense practice, in the sense that "teasing is related to the ability to stand up for oneself, to speak up in anger, and to fight if necessary" (p. 200). According to Attardo (1994) "teasing differs from other types of humorous interaction because of the presence of an element of "criticism" in the interaction". Drew (1987) found that teasing can be used for controlling and thus managing transgressions (p. 248). He also maintains that recipients sometimes take teasing seriously and do not laugh along (p. 219). When teasing becomes a source of evaluation, there can be a teasing sequence, meaning that to tease the recipient is to put him in "a mock challenge, insult, or threat" (Eisenberg, 1987, p.184; cf. Drew, 1987). Teasing may lead to interactional conflict because "teasing directed intimates can have the potential to hurt, even as it ratifies the bond between the interactants" (p. 296). In the following

example, both Basm and Mdallal intend to trap Alaashiq in pranks. Basm is a host, and both Mdallal and Alaashiq are interviewees. After a series of disagreements, Mdallal teases Alaashiq by impersonating him offensively in a sarcastic manner.

Example (9)

1. Mdallal: ʔinta la:zm tra:ʤiʕ ʃerkat ðˤðˤila:l
   You must visit and check with Al-Zilal Company
2. Alaashiq: >ʔi: le:ʃ? ʃaku:? ʃaku:?<
   >oh yeah, why? For what? For what?<
3. Basm: le:ʃ?
   why?
4. Mdallal: ʃi:l manafestak xal ʔalma:ni: bmaka:n ha:ða lʔaswad lhna:
   Take off this manifest ((freckle on Alaashiq's chick)) and
   put a German one in its place.
5. Alaashiq: tabʕan ham jitʤa:waz ham jitʤa:waz ((li Basm))
   See, he is encroaching again, he is encroaching again ((to Basm))

Mdallal teases Alaashiq by referring to him as a German car, because of which the latter has to visit Al-Zilal company. By 'manifest,' which usually refers to a registration document required for buying a new car, Mdallam means a noticable black freckle on Alaashiq's left cheek At the beginning, Alaashiq does not understand the teasing act. He asks "why? For what? For what?" Later, when Mdallal explains further in line 4, Alaashiq characterizes the teasing as an act of

encroachment. As such, the outcome of the teasing is an emergent meaning composed prospectively. When an impolite act contains a reference that manifests in the subsequent turns, the offence is going to be emergent.

This exchange shows that teasing is a powerful interactional practice for causing offence as Drew (1987) points out: "teases are parasitically exploiting materials" (p. 243). Mdallal achieves his pranks through teasing to make Alaashiq appear foolish in order to produce aggressive reactions.

3.4.2 IMPOLITENESS AND LAUGHTER

Laughter is a paralinguistic practice for delivering mock impoliteness (Furman, 2013). It is associated with a range of speech acts that can be sources of impoliteness such as irony, sarcasm, mocking, ridiculing, belittling and the like. It constitutes a powerful practice for delivering impoliteness, and it may invite a range of negative evaluations and inferences if not presented properly. It also plays a crucial role in reinforcing or weakening social relationships.

Because laughter has various functions or associations, its meaning is highly context-dependent. The timing of laughter is important. An act of stumbling may invite laughter, but it may be rude when the stumbler is a child or a female or is in danger and needs immediate help. As such, laughter can be friendly as in the case of laughing *with* or unfriendly as in the case laughing *at*. One example of unfriendly or impolite laughter is when it lacks an explanation or accountability in the recipient's point of view. Sometimes laughter may have a reason, but it may cause disaffiliation on the recipient's side. Or some situations may be funny for one participant but not for the other. Therefore, unfriendly laughter always has an object to which it refers, and that

reference must be adequately qualified as laughable or funny. This contractual agreement becomes apparent through the expression "what is so funny?' in English. In Arabic there is a famous proverb regarding this point: "ʔal dˤdˤaħku bila sabab min qillat lʔadab" meaning, "Laughing without a reason is rude".

Laughter can vary according to the context. Laughing *at* may be offensive for the recipient as it is an interactional practice that may form a range of challenging speech acts, such as ridiculing, mocking, teasing, denigrating and so on.

Laughter may be unilateral or co-constructed. Unlike unilateral laughter, co-constructed laughter may be categorized as licensed. Unilateral laughter may be rude as in the case of laughing at, while laughing with may be friendly as in the case of joking. One of the forms of friendly laughter includes what Jefferson (1979) called an 'invitation to laugh,' when the "speaker himself indicates that laughter is appropriate, by himself laughing, and the recipient thereupon laughs" (p. 80).

As a type of mock impoliteness, laughter sometimes becomes a source of offence. One type of co-constructed laughter occurs in a multi-participant interaction when two or more participants make another participant the butt of a target. This is true in cases, for example, where the speaker and recipient coordinate with one another in making a third party the target of their teasing laughter. In this case, laughter becomes a co-constructed practice for delivering offence.

Example (10)

1. Kazem: bas ʔasˤaħħiħ maʕlu:mah. ʔa:ni: mu: mdammadʒ =

   I just want to correct something. I am not a double actor =

2. Basm: = >la:, la:< dajitma:zħ wijjaja ʔustað Laith

= >No, no<, Laith is joking with me

3. Kazem: >la:, la: maixalf<. matiħtʃi gdda:m l-ka:mrah. wa:dˤiħ

ha:i? mazħkum ʃaqa:kum be:na:tkum. ʔu:: ʔaku:

xtˤu:tˤ ħamrah radʒa:ʔan lataʕbru:ha

>No, no, I do not care<. You cannot say it in the scene. Okay? Your joke

must remain between you. There are red lines. Please, do not trespass them

4. Basm: muʃa:hidi:na lkira:m dˤa:dʒ [Kazem mdallal. ʔardʒaʕ? ((li Kazem))

Our esteemed viewers, Kazem got annoyed. [Can I start again?

((the program seeking permission from Kazem))

5. Shaimaa: [ehhh heh heh huh huh huh

Huh huh ((chuckling))

6. Kazem: ʔi: ʔrdʒaʕ

Yes, you can start again

7. Kazem: ʃnu: lmubarrir tidˤħak

What is so funny?

8. Basm ehh ga:l (h) mumaθθil damdʒ. djiʃʃa:qa wijja:k ʃbi:k?

Ehh he said (h) he ((Kazem)) is a double actor. He is joking with you.

what is the big deal?

9. Shaimaa: [HUH HUH heh heh heh

[HUH HUH heh heh heh

10. Kazem: [ʕala: ʃnu: tidˤħak? ((qa:ʔilan li Basm muʃtakijan ʕala Shaimaa))

What is she laughing at? ((To Basm asking about Shaimaa))

11. Shaimaa: [ehuh huh huh huh

12. Basm: ʕaddamʤ (h) ehh= ((mudi:ran waʤhahu li Shaimaa))

At double ((actor)) (h) ehh = ((turning to Shaimaa))

13. Kazem: = wallah ma:dri:. >Balla gu:m ʔaxa:f ʔaku: ʤawwa ʃi: jidˤaħħik<

= I have no idea. >for God's sake stand up there may be

something tickling underneath< ((the chair))

14. Shaimaa: ʃnu: ʃnu: maθalan ha:ða ʃʃi:?

What what do you think it could be? ((laughing quietly))

15. Kazem:: ʔa:ni: ga:ʕid [ʔa:ni: ma:ʕruf

ºWell, I have [no ideaº

16. Shaimaa: [jaʕni ħtʃa:ja matuʕruf ʃnu: xalfijja:ta w

tuʕruf ʃnu: jaʕni: ha:ða ʃʃi: maθalan?

[How come you do not know the story

behind that ((laughable)) thing?

17. Kazem: ʔinti hassah ga:ʕdah ʕala: kursi: jiʤu:z bi: masa:ʤ jidˤaħħik

Now you could be seated on a massaging chair making you laugh

18. Shaimaa: WALLAH?

REALY?

In this exchange, the pranksters, Basim, Kazem, and Laith, the director, succeed in creating an environment in which Shimaa, the target, initiates offensive laughter. After welcoming Kazem to

the show behind the scenes, Basm says ‘double actor’ as an indication that Basm used to sing rather than act. When Kazem reacts negatively to Basm’s mocking, the latter pretends that it was just a joke between him and the director, to whom Basm talks via the microphone in his ear, and he repeats what Laith said. Then Shimaa laughs at this incident, giving Kazem a pretext to act foolish.

In this example, we see an act of offensive laughter. It seems offensive at first because it repeats or continues over a number of turns. Sometimes continuing laughter in response to a joke turns into a serious matter and thus becomes insulting, inviting what Drew (1987) calls a po-faced response. A po-faced response means reacting to teasing and laughter in a serious manner by, for example, not laughing when invited to laughter in a multi-party conversation. Second, Shaimaa is aware that before she laughs Kazem is already angry and has evaluated Basm’s ‘double actor’ as unacceptable. Therefore, any laughter from Shaimaa over ‘double actor’ may offend Kazm more. Kazem’s negative evaluation of Shaimaa is evident in his questioning the reference of her laughter more than once when saying, “What is so funny?”, and “What is she laughing at?”. Instead of offering a remedial act (Goffman, 1971) such as an apology, Shaimaa expresses her surprise that Kazem should know the object of her laughter. This is an act of insistence which exasperates an offence (see Chapter Four). In an ironic manner, Kazem eventually depicts Shaimaa’s laughter as the one that lacks accountability: “you could be seated on a massaging chair making you laugh”. Implying that someone’s laughter has no reason constitutes an interactional practice for negatively evaluating the laughter as impolite, as in the Arabic proverb ‘laughing with no reason is rude’.

Two other points should be highlighted here. First, a noticeable alignment occurs between Basm and Shaimaa. Shaimaa laughs over Basm’s joke of ‘double actor’. This alignment could be

interpreted as an act of positioning Kazem as the target of the teasing. Second, this laughter occurs across genders. In other words, Shaimaa performs a 'risky laughter', by laughing at a male (Lampert & Ervin-Tripp, 2006). This example shows that laughter is an interactional practice that could be exploited for targeting recipients by offending him.

3.5 Impoliteness and multimodality

Multimodality includes various modes of interaction including nonverbal interactional modes such as gesture, facial expressions, posture, gaze, and proxemics (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 130; Xiaoting Li, 2014, p. 3). Some researchers believe that im/politeness is multimodal in nature (Brown & Prieto, 2017, p. 367; also cf. Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 130). Im/politeness does not merely involve words but is also associated with how someone behaves (p. 357). One of the aspects of the multimodality of im/politeness is using the body for delivering face-threatening acts. In the example below, Basm hosts Kazem and Solaf in an interview. Basm asks Solaf about the private life of Kazem away from his professional life, as they are friends and work together. In Solaf's point of view, Kazem is talented at hosting television shows, singing, and other arts but he is not talented in acting. Instead of saying he is not good directly, Solaf does not complete the turn and instead looks at Kazem with a facial expression that delivers her meaning.

Example (11)

1. Solaf: la tizʕal minni: Kazem. ʃuɣlah kulliʃ ħilu huwwa.
   bas ka tamθi:l ((taʕbi:r bilwaʤh))
   Kazem, do not get angry at me. Kazem's work is amazing.

But as an actor ((facial expression))

2. Basm: fa:ʃil?

failure?

3. Solaf: la: ma: gu:l fa:ʃsil. bas jaʕni: katamθi:l jaʕni: l-ʕa:lam

ma: ħabtha bittmaθi:l ʃgad ma: ħabta bilbara:mʤ

No, I would not say failure. I mean as an actor, I mean people

do not like him as an actor as they do as a singer

In this excerpt, Solaf mitigates her criticism act of Kazem by praising him. In performing the act of criticism she does not utter it but instead performs a facial expression with a slight smile, eyebrows raised a bit and her hands clapped together. Since criticism constitutes a face-threatening act in Brown and Levinson's terminology, Solaf resorts to a facial expression instead. Basm initiates a repair by implying that Solaf has expressed the opinion that Kazem is a 'failure' actor. Here, Basm collaborates in setting up a conflict since he is one of the pranksters. Solaf rejects Basm's interpretation. She reconstructs what she meant by saying that acting may not be Kazem's professional arena. This example explains that various non-verbal modes can be used to cause offence to the recipient.

Impolite social actions are not confined to speaking, for sometimes the human body becomes the source of potential offence. The body either replaces words altogether or sometimes reinforce or illustrates what is said. Brown and Prieto (2017) state that "(im)politeness resides not just in *what* you say, but also *how* you say it" (p. 357). When engaged in a conflict conversation, participants make meaningful (salient) gestures towards their recipients as they utter offensive or

impolite words. In what follows, I analyze two examples, one on posture and the other on gesture as two channels for producing offensive actions.

3.5.1 IMPOLITENESS AND POSTURE

One mode of delivering offence involves posture, "the way participants position their bodies in a given interaction" (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 131). Bull (1987) distinguish posture from other non-verbal modes arguing that "posture is conventionally understood as referring to bodily positions as distinct from bodily movements, which are customarily referred to as gestures" (1987, p. 3). Contextual factors and sociocultural norms play a crucial role in evaluating and construing how nonverbal modes work and what they mean in interaction. In Iraqi culture, for example, crossing legs in conversation while being seated on a chair is perceived as a lack of courtesy and even offensive if there is not, for example, a health-related reason for doing so. In the following example, Kazem exploits the position of crossing legs to irritate his interlocutors.

figure 1: crossing legs **figure 2: moving legs onto the table** **figure 3: putting legs on the table**

Figure 2: Kazem's posture

Example (12)

1. Basm: >ha:i ʃnu: Kazem<?

   >What is this Kazem<?

2. Kazem: ʃllak ʕala:qa?

Mind your business

3. Basm: la:, la:, ʕe:b

No, no, this is rude

4. Kazem: ΣLLAK ʕALA:QA? ΣLLAK ʕALA:QA? ((sˤaʔiħan))

MIND YOUR BUSINESS. MIND YOUR BUSINESS ((Yelling))

5. Basm: ja: ʔaxi: ʔiħtarm lfadˤa:ʔijja ʔiħtarm nna:s ʔiħtarm ʤʤmhu:r

Brother, show some respect to the building, to the people, to the fans

6. Shaimaa: xalliha: ʕalme:z ʔaħsan

It would be better if you put them on the table ((ironically))

7. Kazem: tħbi:n hiʧ? ((wadˤiʕan riʤlaihi ʕala lme:z))

You like it this way? ((putting his legs on the table))

8. Shaimaa: balla:h↑? ʔaħib hiʧ? ((mustaɣribatan))

For God's sake, do I like this way? ((shocked))

After a series of conflicts between Shaimaa and Kazem, the latter crosses his legs while aware that this behavior appears offensive to his interlocutors, especially if he crosses his legs in front of a female. Crossing legs in such a way violates the sociocultural norms of *Usuul* at the societal level. In a scolding manner, Basm criticizes Kazem by questioning his behavior. In return, Kazem urges Basm not to get involved. In Iraqi Arabic, "Mind your business" is understood as a defensive practice when being criticized or blamed for performing a concerning act questioned by the recipient. Basm considers Kazem's posture offensive to the channel, the people who work there, and even to the fans. In an ironic manner, Shaimaa suggests that it would more appropriate for

Kazem to put his legs on the table in front of them "It would be better if you put them on the table", an indication that what Kazem is doing has gone too far with respect to *Usuul*. Since irony has two meanings, *what is said* and *what is meant* (Grice, 1975), Kazem accepts the literal meaning (what is said) from Shaima's utterance to reinforce the contradiction. In the last two pictures he puts his legs on the table. It is clear that both Shaimaa and Basm evaluate Kazem's behavior negatively as impolite. In Iraqi culture crossing legs while being seated on a chair is associated with showing power and acting inconsiderate. Posture, especially crossing legs in situations of impoliteness, is one of the areas that deserves further investigation through future research. This example clearly shows that posture can be a source of offense. As such, Kazem uses posture here to make Shaimaa appear foolish, and he succeeds.

3.5.2 IMPOLITENESS AND GESTURE

Perhaps impoliteness carried out via gestures is more offensive than merely performing it through words. Extending or raising someone's hand may be construed as an illegal act as it is considered a physical assault to the target. Beating with hands, for instance, leaves physical marks or evidence for investigation. Physical attack is considered a loss to the target, but in the context of a hidden camera show is regarded as an achievement for the prankster, for he succeeds in making the recipient carry out an emotive action (a concept explored further in chapter four) by encroaching on him physically. This last point is viewed as a manifestation of the affordances of candid camera shows.

In the following example, the host expresses his annoyance at the guest's long answers, telling him that the latter talks too much with little value in response to each question, and urges

him to answer briefly because time is limited. The guest, however, shows a strong reaction to this criticism, to the extent that he snatches the papers from the host and hits him with them twice.

Example (13)

1. Jawad: hwa:j tiħʧi: hwa:j tihrit [maʕ ʔiħtrmati: ʔilak
   You talk too much. You say too much of little value [with my due respect
2. Abul Abbas: [ʃgiligt↑?
   [What did you say↑?
3. Jawad: hwa:j tihrit
   You say too much of little value
4. Abul Abbas: la:, la:, la:, la:, t-taʧfi:sˁ laʧʧaffsˁ
   No, no, no, no, this is stupidity. Don't be stupid
5. Jawad: >la:, la:, la:, la:↓<
   >No, no ,no, no↓<
6. Abul Abbas: la: Jawad ðˁðˁa:hir nta <u>tiʧaffisˁ</u>. ʔw lo: ʔadri: nta muqaddim
   lbarna:maʤ walla: ma: ʔaʤi:
   No, Jawad, it looks like you are being <u>stupid</u>.
   Had I known you were the host, I would not have come

Figure 3: Abul Abbas's gesture

In the first picture on the left top, the guest wearing light green lowers his head, gazing directly at the host dressed in a black outfit, raising his eyebrows and saying to him "what did you say?" which constitutes his first reaction (Chapter Five). In the second picture on the top right, the guest shows an emotive action by repeating the negation particle 'no' four times and uttering a profane word while taking the papers away from the host's hands. In in the third picture he starts beating the host and repeats the act in a different way as shown in the pictures. In the last picture he expresses regret for coming to the program as Jawad is the host.

This exchange displays the kinds of gestures associated with emotive impolite actions specifically. Beebe (1995) refers to these outrageous actions as 'volcanic redness', which is accompanied by "loss of someone's temper...violent, explosive expressions of anger, as well as

more minor outbursts of impatience and expressions of contempt" (p. 156). Beebe did not explain, however, that volcanic rudeness is usually accompanied and expressed by nonverbal communicative acts.

These emotive body movements accompanied by profane words constitute a source of entertainment for the audience because they reveal private attributes about those actors' personalities that could not be seen otherwise. It is because of this last point that impoliteness constitutes a remarkable method for pranksters to produce entertainment, while for researchers of impoliteness such affordances make impoliteness available for developing and establishing an impoliteness theory.

3.6 Challenges

Data upon which this dissertation is built contain the kind of actions that look impolite to the recipient such as accusations, defamations, disparaging and others. In order to set up them together, I adopt Labov and Fanshel's (1977) term *challenge*. In their conceptualization, "a challenge is any reference (by direct assertion or indirect reference) to a situation, which if true, would lower the status of the other person" (p. 64). Their examples of challenges include what they called "personal actions" such as "criticisms, attacks, denigrations, insults" (p. 64). Moreover, in their understanding, those challenging speech acts are "inherently critical" of the recipient (p. 74).

Challenge lies at the heart of impoliteness. Lachenicht (1980) investigated challenges in light of aggravation. According to him, challenges "offend H's[7] sensibilities and beliefs" (p. 639).

[7] Here, H refers to the hearer in Lachenicht's terminology.

The outcome of challenging is "to "shock" H, not merely to explicitly inform him that he is not liked, but to show that the conventions and beliefs by which he guides his life, the standards which he applies to himself, etc., are not respected" (p. 640). From Labov and Fanshel's 'personal actions' and Lachenicht's 'standards and sensibilities', we see that challenging involves some kind of personal association. In my data, the examples show that to challenge the targets, the pranksters usually attack their personal skills, fame, artwork and the like. Culpeper et al. (2003) discovered that their data were replete with challenging practices. One of the challenging practices was impoliteness, such as 'what the fuck are you doing?' (pp. 15-59-1561). They also discovered that when a challenge contains a taboo word targeting personal qualities it becomes very rude (p. 1569). Finally, Bousfield (2008) divided challenges into 'rhetorical challenges,' which 'do not require an answer" and "response seeking challenges' which "do require an answer" (p. 241). These studies have discovered that challenging a recipient is an effective practice for delivering impoliteness. As such, they did not hesitate to exploit challenging as a conversational practice to anger the targets. Following Labov and Fanshel's understanding of challenging, I will investigate in the following section how the pranksters deploy challenges in various methods.

3.6.1 DENIGRATION

Denigration encompasses any impolite practice performed by the speaker to denigrate the recipient's qualities, such as professionality, skills and position. Other-denigration has received scant attention in the scholarly literature on impoliteness. However, self-denigration strategies have been studied by a number of researchers, particularly those working on Chinese politeness.

Gu (1990) invented what he called the "self-denigration maxim,"[8] including: "Denigrate self and elevate other" (p. 246). He also did not forget to shed light on the negative side as he came up with two breaching submaxims: 1. Denigrate other, and 2. Elevate other (p. 246), but he did not explain how these two submaxims function nor did he give an example on impoliteness; his work focused primarily on politeness in the Chinese context. Moreover, Gu illustrates the variables that fall under the personal qualities of 'self' and 'others,' associated with denigration: "self or other's physical conditions, mental states, properties, values, attitudes, writing, spouse, family, relatives, etc." (pp. 246-247). These variables constitute the various scopes of negative and positive evaluations.

In the data of this dissertation, other-denigration constitutes one of the offensive practices employed by the pranksters to enrage recipients. In particular, they use this practice in particular against the targets who are well-known figures in Iraqi society. Other-denigration can be performed explicitly by clearly challenging the recipient's position. In the following example, three individuals hold a meeting to talk about producing a T.V. series in which Abbas would be the owner of the production company, Abd would be the main actor, and the guest, Adnan, the target, would have a different role. The pranksters (Abbas and Abd) seriously disagree about which role Adnan should play and for how many episodes he should participate in the series. According to a previous script, he will play his role in 29 out of 30 episodes. Abd criticises the decision, however, claiming that Adnan's skills qualify him for no more than two episodes. The idea is that in order to make Adnan behave foolishly, Abd is going to denigrate Adnan's skills. Abd performs

[8] In pragmatics maxim is like a normative general rule or principles that that applies to different situations.

the denigrating act by violating the professional normative expectations, namely, that Abd is the one who is going to choose the characters he will play even though choosing who performs which role is the director's job.

Example (14)

1. Abbas: ʔihna:ja Adnan Shla::sh ʃaxsˁijjat lmuħami: tisʕa w ʕiʃri:n ħalqa =
   Here, Adnan Shla::sh a lawyer role for twenty nine episodes =
2. Abd: = ʔusta:ð
   = Dear
3. Abbas: twaqqiʕ lʕaqd, >fad laħðˁa ʔusta:ð<, twaqqiʕnna lʕaqd ʔiljo:m w taxuð ʕarbu:n [ttwakkal ʕalallah] wʔajja:m ttasˁwi:r nttasˁil bi:k
   You are going to sign the contract, >just a second dear< ((to Abd)), today you are going to sign the contract with us and take your paperwork.
   And we will call you when the recording starts.
4. Abd: [la: la: qabl qabl]
   [No, no, before, before]
5. Abd: qabl la: jiwqqiʕ ʔusta:ð. ʔinta mutʔakkid lmuħami:?
   Wait, before he signs dear ((to Abbas)). Are you sure about the lawyer role?
6. Abbas: ʔi: lmuħami:
   Yeah, the lawyer
7. Abd: >ʃaxsˁijjat lmuħami:< =

>the lawyer role< =

8. Abbas: = <Adnan Shla::sh> ʃaxsˁijjat lmuħami:

= <Adnan Shla::sh> the role of lawyer

9. Abd: ʔusta:ð, ʔani lba:rħa wlmuxriʤ ʔittafaqt wijja:h ʔu haðanni lħalqte:n ma:l ʔusta:ð Adnan

Dear, yesterday I talked to the director about this matter and here are Adnan's two episodes

10. Abbas: ʃnu: ħalqte:n?

What, two episodes?

11. Abd: jitˁlaʕ ʔabu lbnajjah::↑ lli: ʔaħibha:↑ ʔilʔula: wθθa:nijah. bilħalqa θθa:nijah jitwaffa: www (0.2) ħalqte:n

He will play my mistress' father in the first episode, and he will die in the second episode. (0.2) two episodes only

12. Adnan: ʃni: ga:llak ʔabi:ʕ karafs ʃni:?

What is this? Did he tell you that I sell celery? What is this?

Adnan Shlash is known to be one of the Iraqi pioneer movie makers and actors who has been active in the domain for decades. Noticeably, a distinction exists between the two characters suggested for Adnan, namely playing a lawyer role in the 29 episodes and a peripheral character who dies in the second episode. There are two problems here, one is that the director had given Adnan the role of lawyer in 29 episodes, and morally he is the one who is supposed to distribute the roles. However, Here Abd claims, however, that because he is given the role of the main character he

must be entitled to choose the roles instead of the director. Second, by saying that Adnan will be given the role of his mistress' father for only two episodes, dying in the second, Abd implicitly denigrates Adnan's professionality. This appears to be an insult for a well-known and experienced screenwriter and actor. Denigration is evident in Adnan's response when he negatively evaluates Abd's act of criticism, and thus a negative evaluation, when expressing his feelings by talking about a grocer.

In order to explain the bigger picture of this exchange, a there-and-then understanding of this excerpt may be necessary here. What Abd is saying, "two episodes only" can be the subject of evaluation based on the participants' history and acquaintance with each other. Abd knows Adnan's professional history and skills as an actor. Taking into account their 'relational history' (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 77), Abd's suggestion is an act of denigration that challenges Adnan's sensibilities. This there-and then understanding is in Adnan's response "Did he tell you that I sell celery?" where he ironically asks Abd if the director has also told him that Andnan is a grocer. Comparing a grocer with an actor and screenwriter who has written television series illustrates the gap between the two positions.

Adnan is shocked and enraged by this comparison. His initial reaction is apparent in the two pictures below in which he leans forward and pays close attention as Abd reduces his role to two episodes. Adnan places his right hand over his mouth, paying concerning attention and reflecting on Abd's explanations. The pictures show that evaluation is clear even from his postural positions.



Figure 4: Adnan's gaze and posture

Sometimes the pranksters tend to display the denigration as a human mistake by performing it dexterously. In the example below, Yasser, a prankster, mispronounces a movie star's name, Uday Abdel Sattar. As a result, Uday Ahmed shows a strong reaction which reveals the degree of his negative evaluation of Yasser's forgetting act.

Example (15)

1. Yasser: wijja:na: Uday <Ahmed> [wa Lolita
   Uday <Ahmed> [and Lolita are with us
2. Uday: [Uday Abdel Sattar =
   [Uday Abdel Sattar =
3. Yasser: = >Uday Abdel Sattar<
   = >Uday Abdel Sattar<
4. Uday: ʃnu: Ahmed? >ʃnu: Ahmed<?
   What is Ahmed? >What is Ahmed<?
5. Lolita: ðkar ʔabu:ja ðkar ʔabu:ja

He mixed it up with my father. He mixed it up with my father

6. Yasser: ha: xalatˁt wijjah ʔa:sif

Oh, I mixed it up with her father

7. Uday: Uday U[

Uday U[

8. Yasser: [la:, la:, ʔa:sif. Uday Abdel Sattar

[No, no, I am sorry. Uday Abdel Sattar

9. Uday: Uday Abdel Sattar

Uday Abdel Sattar

10. Yasser: ʔinta ʔism kabi:r ʔa:sif. Bas ʔa:ni: ɣlatˁt liʔannu: xlatˁt wijjaha: liʔan ʔabu:ha: Uday Abdel Sattar ʔism kabi:r w muhimm w nħtarma w nqadra

You are a big name. But I made a mistake when I mixed it up with her father because her father is Ahmed. I apologize. Uday Abdel Sattar is a big and important name. We certainly respect him very much.

In this example, Yasser mispronounces Uday's last name. His mistake looks deliberate because when he utters the name, he slows down to say it clearly as it is represented in the transcript '<Ahmed>'. To correct Yasser, Uday performs a repair initiation by saying, "Uday Abdel Sattar". Even though Yasser apologizes through remedial actions repeatedly, Uday insists on evaluating what Yasser did as unacceptable by keeping questioning and correcting the mistake.

Yasser's mistake implies denigrating the recipient; it could mean that Yasser mispronounced his name because Uday is not well-known. This understanding is evident in Yasser's last turn, when he says, "You are a big name… Uday Abdel Sattar is a big and important name". Here, Yasser shows his reflexive awareness, namely, he thinks about the presupposed negative inferences (denigration) that Uday is thinking about, as well. This interpretation proves that denigration is readily accessible in Yasser's forgetting act. By saying, 'You are a big name', Yasser negates the opposite meaning, as if saying, 'I did not mean to denigrate you'. Construing these negative inferences is evident in Uday's repeated corrections and anger.

There is one more feature here which involves a retrospective understanding. According to Schegloff (2007), "there are sequences which operate retrospectively" which he calls 'retro-sequences' (p. 217). He further explains that retro-sequences are outcomes of prior sources, in the sense that retrospective turns interpret the meanings of the prior turns (p. 217). Here, Yasser's retrospective turn offers some explanations for the 'trouble source' (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 363), namely, Yasser's mistake. Yasser's last turn offers an explanation of his first turn where the mistake happened in "you are a big name". But I made a mistake when I mixed it up with her father because her father is Ahmed. I apologize. Uday Abdel Sattar is a big and important name. We certainly respect him very much."

To recapitulate the analysis, Yasser mispronounces Uday's second name strategically in order to enrage Uday. Uday's angry reaction reveals that the mistake is an act of denigration, showing that Uday is not famous. This exchange exhibits how the pranksters are capable of offending the targets by acting in a genuine manner. Showing one's act as accountable or genuine is one of the aspects in which candid camera shows differ from Garfinkel's breaching experiments.

3.6.2 DEFAMATION

Defamation encompasses impolite practices perceived by the recipient as aiming at his public image. Defamation has been defined in the Oxford dictionary as follows: "The action of damaging the good reputation of someone; slander or libel"[9]. It is clear from this definition that defamation is damaging someone's reputation. Linguistically, defamation is achieved through false statements about the target (Shuy, 2010, p. 40).

In the example below, Ali interviews Dhyaa in the latter's home. Dhyaa is a famous Iraqi poet. During a break in the interview, Ali explains to Dhyaa that because the cameras are now off, he wants to ask her about a private matter (a recent blurb), namely, that Dhyaa buys poems from famous Iraqi poets and publishes them in his name. This is the core of the prank.

Example (16)

1. Ali: ʔhhh diʕa:ja l-li: tˁraħat. bsˁara:ħa w bsˁara:ħa kθi:r min nnas lli: sʔalthum w ʔajiado:ni bi:ha: xsˁu:sˁan min ʔaqrab n-na:s ʔilak gallo:li ʔnnu: Dhyaa Al-Mayyali jidfaʕ l-flu:s ʕalmo:d jiʃtari: ʃiʕr min ʃuʕaraʔ kiba:r w jisalmah lilmutˁribi:n bas fi: sabi:l smah
   There is that blurb. Honestly, most of the people especially those who are close to you whom I asked confirmed to me that Dhyiaa buys his poems from creative poets then he gives them to singers for the sake of fame.
2. Dhyaa: ʃnu:? ((juɣaijjr lqaʕdah))
   What? ((adjusting his place and then staring at Ali's face to appear serious))
3. Ali: Dhyaa Al-Mayyali jiʃtari: ʃiʕr min ʃuʕaraʔ kiba:r muqa:bil maba:liɣ

[9] (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/defamation).

w jibi:ʕha: lʃʃuʕaraʔ lilmutˁribi:n ʕafwan ʕalmo:d lsm =

Dhyiaa buys his poems from creative poets then

he sells them to singers, sorry, for the sake of fame =

4. Dhyaa: = ħabi:bi, ʔinta ʤa:j datn[sˁub ʕalajja] nta lo: datsawwi: liqa:ʔ lo: ħiwa:r wjjiaja?

= Dear, you are wasting [my time or you] are interviewing

and conversing with me?

5. Ali: [laʔ, laʔ, ʕafw] laʔ l-lqa:ʔ waħħid =

[No, no, sorry] No, put the interview aside =

6. Dhyaa: = ʔi: HA:ÐA TAʤRI:Ħ HA:ÐA >dddd< txalli:ni nta ddd ttahimni

ʔa:ni mu: ʃa:ʕir. <u>mnu: ha:ða</u> ʃ-ʃa:ʕir l-li: ga:il lak?

= This is libel this >dddd< you are making me ddd accusing

me that I am <u>not a poet</u>. <u>Who</u> told you so?

7. Ali: ðo:lah min ʔaqrab n-na:s lli: ʔilak =

Those who are the closest people to you

8. Dhyaa: = mnu: ðo:lah l-ʔaqrab?

How are those closest?

9. Ali: ma: ʔagdar ʔaðkur lak ʔasmaʔ ħatta:[

I even cannot tell you their names [

10. Dhyaa: [la: <u>radʒa:ʔan</u> la: ha:ða: tadʒri:ħ ʔhhh

radʒa:ʔan radʒa:ʔan ((qa:ma wa ɣa:dara l-maka:n ɣa:dˁban))

[No, <u>please</u>, this is libel ahh please, please ((left

the place angrily))

In this excerpt, Ali makes a false statement in line 1 when he states that Dhyaa's poems are not his own and that he buys them from other famous poets. Even though Ali himself acknowledges that it may not be true when he names it a 'blurb', asking such a question proves provocative and offensive. Ali brings this defamatory question into the discussion in order to provoke Dhyaa. In return, Dhyaa takes offence at Ali's false statement. Dhyaa displays his negative evaluation of Ali's statement in various ways. First, he questions Ali's statement through a repair token 'what?'. Here, Dhyaa wants to know more about what Ali means or intends to mean. Chapter Five will explain that when recipients encounter an impolite statement from the pranksters, they appear confused at the beginning. They usually question what the speaker means by the statement as a remedial practice done through repair initiation. Dhyaa's negative evaluation when saying 'what?' is reinforced by his nonverbal reactions, namely, his adjustment and staring at Ali. Second, Dhyaa's responses follow a quick pace, which has been represented by the equal sign (=). We see no break or gap between Dhyaa's and Ali turns from line 3 to 7. Third, in 7, Dhyaa quickly says, ">dddd<" quickly which is not a word. This shows his emotional reaction (see Chapter Five). Fourth, he explicitly categorizes what Ali does as an act of libel in line 7 and 10 when saying, "this is libel". Finally, he uses negative particles in line 10 "No, please, this is libel ahh please, please" when he is leaving the location and Ali urges him not to leave by grabbing his hand.

This excerpt shows how Dhyaa reacts towards Ali's act of defamation through a number of disaligning tokens such as questioning, quick response, negative particles, and nonverbal reactions. This disalignment is accompanied by disaffiliation. i, e. At the level of affection and stance, Dhyaa disapproves what Ali is saying. All Dhyaa's reactions count as evidence of Ali's

success in his prank. By making a defamatory statement, Ali intended to provoke and make Dhyaa angry.

The concept of defamation is deeply rooted in the moral order. It has a serious impact on the recipient's reputation. In terms of the effect of defamation and its publicity, Shuy (2010) states that "defamation reorders the relationship between an individual and a community" (p. 10). Briefly, Ali's defamation and Dhyaa's disaffiliative reactions in this example explain why the pranksters employ defamation as a conversational practice for getting their targets involved in a verbal dispute and why the targets, especially the ones who are famous stars in Iraq become indignant in response to the defamatory statements.

3.6.3 ACCUSATION

Accusation constitutes a suitable conversational practice for the pranksters to trigger a disaffiliative act on the recipient's end and to create a sequence of argument. As previously explained, the pranksters use conversational sequence to cover the time allocated to the program. How does accusation contribute to creating a sequence?

Accusations always project dispreferred actions. Atkinson and Drew (1979) studied accusations in light of sequence and preference organization. In their view, accusations restrict the recipient's possible responses to actions like denial, request of justification, request of clarification (Chapter Four in this dissertation), counter accusation (p. 112). Otherwise, accepting an accusation may be damaging and may have consequential complications. The pranksters know that a response to an accusation would always be a disaffiliative act. Therefore, they find it to be a good means for setting up an undesirable situation.

In the following example, Ali, the prankster, is a shop owner, and a lady, Zabuna, is the customer. She returns a cell phone because it is not working. In order to engage the lady in the prank, Ali refuses to accept the action of returning. He accuses the customer of having burnt the device, claiming that he had sold it to her in its own pocket, implying that the device was brand new. Now, accepting Ali's accusation would cost the customer a considerable amount of money as she is looking for a full refund.

Example (17)

1. Ali: ha:i nti ħa:ragtah
   Seemingly, you have burnt it
2. Zabuna: ʔasˁlan ma la:ʕba bi:h. mdʒarrad xalle:tlah simkart maʃtaɣal =
   I have not used it in the first place. I just put the SIM card in it
   and it did not work
3. Ali: ha:ða: mħtarag mħtarag [ha:ða: ʔasˁlan mħtarag
   Burnt, burnt. [This is burnt in the first place
4. Zabuna: [ɣe:r nta ba:ijʕlija:h mħtarag
   [That is because you sold it burnt to me
5. Ali: ʔadri: ʔinti mn ʔaxaðti: mna: mina lmaħal ʤe:ti:ni
   ʔu: ʕa:malti:ni: ʕale:h FAĦASˁTA LO" MA: FAĦASˁTAH?
   Okay, when you took it from my store, and we bargained
   over the price, I checked it did not I?
6. Zabuna: hatta: gtli: ʔiða ʃakkalti si:mkart w huwwa muɣlaq

ʔiʃhani: [θala:θ sa:ʕa:t

You even told me that if you put a SIM card on it charge it for [three hours

7. Ali: [ʔadri: ʔA:NI: FAĦASˁTA LO" MA: FAĦASˁTAH?

[I know. I checked it did I not?

8. Zabuna: ma:dri:. la: huwwa bilpake:t ntˁe:tnijja:h. ma: faħasˁtlija:h

No, you gave it to me unopened. You did not check it for me

9. Ali: ʃlo:n ma: faħasˁtah

How come I did not check it?

10. Zabuna: ma: faħasˁtah =

You did not check it =

11. Ali: = ʔA:NI: MUSTAĦI:L JITˁLAʕ MO:BA:IL MNALMAĦAL ʔU: MA: ʔAFAĦSˁAH

= IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT I SELL A CELL PHONE WITHOUT CHECKING IT

12. Zabuna: ʧa:n ʔaku: <u>wa:ħid</u> maʕru:ḍ faħasˁtah. bas ha:ða mntˁatnija:h huwwa bilpake:t jaʕni: ma faħasˁtah gddami:. ham ʧa:n ʔaku: na:s ʕale:k hwa:ja fmadaqqaqt ʕale:h. mn wsˁalt lilbe:t ʃakkaltah si:mkart ʃaħħantah θala:θ sa:ʕa:t maʃtaɣal niha:ʔijjan

There was <u>one</u> for exhibition that you checked. But you gave me this one unopened. You did not check it probably because there were many

customers you were busy with. Once I reached home, I put a SIM card on it and charged it for three hours and it never worked.

13. Ali: ʕadʒi::b!

This is weird!

In order to get Zabuna involved in the prank, Ali not only refuses to accept the returned cellphone from Zabuna, but also accuses her of having burnt it. He does so to avoid taking responsibility for the problem and accepting the returned item. As such, Zabuna, of course, denies Ali's accusation. She forms a dispreferred action through an "extreme case formulations" (Pomerantz, 1986) by using words like 'in the first place', and,'just' in line 2: "I have not used it in the first place. I just put the SIM card and it did not work". When Ali repeats the accusation, showing his insistence and aggravation, she needs to aggravate her response, as well (see chapter 4). This time she makes a counter accusation when she alleges that he has given her a damaged cell phone in the first place "That is because you sold it burnt to me" (turn 4). Drew (1978) argues that accusations can be performed by "the production of descriptions of the scenes" (p. 1). In this exchange, descriptions play an important role, not only as resources for constructing interactional and conversational moves but also as resources for evaluating (justifying/ denying) each other's accusations.

After exchanging accusations, they start to justify the validity of their own accusation and to prove the invalidity of the other's by recalling the moments of the purchase act. The narrative descriptions constitute what Atkinson and Drew (1979) called "the basis for the accusation" (p. 106). These bases are usually established "progressively" and constructed through descriptions (p. 106). As a prankster, Ali extends the argument. To justify his accusation, Ali recalls the moments in which the purchase act took place and urges Zabuna to remember that he (allegedly) had checked

whether the device worked before she took it. This could be just a claim. Zabuna, however, refers to the fact that the device was still in its original package, which means it was unopened and could not possibly have been checked: "you gave it to me unopened. You did not check it for me" (turn 8). This is to prove that Ali's claim that he had checked it is invalid. Ali makes an argument based on one of his sales policies, "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT I SELL A CELL PHONE WITHOUT CHECKING IT" (in line 11). As the capitalization denotes, Ali raises his voice to trigger more adversaries. This time, Zabuna provides a range of actions (in line 12) as evidence for the validity of her claim as follows:

- Detail 1: Identifying the mistake: "There was one for exhibition that you checked"
- Detail 2: Providing an account for the mistake: "You did not check it probably because there were many customers you were busy with"
- Detail 3: The problem: "Once I reached home, I put a SIM card on it and charged it three hours and it never worked".

This example shows that accusations are immoral. Therefore, they are suitable, as interactional practices, for extending conversational sequences to cover the amount of time allocated for the program and for establishing an argument through the conversational sequences.

3.6.4 PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS

A provocative question describes any question that provokes the interlocutor by either offending him or creating an opposing situation in which the recipient is not willing to participate (see Chapter Four). Provocative questions take many forms, including unanswerable questions (Whisner, 2008), hostile questions (Heritage, 2002), private questions (concerning the recipient's

private life), accusatory questions (Clayman & Heritage, 2002) that may leave a serious impact on the recipient, and rhetorical questions (Bousfield, 2008). In fact, most of the adversary conversations in my data are formed through the adjacency pair of question-answer. What those types of questions have in common is that they challenge the interlocutor.

Heritage and Clayman (2002) similarly observed what they call 'hostile questioning' in news interviews where the interviewers try to drive the interviewees to a dilemma. They do so by manipulating the practice of asking questions in a way that is "understood as engaged in "questioning" rather than stating an opinion" (p. 217). In what follows, I will discuss two types of provocative questions: unanswerable and accusatory.

3.6.4.1 Unanswerable questions

Unanswerable questions are questions that are beyond the recipient's limits of knowledge, either because he cannot answer them or because the questions are designed in such a way that they cannot be answered. In either case, directing an unanswerable question to the recipient constitutes a challenge and may lead to an argument. In the following example, Jawad, a prankster and television program host, asks Khalaf, an Iraqi actor, to evaluate himself. Khalaf, however, illustrates his reluctance to the question by implying that it is either the wrong question for him or that he is not in a position to answer it.

Example (18)

1. Jawad: ngdar nʕruf l-basˁma l-fannijah li: tarakha: Khalaf Zedan l-ldʒmhu:r?
   Can you tell us what is Khalaf Zedaan's best artwork familiar to his fans?

2. Khalaf: °ha:i nta tʕrufha: wa l-ldʒmhu:r jiʕrufha:°

You and the fans know that

3. Jawad: ʔiħchinnajja:ha: ʔiħchinnajja:ha:

Come on tell us about it tell us about it

4. Khalaf: ʃaħchikjj↑a:ha:

Tell you what?

5. Jawad: ʔiħchinnajja:ha: sta:ð

Tell us about it, dear

6. Khalaf: ʃnu: l-basˁma ʔaħchinnajja:ha: [lo: ʔaʃawfakjjaha: ((sa:xiran))

What? I talk about my best artwork [or I show it to you? ((sarcastically))

7. Jawad: [ahh la:(h) jaʕni: ʃnu: l-ʕamal l-li:

qarrab Khalaf Zidan ʔila l-ldʒmhu:r wnʕaraf min xila:lah?

[Ahh la: (h) I mean what is

the work that brought you to the public?

8. Khalaf: ʔastaɣfirulla:h (0.2) ((ħa:kkan rasa)) °waqqif hai: waqqif° ((li-lka:mera))

Oh my God. (0.2) ((scratching head)) °stop that stop° ((to the camera))

9. Jawad: le:ʃ↑?

Why↑?

10. Khalaf: ʃ (.) ʃbi:k nta? madri:nta ʃlo:n tiħtʃi: JAWAD (0.3) >ʃBI:K< nta?

W (.) What is wrong with you? I don't know how you talk JAWAD (0.3)

>WHAT< is wrong with you?

11. Jawad: da:gullak[

I am saying [

12. Khalaf: [ʔasila ha:i ʔasila?

[Are these questions? Are these questions?

13. Jawad: ʃnu:- ʃbi:h s-suʔa:l Khalaf le:ʃ hi:tʃi:? =

What- what is wrong with the questions Khalaf? Why are you saying that =

14. Khalaf: = ʃnu:::↓ ʔiħtʃinna basˁmah ma:ltak? l-basˁmah- ʔinta tiħtʃi: ʕala:

basˁmti:? ʔinta fanna:↑n w kul fanna:n jiʕurfuh dʒmhu:rah.

Hwa jidʒi: jiħtʃi ʕan basˁmtah↑? =

= What is ahhhh↓ tell us your best artwork? You talk about

my best artwork. You are an actor↑ and every actor is known by his fans.

Can he talk about his own best artwork? =

15. Jawad: = ʔusta:ð Khalaf, ʔinta mubtaʕid ʕan s-sa:ħa l-fannjiah =

= Dear Khalaf, you have been away from acting =

16. Khalaf: = >ha:i ʕalmo:kjjiaha< dʒdi:da::↓? =

= Did they teach you that recently↓?

17. Jawad: =>la:, la:, smaħli:<[

=>No, no excuse me<[

18. Khalaf: [Jawad, xal tku:n ʕasiltak mdˁabbatˁah. ʔa:ni: lo:

ma: ħtiraman la:::: cha:n ʕfta t-tasdʒi:l. Jawad, xalli:ni::: ahh

ʔa:ni: wja:k ħdu:d

[Jawad, you should prepare your questions

properly. If it weren't fo::::r being polite, I would have left the studio. Jawad, you must maintain a distance between the two of us.

In this excerpt, even though Jawad asks a polite question (in line 1) and even though this question may not appear unanswerable, Khalaf's response suggests that it's not an appropriate question to direct at him. He produces a rejection, "You and the fans know that". So far the interaction appears normal. Jawad urges him to give an answer in line 3, "Come on tell us about it tell us about it" which conflicts with Khalaf's unwillingness to answer, "What to tell you?" (in line 4) in which Khalaf raises his voice, showing his surprise at Jawad's insistence. In line 6, "What? I talk about my best artwork [or I show it to you?" in responding to Jawad's insistence, Khalaf formulates his response in such a way that (a.) shows why he cannot answer the question, (b.) shows where the question is wrong. We see that he aggravates his reluctance in a peaceful manner; in line 2 he simply rejects it, in line 4 he raises his voice, and in line 6 he ridicules Jawad's question sarcastically where Jawad gently laughs and Khalaf turns to the cameraman with a smile. Now the expectation is that if there is more insistence on Jawad's side, Khalaf will come up with a stronger response. In line 7, Jawad reproduces the question with the same content: "I mean what is the work that brought you to the public?" This repetition demonstrates how speakers sometimes reconstruct their questions in order to continue challenging their recipients (Heinemann, 2008, p. 68).

Throughout this exchange, Jawad reproduces his question as in line 7, "I mean what is the work that brought you to the public?" or he defends the suitability of it, as in line 13, "what is wrong with the questions Khalaf?". In return, Khalaf's responses gradually become more exasperated. In line 8, he uses the expression "ʔastaɣfirulla:h", "oh my God," a discourse marker used in Arabic for showing anger and disagreement. Sequentially, it marks an advanced sequence

of conflict, meaning it is used as a response to someone's insistence on a disagreement or an undesirable act. Then Khalaf pauses the recording at the same turn as a sign of his reaction toward Jawad's insistence. In my data, pausing recording marks an escalated tension. In line 14, Khalaf invokes a normative belief an artist's fans know his most important work, "You talk about my best artwork. You are an actor↑ and every actor is known by his followers. Can he talk about his own best artwork?". Then, Jawad provides an account for asking such questions:"Dear Khalaf, you have been away from acting". He shows that he wants to know Khalaf's most important work because Khalaf has been on hiatus. In the last line, Khalaf requests that Jawad maintain the social distance between the two of them: "Jawad, you should prepare your questions properly. If it weren't fo::::r being polite, I would have left the studio. Jawad, you must maintain a distance between the two of us".

This exchange demonstrates how the prankster (Jawad) manipulates the target by asking a question that Khalaf finds wrong or unanswerable. The example also illustrates how Jawad capably projects conversational sequences by reproducing the same question, defending its appropriateness or providing an accountability for asking such a question. Questions easily manipulate in interviews. They perform various functions, among which is causing offence.

3.6.4.2 Accusatory questions

What is an accusatory question? An accusatory question is the question that contains an accusation that suggests the recipient has an ill-intention. Accusatory questions trigger defensive second pair parts in conversation (Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 50). Therefore, trial conversations provide the best examples for accusatory questions (p. 50; cf. Komter, 2013, p. 627) as in the example below.

How do the pranksters exploit accusatory questions in their pranks? Because accusatory questions are offensive in nature, they function as one of the interactional practices for getting the targets involved in a conflict. What gives the pranksters the ability to ask accusatory questions is their institutional positions as television program hosts (cf. Clayman & Heritage, 2002). The following example is designed to be an artistic trial. The anchors tell the interviewee that the program is an artistic trail; the first of its kind in Iraq. They cite the decline of Iraqi art as the motive behind the establishment of such programs. From the beginning they tell the artist that they do not tend to praise his achievements; rather, they will focus on criticizing their artwork. Because of this their program is not conventional. The form of the program is as follows: Ali claims to be a judge, Hibah will play the role of lawyer, defending the artist being interviewed, and the artist will be indicted. As we see, the whole program centers on accusation.

Context: this scene is about "setting talk" (Maynard & Zimmerman, 1984, p. 301) which means it takes place before the program starts. Sinan, an Iraqi actor, enters the studio and greets Ali and Hiba, the two program hosts. Sinan starts shaking hands first with Hiba, who sits at the left side of the table. Ali, however, criticizes him by stating that he should have started from the right regardless of who is on the left side.

Example (19)

1. Sinan: salamu ʕale:kum
   `Greeting
2. Ali: ʕale:kmu ssala:m
   Greeting

3. Hiba: ja: ʔahlan wa sahlan. ʕale:kmu ssala:m

Greeting

(0:2)

4. Sinan: tˤabʕan ‘lady first’

Of course, Lady((ies)) first

5. Hiba: ʔahlan ((musˤa:faħah))

Hi, ((hand shaking))

6. Ali: lakinna lqawa:ʕid lʕaʃa:ʔirijjah taqu::l mina ljami:↑n

ħatta: waʔin ka:n ahhh nisa::ʔ

ʔaw: maθalan ʔatˤfa:l ʔaw: ʔajʃi: mina ljami:n lqiud lʕaʃa:ʔirijjah taqu:l =

But our tribal customs say: from the right↑ side even if the left is wome:n,

orr childre:n or anybody. The tribal customs say start from right =

7. Sinan: = biʕtiba:r lbalad muħtal fanatbaʕ qawa:ni:n lmuħtal

Considering that the country is occupied, we follow the occupier’s rules

8. Ali: tunkir ʕiraqi:tak? =

Are you denying being Iraqi? =

9. Sinan: = >ʔabadan<↑ ((muħddiqan li Ali)) (.) >ʔabadan<. Di::r ba:lak.

= >Never<↑ ((staring at Ali)) (.) >never<. I warn you

(0:2)

10. Ali ((muħddiqan))

((Stairs back))

11. Sinan: Di::r ba:lak bhaða ssuʔa:l

Be careful with such a question

In this example, cross-cultural differences in greeting norms lead to conflict. Hibah is seated on the left side and Ali on the right. When entering the studio, Sinan starts shaking hands with Hibah first, following western cultural norms as he utters "lady first" when greeting Hibah. In Islamic and Arab cultures, it is a well-recognized principle that one would start shaking hands from the right side to the left side upon greeting a group of people, as encouraged in religious texts. By greeting Hibah from the left side, however, Sinan does not abide by Iraqi-Islamic culture, leading to the interpersonal conflict seen in the example.

In line 6, Ali criticizes Sinan's handshaking by saying, "But our tribal customs say: from the right side even if the left is wome:n, orr childre:n orr anybody" implying that he should have abided by the *Usuul* of greeting by starting from the right side regardless of who sits on the left side. Here, Ali invokes expectancies of Iraqi cultural norms recognized by his peers. Ali's act of criticism projects a dispreferred act on Sinan's side. In return, Sinan invokes a patriotic discourse by calling the coalition forces, especially the Americans, the 'occupier'. Here, he disaffiliates with Ali's criticism by giving an account that he follows the occupier's rules, since the country is still under occupation. Here, Ali exploits the nationalistic discourse. Ali asks Sinan an accusatory question, "Are you denying being Iraqi?" (in line 8), which proves very provocative for Sinan. Sinan's strong reaction is evident in his quick response with no gap between his and Ali's turns (represented by =) as well as in his use of the word 'never' twice in a strong tone followed by an act of warning: "I warn you".

Nationalism is among the most popular discourses in Iraq. Actors always talk about nationalism by sending salutes to the Iraqi forces or the like when interviewed. Because nationalism counts among the common discourses in Iraq and on television screens, accusing an actor of lacking loyalty to his country is very provocative. Maybe it is because of this sensitivity that Ali evokes nationalism to provoke Sinan. The popularity of nationalist criticism is evident in the following two comments from metaparticipant (YouTube users).

The first metaparticipant says, “Sinan Azzawi is a patriot and pro-reform Iraqi artist”, and the second one says, “Sinan Azzawi is a noble and patriot actor”. Both of these metaparticipants describe Sinan as being patriotic instead of, for example, being polite. The mention of patriotism in YouTube comments is one way to find out such common and everyday topics among the common discourses in Iraqi culture.

This example shows how the prankster Ali leverages a sensitive topic like nationalism to accuse and ultimately drive Sinan to produce negative emotional reactions. It is interesting that Ali was able to establish an argument by accusing Sinan even before the program took place.

3.6.5 CRITICISM

Tracy and et al. (1987) define criticism as an act of “finding fault” which “involves a negative evaluation of a person for an act for which he or she is deemed responsible” (p. 56). They

argue that there is no guarantee in the consequences of giving criticism because the recipient "may take offence and become angry" (p. 46). Therefore, in order to avoid being impolite, a speaker should achieve 'multiple-goals' at the same time when giving criticism; He must deliver the criticism in such a way that it will not be taken personally and will allow him to maintain the social relationship at the same time (p. 46).

Unlike other T.V. programs in which the guests usually receive praise, the pranksters in candid camera shows criticize their guests by 'finding fault' in their artwork. In those programs, criticism constitutes a suitable practice for delivering impoliteness. To this end, the pranksters design their programs in a way that allows them to dexterously criticize their targets' professionalism. In the following example, Ali and Hibah are two pranksters and Talal is a famous Iraqi actor. Before the program starts, Ali illustrates to Talal that their program is not conventional because it is considered an artistic trial as illustrated in the previous example. This scenario serves as pretext on the pranksters' side to justify practicing impoliteness.

Example (20)

1. Ali: ʔalʔdwa:r lʔasa:sijja jaftaqirlha: Talal Hadi
   Talal Hadi usually does not play primary roles[10]
2. Talal: ʔalʔdwa:rʔ =
   Roles? =
3. Ali: ʔarraʔi:sijjah

[10] The main character

Primary ((roles))

4. Talal: jaftaqirlha:?

Does not play?

5. Ali: ʔi: (.) kulha: θa:nawijjah

Yes. (.) It is all secondary roles

6. Talal: maku: hitʃ ħatʃi: =

This is not true =

7. Ali: = laʔ

= NO

(0:2)

8. Talal: ʔana: batˁal ʔakbar musalsal lilqawa:ʕid ʔhh fi: qawa:ʕid lluɣa lʕarabijjah fi lwatˁan lʕarabi:

I am the protagonist of the biggest series in Arabic Grammar in the Arab World.

Talal is criticised by way of a negative evaluation of his artistic career. By criticizing Talal's roles in movies "Talal Hadi usually does not play primary roles" (line 1), Ali finds fault in Talal's career and projects a dis-preferred next action. Before responding to Ali's criticism, Talal first checks his understanding, "Roles?" (line 2), and "Does not play?" (line 4) (see chapter five). Then, he defends himself through an act of denial, "This is not true" (line 6). Ali confirms his criticism when he negates Talal's denial when saying, "No" in line 7 with no mitigation or explanation or evidence that could portray his criticism as not personal. However, to prove that Ali's criticism is wrong, Talal, upon Ali's insistence, shows evidence when saying, "I am the protagonist of the biggest

series in Arabic Grammar in the Arab World". Here, Talal refers to his role as the protagonist of a television series produced for the purpose of explaining the Arabic grammar, which was broadcast in Iraq and the Arab World. The way Talal expresses his last turn is interesting; he states that his series was the biggest one in Arabic Grammar in the entire Arab World.

In conclusion, the examples analyzed in this chapter show how the pranksters put the targets in a reality by catching them in action and exposing their true selves. They also show that the pranksters are capable of performing their practical jokes (pranks) in a serious manner. Using various interactional practices, they succeeded in prompting the targets to produce impolite demeanors. Impoliteness is not madness; as a social action, it should be accountable and justified. We saw how the pranksters created real situations to situate their pranks in a way of which the targets are completely unaware. Some of those situations offer great examples of impoliteness that cannot easily be captured in reality.

4. SELF-DEFENSE AND OTHER-CRITICISM: THE REALIZATION OF IMPOLITENESS

Using the principles of ethnomethodology, which concentrates on participants' methods for organizing everyday activities, this chapter investigates the grounds participants use for evaluations. I focus in this chapter on how the recipients realize and discursively constitute those background expectancies in their responses to impoliteness. I will also investigate other issues through the following fine-grained questions:

How do the participants realize *Usuul?*

How does their practical reasoning discursively form *Usuul* in Iraqi culture?

How do they evaluate the pranksters' offensive social acts and meanings?

Understanding social norms, which are contingent upon various social/personal and emergent/recurrent factors in the course of interaction varies across participants. Pertaining to normative expectations, Chapter Two illustrated the different layers of morality and various footings in interaction. In addition, other factors that may lead to different evaluations because

> not all norms that exist in a society are recognized or accepted by all members of that society. Similarly, not all behaviors that trope upon norms occur equally routinely or are intelligible equally widely; not all intelligible tropes are ratified by those who can construe them; not all the ones that are ratified come to be presupposed in wider social practices or get normalized in ways that get widely known. (Agha, 2007, p. 5).

What all these variations tell us is that evaluating social actions is a complex process as it varies according to different criteria. I suggest that the variation in social norms should be reflected in analyzing and describing the participants' evaluative practices. The variation can be applied to the

dyadic argument between speaker and recipient in evaluating one another's inappropriate actions. As previously explained, Usuul is not a given or fixed idea; it can be invoked in the course of interaction for the purpose of evaluation or it can be discursively formed in accordance with ongoing actions. Social norms usually "consist of descriptions from the point of view of the collectivity member's interests in the management of his practical affairs" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 76).

Evaluating impoliteness can be reduced to two main practices derived from the examples studied in this chapter in agreement with other researchers' findings, namely 'other-criticism' (Mitchell and Haugh, 2015, p. 210) and self-defense (cf. Leech, 2014 for differentiating self and other, p. 20). Researchers who worked on the idea of 'face' in impoliteness use what they call 'offensive-defensive' strategies (Bousfield, 2008, pp. 126-127, Culpeper et al., 2003, p. 1562). Evaluating social actions of others, such as attributing responsibility and exchanging blame, sometimes opens the door to mutual criticism or what Watson (1978) calls "competing claims or competing accounts" (p. 10.5). This means that evaluation is not a fleeting event, but rather a discursive action formed through conversational sequences when the participants take social norms as the basis for assessing socially impolite actions. Variations of evaluation may also stem from the fact that first-order impoliteness is argumentative[11] (Eelen, 2001, p. 37) given that social norms vary according to the ongoing situation and the participation order.

Self-defense consists of descriptive practices by which a participant aims to exhibit the accountability or normative properties of his conduct, namely that his conduct is in accordance with the background expectancies of *Usuul*. Examples of such practices include, but are not limited

[11] According to Eelen (2001), argumentative refers to "various forms of 'involvedness'" (p. 37).

to, descriptions of the rightness of someone's own conduct. For Culpeper et al. (2003) 'defensive strategies' mean "defending one's own face … such strategies seek to deflect, block, or otherwise manage the face attack" (p.1563). Since their research is based on the notion of face, they conceptualize defensive moves as a counter strategy in light of the speaker's attack. In this chapter, however, self-defense is closely linked to the notion of accountability and normativity as explained above.

Other-criticism encompasses practices of finding fault in others' conduct by which a participant forms negative evaluation such as questioning the accountability of the other's conduct. Through evaluative practices of other-criticism participants perform myriad negative speech acts including blame, censure, criticism, and complaint. Other-criticism also involves those practices that reveal another's act to be in marked contrast with normativity. For Garfinkel (1963) an action that breaches normativity is "senseless" which "acquires the perceived properties of unpredictability, arbitrary occurrence, indeterminateness, lacking causal texture, means character, and moral necessity" (p. 196). When depicting another's conduct as breaching normativity, a participant may portray the conduct as lacking accountability, wrong, inappropriate, unexpected and others.

The data for this project demonstrate that the conversations involve morality, meaning that the conversationalists' primary goal is to evaluate their own and other's conduct by tacitly invoking social norms. Drew (1998) states,

> the moral work that speakers may manage through describing their own or others' conduct is very frequently deeply implicit or embedded in their descriptions, in which case the

moral evaluative "point" of an account may not come to be explicitly addressed by the participants in an interaction. (p. 296).

Previous research shows that the sensitivity of delivering criticism requires some mastery with respect to *how* and *when* to deliver it (Pillet-Shore, 2015). When performing other-criticism speakers tend to show their credibility vis-a-vis the other's lack of credibility (Pillet-Shore, 2015). To do so, lay members employ their first-order commonsense reasoning or what Garfinkel calls "the documentary method of interpretation" ubiquitously "taken for granted" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 35) for every competent member. This method includes "a wide array of presuppositions and inferential procedures" (Heritage & Clayman, 2010, p. 11) used by participants to categorize actions and evaluate them. To exhibit their credibility and another's lack of credibility, a speaker may exercise agency by resorting to evaluative practices stemming from mundane reasoning or common-sense knowledge that display social sanctions known by every member. Garfinkel (1967) discusses a member's competence in relation to common sense knowledge when a member is perceived as a "bona-fide and competent collectivity member" who "is entitled to exercise that he is capable of managing his everyday affairs without interference" (p. 57). Accordingly, violating Usuul would straightforwardly be recognized by members of the same sociocultural network as a socially marked behavior (Locker and Watts 2005; Locher, 2004).

In accordance with interactional approaches, any emic understanding must be conceptualized discursively and dynamically in context (Haugh, 2006). I argue that in their emic understanding of impoliteness, the participants orient to self-defense and other-criticism vis-a-vis Usuul, which provides accountability for one's social conduct in terms of rightness and/or wrongness. In order to behave in accordance with social norms, an individual has to behave within

the societal, smaller social network, and personal or localized interactional background expectancies (Kádár and Haugh, 2013). *Usuul* in relation to any activity or speech act includes what Garfinkel (1963) calls "perceived normality". In Garfinkel's terminology, normality denotes events characterized by recognized features like "typicality, comparability, likelihood, causal texture, instrumental efficacy, and moral requiredness" (p. 188). In cases of violation, however, social acts are perceived by members of a particular relational network "as being atypical, causally indeterminate, and arbitrary in occurrence, without a relevant history or future, means character, or moral necessity" (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 189). By referring to norms of *Usuul* in evaluating one another's acts, the participants implement myriad interactional practices of self-defense and other-criticism. Those practices reflexively display the participants' emic understanding of impoliteness as first-order.

4.1 Understandings of *Usuul*

Chapter Two explained how participants conceptualize *Usuul*. This section explains their divergent understandings and different uses of *Usuul*. Because participants' understandings of *Usuul* vary*,* evaluating social actions by invoking normative frames remains subject to multiple interpretations (Haugh, 2010; Culpeper & Huagh 2014). Eelen (2001) explains that since first-order im/politeness is interwoven with social norms and always implies "some social effect" (p. 40), it is argumentative in the sense that what seems impolite to one participant may not be so for another. To better understand the argumentativity of the participants' evaluations over Usuul, we can take a look at the following example. In this exchange, which takes place on a television program, Yasser is the show host, and Lolita plays the role of a poet who is only in her twenties

but has acquired millions of Facebook followers for being very famous and active on social media. A third participant, Karrar, is a young singer. During the episode, Yasser expresses his doubt regarding Lolita's poetic talent, claiming that she does not deserve such high numbers of followers on Facebook. Instead, he argues that the fans like her beauty, not her poetic talent. What Yasser and Lolita are simply doing here is setting up a moral conflict to get Karrar involved. Lolita takes great offence at Yasser's criticism. Seemingly, Yasser's dismissal of Lolita is immoral. The relational network of members who work in media believes young talents should be supported and encouraged. Yasser defies this understanding, which involves the second-order morality defined as shared norms among members of any group institutional or not (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 95).

Example (1)

1. Yasser: jiʕni: madaʕrf ʔinti le:ʧ ma:xða ha:ða lħadʒm jiʕni:
   I mean, I cannot believe why you have millions of followers
   (Turns eliminated)
2. Yasser: ma: ʔaʕrf. Bas ha:ði widʒhat naðˁari: ʃ-ʃaxsˁijjah
   I don't know, but this is my own point of view.
3. Lolita: ʔinta sa:ʕah tqra:li: ħatta tdʒi:bni: l-lħalqa, hassah txtalif ʕalijja, ʃnu:?↑ =
   You were begging me just to accept your invitation,
   but now you are all different. What is the matter?
4. Yasser: = daqi:qah, waggif ((li-lmsˁawwri:n)). Waggif ka:mera:t, daqi:qa
   Just a second. Stop recording ((to the cameraman)). Stop it.
5. Lolita: ʃnu:? ʃnu:↑?
   What is that? What is that?

6. Yasser: ʔawwal ʃi: ha:j mu: lahdʒah tiħtʃi:n bi:ha ma:l (.) ‘tqra:li’

First of all, “you were begging me” is not how you speak

7. Lolita: ha:i ħaqi:qah mu: lahdʒah =

= This is a fact

8. Yasser: la:, la:, hai: luɣa mu: luɣat tlfizio:n

=No, no this language is inappropriate for T.V.

9. Lolita: ta:dʒ ra:si: hai: ħaqi:qah mu: luɣa

My dear, this is a fact, nothing else

10. Yasser: ha:i mu: luɣat tlfizio:n okai? ʔa:ni: dʒibtaʧ dˤaifa la:

niħtʃi biħtra:m w niħtʃi bmuka:n muħtaram

This language is inappropriate for T.V. okay? I hosted you as a guest,

so you should speak respectfully because this is a respectable place.

11. Lolita: >ʔINTA maħtaramtni:< ʔa:ni: ʃlo:n ʔaħtarmak? = ((biɣa:dˤib))

How come I do? when you did not? ((angrily)) =

12. Yasser: = ʃnu: maħtarmʧ? =

= What do you mean that I do not respect you?

13. Lolita: ʔaku: wa:ħid jixabir ssa:ʕah bilwaħda bille:l?

= Is there anybody who calls at one o’clock at night?

14. Karrar: ((dˤaħkah))

((Laughter))

(0:2)

15. Lolita: huwwa ha:ða muħtaram?

Is this polite?

16. Yasser: ʔa:ni: mxa:braʧ waħda bille:l ʃnu:? datɣazzal

wjja:ʧ? dagullatʃ bachir ʔo:rdar ʔaku:

I called you at one for what reason? Was I flirting with you?

I offered you an invitation ((to the show)).

17. Lolita: bilwaħda?↑ fde:tak, fde:t galbak

At one o'clock↑? Good for you! Good for you! ((sarcastically))

18. Yasser: ʔi:h

ahh

19. Karrar: ʔi:h ʔa:ni: xabrni: bilwaħda

He called me at one o'clock, as well

20. Yasser: sa:ʕah be:ʃ xa:bartak?

((to Karrar)) What time did I call you?

21. Karrar: xabarni: bilwaħda, waħda w nusˁ

You called me between one and one thirty

22. Lolita: ʔinta WALAD (ʕa:ija:tˁah). ʔinta walad ħatta ʔiða: jixabrak

bilwaħda bille:l, biθθnte:n bilxamsah ʕo:kai ʔinta walad

You are A BOY ((shouting)). It is okay with you

even if he calls at one, two, or five because you are a boy.

23. Karrar: ʕo:kai ʕa:ni ʕa:sif ((bihduʔ))

Okay, I apologize ((softly))

24. Lolita: ʕi:h

Yeah

By stating, “I don’t know, but this is my own point of view”, Yasser refers to his previous turn “I cannot believe why you have millions of followers” criticism, namely, that Lolita does not deserve such a large number of Facebook followers. In displaying annoyance, Lolita provides a disaffiliated response, drawing on the word ‘begging’ in line 3, “You were begging me just to accept your invitation, but now you are all different”. Then, she expresses the Nonsensicalness of Yasser’s contrastive behaviors through the question “What is the matter?” in the same line. Not only is Lolita’s response disaffiliative, it’s also offensive; Yasser takes great offense at Lolita’s response, criticizing her for uttering the word ‘begging’ and considering it inappropriate for a T.V. program. We see that a recipient may be reflexively accountable, as well, for providing a negative evaluation. By saying, “this language is inappropriate for T.V.”, Yasser invokes Usuul of that activity: how one is expected to talk properly in a T.V. interview. Yet, he requests pausing recording in line 4.

We see that Yasser and Lolita appeal to competing moral accounts by finding fault in each other’s actions. Lolita finds Yasser’s contrasting frontstage and backstage (Goffman, 1959) behavior unaccountable or what Garfinkel (1963) calls “senseless” or “indeterminate, unpredictable” (p. 189). According to Garfinkel’s theory, senseless actions violate background expectancies. Lolita complains that Yasser was begging her to come to his show before, but now he criticizes her. For her, these two contrastive acts do not make sense. Here, she expresses her expectancies. She also finds fault in Yasser’s phone call when the latter called her at one o’clock at night: “is there anybody who calls at one o’clock at night?”. To validate her criticism, Lolita

utilizes two practices. First, she shows the ubiquity of social norms by saying "is there anyone" to highlight the abnormality of Yasser's call. Pomerantz (1986) points out when speakers strive to prove the validity of their claims, they use what she calls "extreme case formulations" such as "every time, everyone" and others (p. 219). The second practice Lolita applies is utilizing mock impoliteness when she sarcastically refutes Yasser's accountability, which touches upon Yasser's competence. Here, she makes an emic cultural point when saying "Good for you" to mock Yasser's inadequate recognition of the social norms, namely recognizing the complications of calling a female at one o'clock in the morning for any reason. So far, Lolita applies practices of other-criticism only. By contrast, Yasser also finds fault in Lolita's style of speech, censuring her for missing the *Usuul* of speaking during a television show. As explained earlier, he is upset with Lolita for using the word 'begging'. To validate his criticism, he links the morality of the situation to hospitality in line 10. When someone hosts another one, the latter should behave in a kind and respectful way.

As pranksters, Yasser and Lolita set up a moral argument to indirectly invite Karrar, the target of their pranks, to align with either Yasser or Lolita by taking a moral stance. Their prank ultimately succeeds when, in line 19, Karrar aligns with Yasser by saying "He called me at one o'clock, as well". The words "as well" make this alignment evident by implying that Yasser did not have any ill-intention in calling Lolita at one o'clock (cf. Stivers et al., 2011, Steensig, 2012). Karrar's affiliation with Yasser can be interpreted as an act of disaffiliation from Lolita's side. In other words, Karrar's words imply an act of defense in Yasser's favor and criticism for Lolita. In such conversations, where a high degree of conflict exists, a third party should be careful in taking a stance. Karrar's affiliation also implies the invalidity of Lolita's criticism of Yasser. Now Karrar

becomes trapped in the prank and provides Lolita with a pretext to act impolitely against him. As such, it is not surprising that Lolita gets enraged by Karrar's contribution to the conflict. She shouts in Karrar's face when saying, "You are A BOY. It is okay with you". By apologizing to Lolita, Karrar absorbs Lolita's anger and accepts her act.

This example shows how participants disagree about particular social norms by providing disparate and even contrastive accounts for their actions. In their disagreement about social norms, Yasser and Lolita appeal to the here-and-now and there-and-then; Lolita appeals to broader and recurrent social norms such as the *Usuul* of calling a young female at an inappropriate hour. Because this action is part of a broader norm and took place in the participants' relational history[12], it represents a there-and-then understanding of Yasser's discourteous acts. However, Yasser appeals to a more local understanding when defending himself, namely the contextual and pragmatic factors for calling her at that time. He claims that he did not have any ill-intentions when he called her, "I called you at one for what reason? Was I flirting with you? I offered you an invitation [to the show]". This is a local and situational (here-and-now) understanding of impoliteness. Karrar supports this here-and-now understanding when he says, "He called me at one o'clock, as well". However, when he criticizes Lolita for not speaking properly on television, he also appeals to broader norms (how one speaks on television, for example, and norms of hospitality) (cf. Kádár & Haugh, 2013, pp. 76-77). To recapitulate, evaluating impolite actions varies between participants. They appeal to different understandings of *Usuul* when performing self-defense and other-criticism.

[12] Here, Lolita alludes to their relational history by referring to what happened between Yasser and her about the telephone call in a previous time (cf. Kádár and Haugh, 2013, p. 77).

4.2 Practices of realizations of *Usuul*

In what follows, I will describe how Iraqis evaluate one other's inappropriate actions, presented as pranks in candid camera programs. Generally speaking, practices of evaluation fluctuate between defensive and offensive moves. Drew (1998) found that defensive accounts in interaction tend to be implicit when someone demonstrates the rightness of his own conduct. However, when reporting other's wrong conduct, a speaker tends to do so explicitly. For theoretical purposes, this chapter will investigate how *Usuul* is invoked as a source for evaluation. My data suggest that participants appeal to the moral order either explicitly or implicitly. Speakers appeal explicitly to *Usuul* through metalanguage and perform implicit appeal through invocation of the normative frames. Overall, the examples exhibit myriad practices of evaluating social actions: invoking normative expectations (Kádár and Haugh, 2013, Spencer-Oatey, and Kádár, 2015), and metapragmatics. The participants perform broad practices for self-defense and for other-criticism.

4.2.1 DESCRIBING REFLEXIVE AWARENESS AS A SELF-DEFENSE PRACTICE

One of the self-defense practices used in impoliteness is to suggest that someone, as a member of the same relational network, is aware of the speaker's thoughts. According to Culpeper and Haugh (2014), metacognitive awareness "refers to the reflexive presentations of the cognitive status of information and understandings of context and common ground" (p. 242). Metacognitive awareness encompasses reflexive awareness of the participant's deontic status concerning how one is expected to act in terms of rights, obligations, and the moral order, and epistemic status with respect to how the participants realize the truth value and/or are given new information (Stevanovic, 2013, p. 243; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015, p. 1). Reflexive awareness constitutes

one of the primary principles of what Garfinkel (1963) calls 'constitutive expectancies,' when arguing that participants expect each other to have the same expectations of social sanctions (p. 190).

As an additional layer of intersubjectivity, reflexive awareness is a manifestation of the Iraqi participants' emic understanding of *Usuul*. It involves the recognizability of *Usuul* among the members of a relational network. According to Kádár and Haugh (2013), "an action or meaning counts as polite because it is recognisable to participants as polite, but it is recognisable to participants as polite because it is recognised by at least some participants as polite" (p. 184). Normally, an act is impolite because it is recognized as such by members of the same relational network. Garfinkel (1967) argues that members tacitly organize and recognize their common-sense practices by virtue of rationality, including properties of logic and methodology which "are variously available as norms, tasks, [and] troubles" (p. 33). For members, the recognition of actions as im/polite is not only because they are "about familiar scenes, but they are so because it is morally right or wrong that they are so" (p. 35).

The example below is also extracted from a marriage ceremony. Abu Saif is a prankster, Hafiz plays the groom's role, and Husein is an artist who represents Hafiz. Abu Saif comments on the guests' late arrival and his expectation that they would not attend the marriage ceremony after arriving late, which represents an implicit act of other-criticism. The guests, on the contrary, have shown that they fully understand social norms and are quite aware of what the prankster intended to criticize.

Example (2)

1. Guest 1: ʔaku: zaħma biʃʃa:riʕ =

((seemingly)) The roads are crowded =

2. Hafiz: = Jaʕni: tˁ-tˁruq ga:dirlha ʔin ʃa:ʔallah ʔiħna ga:dirlha

= Well, we are capable of making it, capable of making it

3. Abu Saif: glt baʕd Maajidʒu::n =

I thought you would not come =

4. Hafiz: = LE:Σ ja:satta:r? ʔaku: wa:ħid Maajidʒi:↑?

Wa:ħid jintˁi: mauʕid w Maajidʒi:↑? JISˁI:R↑?

WHY for God's sake? Is there anyone who promises to come

and then he would not↑? Is there anybody like that?

Is that even possible↑?

5. Husein: haða kala:m ʕaxla:qi w ʕadabi: w tˁa:lama:

ʔaku: mauʕid ʔiħna jaʕni: l-mauʕid la:zm juħtaram

This is a common courtesy. One should stick to the given appointment.

6. Hafiz: >baʕde:n< ʔiħna ma: tʔaxxarna: ʕale:k dkto:r jaʕni: daqi:qte:n

And we are not late Doctor. Only two minutes ((to Guest 2))

7. Husein: = sˁaħ ha:i wlfanna:ni:n ʕale:hum sumʕa ʔinnu:

bilmawaʕi:d. bas >bas BILĦAQI:QAH BILʕAAKS< jaʕni: mundˁabtˁi:n

dʒiddan bimawa:ʕi:dnah w mafru:dˁ nku:n qdwa↓ mu: ʔusta:ð Hafiz?

It is true that actors have this reputation for not being punctual

but on the contrary, we are very punctual.

We are supposed to be role-models. Right Hafiz?

8. Hafiz: TˁABʕAN ʔAKI:::D↑

OFF COU:::RSE↑

9. Guest 2: muʃta:qi:n lDʒAJJatkum jaʕni:

He meant we ARE GLAD to see you

The first line of this exchange lends itself to more than one interpretation. It could be an implicit criticism after the guests arrived moderately late. This constitutes what Brown and Levinson (1987) call a face-redressing act. And it could simply be interpreted as an opening statement. By taking a look at Hafiz's response, we see that he interprets the first line negatively when stating, "Well, we are capable of making it, capable of making it". If it were an opening statement, Hafiz would have come up with an affiliation. Guest 1 makes a statement in which he alludes to the moderately late arrival. Both Hafiz and Husein take offence to that. In marriage ceremonies, statements like Abu Saif's are relatively negative and provide various inferences. Hafiz shows his astonishment because they were not very late. Husein articulates the importance of the meeting and their commitment to attending.

Now, we can see how reflexive awareness has been achieved. In line 4 "WHY for God's sake? Is there anyone who promises to come and then he would not↑? Is there anybody like that? Is that even possible↑?" Hafiz shows his awareness of the importance of the meeting by talking about the importance of promises. Both the meeting and promise are characterized by commitment. Hafiz uses generalized conventional expressions, "Is there anyone who promises to come and then he would not↑? Is there anybody like that? Is that even possible↑?" He displays a strong stance for which he formulates an extreme case. Pomerantz (1986) argues that to defend themselves participants sometimes use 'extreme case formulations'. Through his statements in line 4, Hafiz

shows his reflexive awareness: not only does he realize the situation and its underlying norms, but he also realizes what Abu Saif means. Likewise, Husein explains the social meaning of attending this meeting: "This is a common courtesy. One should stick to the given appointment". But he formulates an emergent understanding of Abu Saif's utterance within the second layer group-based morality. In line 7 Husein defends actors, as he is an actor, himself. His reflexive awareness comes from the idea that Abu Saif alluded to an existing stereotype, namely, that actors are famous for not committing to promises: "It is true that actors have this reputation for not being punctual, but on the contrary, we are very punctual. We are supposed to be role-models. Right Hafiz?" Here, Husein formulates his response to what Abu Saif may have been thinking. In other words, he shows that he has thought about what Abu Saif thinks about. He uses the word "sˁaħ" which means it is true that actors are notorious for not committing, as if Abu Saif has explicitly meant this. One would say "sˁaħ" to affirm that what the speaker is saying is true.

Husein's understanding is important because it is emergent. When he mentions a stereotype about actors he refers us to a specific understanding among the members of actors' relational network. Here, a wider cultural understanding informs the analysis. The question is: why does Husein think that what Abu Saif said applies to actors? In Iraqi culture, a person who represents a groom and speaks on his behalf at a marriage ceremony has to be qualified. Here, Husein is an actor and he thinks that the bride's family, including Abu Saif, know him. He also believes that they may know the reputation actors have for not being punctual. He defends himself as an actor implying that being moderately late has nothing to do with his identity, because the stereotype is invalid in the first place. All this reflexive awareness constitutes the participants' emic localized understanding of interaction. Moreover, what Hafiz and Husein do here constitute practices of self-

defense which are evaluative because they are uttered as a response to Abu Saif's low expectations when he thought they would not attend.

4.2.2 INVOKING *USUUL* OF RELATIONSHIP

Researchers of the im/politeness field have developed the notion of "relational work" (Locher ,2004; Locher and Watts, 2005; Locher, 2008) and "relational practice" (Fletcher, 1999; Holmes and Marra, 2004; Holmes and, Schnurr, 2006) which "refers to the interpersonal level of communication . . .. It pays tribute to the fact that people are social beings who use language not only to communicate facts but also to shape their identities vis-a`-vis their interactional partners" (Locher 2006, p. 251). Culpeper and Haugh (2014) point out that interpersonal relations and interpersonal attitudes are two strongly-connected areas of interpersonal pragmatics. In their view, interpersonal relations encompass "mutual social connections amongst people that are mediated by interaction, including power, intimacy, roles, rights and obligations", while interpersonal attitudes embrace "perspectives, usually value-laden and emotionally charged, on others that are mediated by interaction, including generosity, sympathy, like/dislike, disgust, fear and anger" (p. 197). In this next section I shall shed light on how the participants invoke interpersonal or relational associations such as entitlements when the appropriateness of conduct is in question.

The exchange below shows how the addressee invokes the relational expectations required for maintaining interpersonal relationships to evaluate the speaker's impolite actions. In'am, an interviewee, criticizes Abd for intruding upon the interview and reproaching Jawad for being unpunctual for causing a delay in blocking Abd's car.

Context: Jawad is the show host and In'am is the interviewee. Abd, a famous actor, intrudes into the interview suddenly and talks to Jawad with irritation because Jawad had not fulfilled his promise that he would move his car, which has been blocking Abd's car for a long time.

Example (3)

1. Abd: Jawad, ʃlo:n tfudˤ muʃkilti:[Jawad? ((ɣa:dˤiban))
   Jawad how are you going to solve my problem [Jawad? ((angrily))
2. Jawad: [ja:bah nta dʒe:t sit Inaam[
   [Hey, when you came Ms.[
3. Abd: [ja:bah wallah tasˤwi:r ʕindi. ma: ntaðˤ ʔa:ni
   [Hey, I swear, I need to do recordings and cannot wait
4. Jawad: Abd, Abd, ʕala ke:fak ʔustað
   Abd, Abd, calm down Mr.
5. Inaam: ʕala ke:fak huhhhh
   calm down ahhhh
6. Abd: st, fdwa lgalbatʃ mawa:ʕida [<muxarbatˤa>
   Ms., with due respect, he is [<disorganized>.
7. Inaam: [jaʕni: tiqbal hassah tiqbal ʔagullak ʕabd? Tiqbal ʔagullak ʕabd↑ mu: ʔilla ʔagullak ʔustað↑
   [Would you accept Now, would you permit me to call you Abd? Don't I

need to call you Mr. Abd?

8. Abd: bilʕaks la:,↓ la:

Of course, why not?

9. Jawad: ʔi: Abd hwwa ʃnu: hwwa?

Yeah, he is Abd. Is he not?

10. In'am: uh::: ʕabbu:di

Uh::: Abu::::di:

11. Abd: ha: ʕu:ni:

Yes, honey

12. Inaam: uh:::: ʔa:ni: mu: muʃkilti:

ahhhh this is not my problem

((Turns omitted))

13. Jawad: bas Abd galli: ra:ħ ʔatˁbag ssaijarah w sˁa:rli nusˁ

sa:ʕah ħadˁirtach dʒe:t mustaʕdʒilah. glna: xal nxbuz l-liqa:ʔ

But Abd permitted me to park my car there and it took me half an hour

and you came quickly in the meantime. We said let us get rid of the show

14. Abd: ʃnu: ΣTSAWWI:? ((muħaddiqan))

What? What are you going to do? ((Staring at Jawad))

15. Jawad: glna: xal nxbuz l-liqa:ʔ w be:n ma: tdʒi: nta

We said that we might get rid of the interview before you return

16. Inaam: >ha:i ʃnu:? ha:i ʃnu:?< ʃnu: nxbuz l-liqa:ʔ?

>What is that? What is that?< What is get rid of the interview?

17. Jawad: >jaʕni: ʕASSARI:ʕ ʃwajjah liʔan<

>I meant QUICKLY a bit because<

18. Inaam: ʃnu: ʔgullak JAWAD, mn saʔaltni gtli: nxbuz[w hassah

Hey JAWAD, by the way, when you asked me you said

let us get rid [too

and now

19. Jawad: [la: jaʕni: hi:ch

DA:Rdʒa hi:chi be:natnah l-ħaja:

[No, I mean this is an informal language between us

and I have no intention behind that

20. Inaam: ʃnu:?

What?

In the first exchange from the beginning to the line (13), there are three moral points germane to interpersonal relationships. These have been studied under the terms “familiarity”, “distance”, and “involvement”.

Through implicitly enacting or discursively formulating a rule of *Usuul* with respect to addressing someone in a formal setting, In’am performs an act of criticism to evaluate Abd’s performance negatively. Her criticism of Abd for not being polite emerges from the latter’s violation of *Usuul* in addressing Jawad. As a relational practice (Holmes and Marra, 2005, Holmes and Marra and Vine, 2011), *Usuul* requires participants to create distance in conversation via devices such as forms of address required by the nature of the relationship. In other words, by criticizing Abd, In'am explicates the background expectancies regarding forms of address, viewing

the relationship between Jawad and Abad as a formal one. In line 7, she implicitly displays how the act should have been performed: “would you permit me to call you Abd? Don’t I need to call you Mr. Abd?”.

The question arises here of why she orients to the problem of address while the two antagonists focus on the parking problem? To address this question, we have to pay close attention to Abd’s overall behavior when he enters the room. Abd intrudes the room angrily and bursts into Jawad’s face, giving the impression of someone who is emotionally enraged. To evaluate Abd’s overall behavior, In’am attempts to show the indelicacy of Abd’s style of talking by using his lack of honorifics as an example. In line 1 Abd calls Jawad by his name twice, which shows Abd’s annoyance. This understanding becomes evident in lines 4 and 5 when both Jawad and In’am try to calm Abd down. In line 6 Abd vindicates his behavior when returning to In’am by attributing the responsibility of the ongoing interaction to Jawad for being unpunctual and disorganized. In’am reinforces her criticism by asking if Abd himself accepts to be called by his name without an honorific form of address. The way she produces the questions induces a particular type of response, namely that Abd would not accept being addressed without honorifics. Defending his mischief, Abd shows that it would be totally fine if he were addressed without honorifics. This time, In’am uses a diminutive form of address that implies intimacy when calling Abd “Abbudy” in line 11 as if she had persuaded Abd to calm down. In return Abd calls her “my eyes” ”, a term of endearment similar “darling” in English, implying intimacy and respect, as well.

By uttering “calm down” in line 5, In'am highlights the inappropriateness of Abd’ behavior. By saying “ʕabbu:dy” in line 10, however, she enacts intimacy in Iraqi culture, which denotes “doing being in relationship” in Morrison’s (1997) terminology. In Iraqi Arabic “ʕabbu:dy”

expresses a diminutive form of address that usually requires a close relationship. If non-intimate participants use such diminutive forms of address, they would offend the recipient, because the diminutive would imply disparagement. If In'am were not acquainted with Abd, she most likely would have called him ʔustað ‘dear’. Using diminutive forms of address is ubiquitous and one of the distinctive features of Iraqi Arabic.

In the second part, which starts from line 13 to line 20, she criticizes Jawad for going beyond the formal relationship between him and her when she questions it in lines 16 and 18. Jawad, however, depicts the relationship as informal when he describes the diminutive as a vernacular expression, assuming he has a close relationship with In'am. In other words, Jawad enacts intimacy in an inappropriate way by using an offensive vernacular expression toward In'am. In'am perceives the express as impolite and therefore, evaluates it as inappropriate. In'am’s criticism in this exchange involves relational work when she invokes two sets of expectations: how one should address the interlocutor in specific situations and how the distance should be discerned when speaking. Missing the *Usuul* of these two sets of expectations implies impropriety and thus invites a negative evaluation.

In the following example, which is extracted from the same exchange Abd denigrates Inaam’s professional skills and claims that she is no longer productive because her generation is over. Criticizing Abd, Inaam expresses her shock articulating that Abd is her friend because of which he should not have acted impolitely.

Example (4)

1. Abd: ja:mʕawwad xlsˁat ra:::ħat >ha:ða ldʒi:l< ra:ħ [dru:ħ ja:mʕawwad

She is too old. This generation is over. [Go away

2. Inaam: ha::: >jaʔ jaʔ jaʔ jaʔ jaʔ< ha:i lguba:ħ

Ha >oh oh oh oh< this is rude

3. Abd: st, hassah ra:ħ [dʒi:lkum wntaha:

Mrs., your generation has ended and is over

4. Inaam: [la:, la:, la:,↓ Abd Ab::::::d↓

No, no, no,↓ Ab::::::d↓

5. Abd: wallah kl jo:m [ʔabtˁa:l ʔabtˁa:l xala:sˁ ha:i hija KA:fi:

Seriously. Everyday [heroes heroes. That is it, ENOUgh

6. Inaam: [>la:, la:, la:, bas bas bas< sˁadi:qi: ʔinta Abd la: tgabbaħ

[>no, no, no, but but but< you're my friend

don't be rude

((Abd jiɣa:dir))

((After Abd left))

7. Inaam: ∘ʔa:ni: ʔabad ma: ʔadri: Abd hichi guba:ħi∘

∘I had never known that Abd is so rude∘

In this excerpt, Abd blames Jawad for his show's failure because he has blocked Abd's car. He takes advantage of the car scenario to create a "morally objectionable" (Goodwin, 2007) environment, enabling him to charge Inaam emotionally. After he attacks her in piecemeal fashion, she invokes a relational category, explaining that Abd is her friend. Friendship between two friends

should restrain them from uttering offensive words. By invoking this background expectancy, she not only perceives Abd as being delinquent towards her, but she also brings into focus a range of deontic expectancies (Stevanovic, 2011, Stevanovic and Peräkyla, 2012), including obligation, rights, and responsibilities associated with the category of friendship (cf. Sacks, 1992, p. 40-48 for membership categorization devices). Relying on the tacit understanding of background expectancies of that particular relational network, it is enough to just invoke the category to bring all the morally associated concepts and meanings to attention. Quantitatively, the brevity of the invocation depicts a pragmatic sense where what is meant prevails over what is said both qualitatively and quantitatively. Garfinkel calls such a method "the documentary method of interpretation" where the participants perceive more than the meanings words provide semantically because the categories are "inference rich" (Sacks, 1992., p. 40). By "inference rich" Sacks means that "a great deal of knowledge that members of a society have about the society is stored in terms of these categories" (Sacks, 1992, p. 40).

In terms of the moral order, there are two points must be emphasized. First, it is worth mentioning that the participants here engage in first-order morality "through their own history of interactions" (Kádár & Haugh, 2013., p. 94). Second, the brevity of "but< you're my friend don't be rude" invokes the moral order of friendship or acquaintance. For instance, she does not say Abd should abide by which aspect or rule of friendship, she just says "you are my friend" which is quite general because friends may use offensive language with each other. There is a moral point to this brevity and generality, however. She holds Abd morally accountable for the whole class of the friendship category. Goffman (1971) indicates that norms are usually applied in a general way. Therefore, when a deviation occurs in one instance the criticism will be directed at the whole class

of that category (p. 97). Abd is held accountable for recognizing the parameters of friendship with regard to commitment and morality.

4.2.3 AGENCY

Mitchell and Haugh (2015) believe that viewing impoliteness as social practice should extend to the notion of agency, and they theorize impoliteness in light of a close connection between agency, accountability and the social evaluation of impoliteness. The speaker of an offence is held accountable for violating social norms, and in receiving offence recipients are expected to be able not only to recognize the offence as violating certain perceived social norms but also to be able to form their response loaded with some kind of evaluation (p. 27).

As agents of social actions and members of a specific culture, the participants account for each other's actions and meanings on the basis of social norms. Agency is defined as "the socioculturally mediated capacity to act" (Ahearn, 2001, p. 112), and manifests itself in the participants' methods for doing social actions. According to Lau (2000), agency is framed by social sanctions and cultural understandings because "agency is constituted by the norms, practices, institutions, and discourses through which it is made available" (pp. 50-51). Duranti (2011) explains that agency involves the recognition of everyday practical involvements via practical assessments of one another's actions (p. 157). Iraqi speakers share background expectancies and thus bear responsibility for recognizing "the moral order as [a] perceivedly normal course of action-familiar scenes of everyday affairs" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 35).

Duranti (1994) has investigated the enactment of agency in participants' linguistic expressions. In Duranti (2004), he states that agency encompasses three dimensions, according to which agents: "(i) have some degree of control over their own behavior, (ii) [their] actions in the

world affect other entities' (and sometimes their own), and (iii) whose actions are the object of evaluation" (p. 453). Accordingly, all three elements lead to the fact that the participants hold each other accountable for their social conduct in situations where impoliteness takes place.

Duranti's three dimensions clearly illustrate that agency involves intentionality. The participants hold the assumption that an impolite social action was conducted purposefully, in the sense that in utilizing agency, the actor demonstrated his awareness that his act would affect others. Making misbehaviors observable is also rooted in the recipient's agency, as Mitchell and Haugh (2015) point out: "a focus on agency in theorizing impoliteness allows for the ways in which recipients do not just simply invoke social norms or ... perceived speaker intentions in evaluating talk or conduct as impolite, but may also exercise their own agency in construing the speaker's actions as a particular kind of action, and thus as offensive or not" (p. 207). Garfinkel (1963) illustrates that when responding to inappropriate behavior a recipient does not simply respond to how he has been offended but also describes the oddness of the behavior in light of "perceived normality" (p. 188). Accordingly, the way a participant produces an offence may more or less reveal how the offender utilized his agency in offending his recipient.

But the question that arises in respect to intentionality is how we are going to approach it? In order to answer this question, it would be preferable to discover how relevant intentionality is in researching agency with the conduct of impoliteness in Iraqi culture. From the empirical examples presented here, it appears that in evaluating impoliteness, the participants are concerned with how and where social actions are impolite, independently of the personal interests motivating them. In other words, they orient towards the way social actions are perceived. According to this understanding, impoliteness is associated with someone's overall social and cultural competence

vis-a-vis social norms and ritual customs. Duranti (2011) found that in Samoan society the mode of interaction revealed that participants were focused more on the consequences of interaction than motivation. He concluded that intentionality should be conceived in a broader turn than the Gricean (1957) narrow focus on the speaker's meaning, alone. Rather, intentionality is associated with the idea of aboutness (Duranti, 2011, pp. 152-153). Aboutness refers to:

> the property that our thoughts and embodied actions have to be directed toward something, which may be imagined, seen, heard, touched, smelled, remembered, or maybe a state of mind to be reflected upon (in this case, a second-order intentional act). (Duranti, 2006, p. 36).

In such a case, the social actions, regardless of the recipients, are "directed in the sense of being constitutive of a particular type of cultural activity" (p. 36). To recapitulate, the participants' actions are culturally and discursively constitutive of *Usuul*, to which they are always already accountable.

Unlike cognitive models, interactional approaches view intentionality as an emergent property of interaction rather than as an entity located in the speaker's mind. Adam Kendon (1992) believes that the co-construction of meaning challenges the notion of the speaker's intention altogether. He thinks that when participants intend to change a topic or terminate a conversation they negotiate such steps with one another (p. 327). Arundale (2008) developed an alternative model of what he called "encoding/decoding models of communication", explaining that the recognition of an intention is achieved only through interaction.

After investigating accountability with respect to morality in Italian dinner conversations, Sterponi (2003) explains that interactants including children exercise their moral agency by the

practice of requesting accounts. She found that "requests for accounts, remedial replies, counter-accusations, etc. position family members as moral agents" (p. 95). Likewise, in the following example, we see how the participants enact agency for the purpose of self-defense and other-criticism.

Context: the exchange below takes place inside a television studio and involves three participants. Yasser and Lolita are pranksters, and Dhiyaa, a poet, is the target. Yasser is the host of the program, and Lolita plays the role of a poet who has millions of followers on her Facebook account. Given the fact the she is in her twenties, Yasser doubts the validity of her talent and her claims to social media fame. During the show, he reveals that he cannot believe such typical talent with this age attracts such a huge number of fans on Facebook. Consequently, Yasser's doubt leads to a conflict. This scenario is for establishing a moral point; namely, Yasser will dismiss Lolita because she talks inappropriately. This moral point (urging Lolita to leave the studio) is designed to invite Dhiyaa to take a stance or to engage in the conflict. Seeing that the show has turned into such a mess, Dhiyaa chooses to withdraw from the conversation by complaining about the ongoing interaction.

Example (5)

1. Dhiyaa: ʔallah jixalli:tʃ bas xalli nkammil ʃʃaɣlah waraja ʃuɣl ʔa:ni
   Please, just let us finish this. I have to go
2. Yasser: jallah jallah
   Get out of here get out of here
3. Dhiyaa: jaʕni: ʕala ʔiðnch ʔIĐASSamħi:n. Xalli nixlasˁ ΣuɣuLNA

w nru:ħ. ʔallah↓ jixalli:ch

I beg your pardon, let us finish this and go for God's sake.

4. Lolita: jaʕni: KLKUM sˁiru: ʕalaijjah↑

You are ALL against me↑

5. Dhiyaa: Yasser[

Yasser[

6. Lolita: [MA: ʔATˁLAʕ ((radʒul juri:d ʔan jutˁaliʕha))

[I DO NOT LEAVE ((a bouncer is trying to send her out))

7. Dhiyaa: jamʕawwad xal ʔatˁlaʕ ʔa:ni xal ʔaxlasˁ min [mina lmaudˁu:ʕ ha:ða]

Oh my God. Let me let me get out of [this mess

8. Yasser: [ʔinta sawwe:tah hassah]

[You caused this mess

9. Dhiyaa: la:

No

10. Yasser: wallah lʕaðˁ:m Dhijaa ʔinta sawwe:tah

I swear to God, you did it Dhiyaa

11. Dhijaa: ʔa:ni sˁa:rli sa:ʕah ʕalamo:d tˁiflah dʒa:j:::: tɣlatˁ ʕalajja =

I have been seated here for an hour for the sake

of a child ((little girl)):::: abusing me↑ =

12. Lolita: = tˁiflah?↑

= Child ((little girl))?

13. Dhijaa: [MAJSˁ:R ja: ʔaxi: wallah]MAJSˁ::R↑

[NOT ACCEPTABLE my brother for God's sake NOT ACCEPTABLE

14. Lolita: [leːʃ tˤiflah? ʔintu latˤfaːl

[Why kid? You are kids

15. Dhijaa: (laː judʒiːb Lolita) ʔinta dʒaːj: mgaʕʕidni jam waħda

ʔitguːl ʕanniː muː muħtaram? ʔaːniː ħacheːt wijjaːha

ʔaːniː xadamthaː ħacheːt ʕaleːhaː ʔnnuː ʕdhaː mawhibah w ʕdhaː hːakaða.

ʔu >trd haːða r-rad<? [jaː ʔaxi muːː muːːː] ʃaɣl haːða

You have seated me with someone who says to me I am not polite? I praised and encouraged her. >Is that how she returns the favor?< [Man, this is not how it works.

16. Yasser: [ʔinta kabbart raːsha

[You gave her a big head

17. Dhijaa: jaː↑ taʃtaɣluːn SˤAĦ jaː↑ taʕrufuːn ʃʃaɣlah jaː ʔaxiː.

ʔALLAH JIxalliːk. ʔiħna muː dʒhaːl

Hey, you have to know how to work for God's sake. We are NOT kids

18. Yasser: laː bas ʔuʕrufħchi. ʔuʕrufħchi ʃwaijjah =

No, but you should know how to speak.

You should know how to speak a little bit

19. Dhijaa: = ʔaːniː ʔaʕrufħchi ʔallah jixalliːk. ʔINTA MADATUʕRUF TTSˤARRAF.

dʒibtni ʕala barnaːmadʒ w haːi ʔidart l-barnaːmadʒ maː jaʕniː

>matuʕruf ddiːr l-barnaːmadʒ< jaː- ʔaxiː ʔallah jixalliːk

I know how to speak, but YOU DON'T KNOW HOW TO BEHAVE. You have invited me to this program, ((I mean where are) the managers, I mean >you don't know how to run the show<.

After Yasser strongly disagrees with Lolita, he asks her to leave the location twice using the word "yallah", which implies urging someone to do something promptly. Here, Yasser uses his agency in his interaction with Lolita, quite rudely stretching his hand, as indicated by his fingers pointing to Lolita's place and then to the door. Lolita, however, refuses to leave. Dhiyaa politely solicits cooperation from Lolita to comply with Yasser's request so they can run the program as he has more work to do. Lolita interprets Dhiyaa's solicitation as an act of alignment against her, expressing her shock: "You are ALL against me". Once again, Dhiyaa politely requests twice that Lolita leave so they can finish the program "I beg your pardon, let us finish this and go for God's sake". Lolita continues refusing to leave the place in line 3.

Watching a bouncer attempt to get Lolita out of the room, Dhiyaa cannot stand what is going on. He disengages from the conversation and rises from his chair to leave the room resentfully. Upon witnessing Dhiyaa's disengagement, Yasser attributes responsibility for the failure of the program to Dhiyaa. Because accusation projects a dispreferred next action, Dhiyaa, of course, denies it. In turn, he indignantly blames Yasser for leaving him for an hour with a kid (Lolita) who encroached on him: "I have been seated here for an <u>hour</u> for the sake of a child ((little girl)):::: abusing me". Lolita responds to Dhiyaa by asking him why he calls her a kid "Child ((little girl))?". Dhiyaa ignores her and continues to blame Yasser, describing what is happening as completely unacceptable. Once again, Lolita asks Dhiyaa why he calls her a kid. Dhiyaa likewise

ignores her by continuing to talk to Yasser, accusing the latter of inviting him onto the show with a little girl who lacks gratitude. In his response, Yasser repeats his accusation by saying, "You gave her a big head". Thus, Dhiyaa holds Yasser accountable for what happened because the latter has failed to conduct the program appropriately. Dhiyaa asserts that Yasser does not work professionally and that he does not know how to behave: "Hey, you have to know how to work for God's sake. We are NOT kids."

It is interesting that Yasser exercises his institutionally mediated agency by dismissing Lolita in such an offensive way. He has power over Lolita as the host and the person responsible for his program. By dismissing Lolita, Yasser intends not to recognize Lolita's rights and existential agency as female. In addition, Yasser offends Lolita in such a way in order to negatively affect her, as a consequence of her inappropriate behavior.

Dhiyaa belittles Lolita's agency when describing her as a kid who erroneously disrespected him. Duranti (2010) shows that in some societies adults do not greet children or even unmarried adults. This is due to the fact that "children are being defined as having a weak (or derived) agency (p. 456). In fact, Duranti's description applies to Iraqi society as well, where mistakes or lack of competence are often attributed to children. When someone does not succeed in carrying out a task, others tend to characterize him as a child (by using the word naughty). Employing the ideology of childhood (Kulick and Schieffelin, 2004) vis-a-vis agency appears evident when Dhiyaa twice ignores Lolita's inquiries in lines (11) and (15). Likewise, in line 17, "Hey, you have to know how to work for God's sake. We are NOT kids", Dhiyaa belittles Yasser's agency by blaming him for not being able to manage the program, while he asserts his agency in recognizing how things should have been.

Ahearn (2011) mentioned that as the people's first-order understanding of how to exercise agency, participants sometimes attribute accountability to nonhuman factors such as fate (p. 285; see also Ahearn, 2001, p. 113). In the following exchange, Dr. Maimun, a famous Iraqi director, is negotiating with Abd and Ali, a newbie and inexpert director, about producing a new movie. Ali refuses to work with Maimun because he's uncomfortable with his participation in the work, an act that has been perceived as quite impolite by Maimun, because he is famous and, unlike Ali, has been working as an actor for decades. In response, Maimun blames time, implying that Ali is not qualified to be in his current position, which (Maimum implies), he only acquired by virtue of nepotism as a result of the recent political change. In Iraqi culture, blaming time implies political changes that cause changes in positions. Here, he sounds as if he regrets that an inexpert and unworthy sidekick refuses to work with an expert and finds this irony to be caused by a change in time, as made clear in the example below.

Example (6)

1.	Ali:	ma: ʔamaθθl wijja:k↑
		I will not be with you on the stage↑
2.	Abd:	mu: bke:fak
		It is not up to you
3.	Maimun:	tˤa:ħ ħaðˤðˤ l-waqt lli: xalla:k ʔinta ma: ma: tmaθθlwijja:ja. Ze:n?
		W baʕde:n ʔa:ni ma: ʔamaθθl wija sˤ-sˤɣa:r
		ʔa:ni ma: ʔamaθθl wija kba:r ʔiftahamt lola:? W maʕa
		l-ʔasaf Ali. ʔa:ni cnht ʔasˤsˤawwar nta ɣe:r ʔslu:b!

> Time is unfair for making you say I am not going to be with you on stage, Okay? And then, I do not want to be with inexperienced actors on stage. I want to be with experienced actors. And regrettably, Ali.
>
> I did not expect this from you.

After seeing that agency has been utilized as a practice for self-defense and other-criticism in these exchanges, we can recapitulate that agency plays an important role, not just as a conversational practice in formulating a negative evaluation of the speaker's act, but also in displaying realizations of it in accordance with the familiar scenes of social norms.

4.2.4 CATEGORIZATION

In impoliteness as a form of social action, normativity occupies a central position (Eelen, 2001). In evaluating social actions, participants negotiate sociocultural norms as an emic or first-order conceptualization of impoliteness. According to Sacks (1974), participants "use norms to provide the relevant membership categories in terms of which they formulate identifications of the doers of those activities for which the norms are appropriate" (p. 226). Gumperz (1982) was concerned with the question "how social knowledge is stored in the mind, how it is retrieved from memory, and how it is integrated with grammatical knowledge in the act of conversing" (p. 154). But investigating those norms as they are invoked in conversation remains challenging for the analyst. Gumperz asks, "how can we be certain that our interpretation of the activity being signaled is the same as the activity the interlocutor has in mind, if our communicative backgrounds are not identical?" (p. 167). To address this question, he "suggests a way of carrying out Garfinkel's programme for studying naturally organized activities through language without relying on a priori

and generally untestable assumptions about what is and what is not culturally appropriate" (p. 169). Gumperz has shown that conversational inferences, which he calls "signalling", constitute a way of eliciting sociocultural and ethnic background information. Interactional approaches rely on the members' methods of describing everyday activities or what Emerson and Pollner (1988) call 'member validation procedures' in authenticating inferences.

On the practical level, it is not clear exactly what Gumperz means by signalling. Sacks (1992), however, proposed a similar but more specific notion of conversational inference, which he called "membership categorization devices" as explained earlier in this chapter. One practice of eliciting sociocultural backgrounds is categorization for the purpose of evaluation (Kádár and Haugh, 2013). Housley and Fitzgerald (2015) view the notion of membership as an anthropological notion rooted in cultural and societal understandings pertaining to everyday activities (p. 1).

Jayyusi (1984) related morality to membership categorization. She found that sociocultural as well as biographic knowledge is embodied in the moral implications of categorization. Watson (1978) came up with what he called category-bound entitlements which, in his view, "give us a picture or profile of a given state of events" (p. 106). By categorizing recipients, speakers invoke relevant moral aspects. Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005) state that "persons assume that incumbents of specific relationship categories should conduct themselves in ways that are consistent with the rights, obligations, motives, and activities regarded as proper for incumbents of the relationship categories or be accountable for the discrepancy" (p. 150). Those moral aspects explained above in Pomerantz and Mandelbaum and their recognition are part of the participants' sociocultural knowledge. In this, categorization resembles a "moral profile" for the normative grounds of specific actions and events (Watson, 1978, 107). Fitzgerald & Housley (2015) think

that Sacks' exploration of the categorization practice depicts "a move to a much finer level of granularity that renders visible the relationship between morality, practical action and the social organization of everyday social life through linguistic practice" (p. 3).

Categorizing others, then, remains a productive first-order practice for the analyst to explore how *Usuul* has been conceptualized by Iraqi conversationalists in situations of accountability and attribution. Participants' recognition of categorization emerges from the "taken-for-granted" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 35) nature of *Usuul*. A member is expected to be aware of the moral obligation of a category-bound entitlement (Watson, 1978, 107). Through categorization, members make those "seen but unnoticed" (Garfinkel, 1967) norms visible. To better understand how the participants, employ categorization to frame those tacit norms pertaining to particular activity types, let us take a look at the following example.

Context:

Ali, a famous journalist and T.V. host, acts in a way that reveals he has been banned from entering the T.V. station where he used to host a show on a previous season. Interrupting the interview, Ali starts to question his ban, blaming the staff, and complaining to Dakhil for not helping him when they met outside the station where Dakhil promised Ali he would report his problem to the managers in order to facilitate his entrance.

Example (7)

1. Muziaa: jaʕni: matuʕruf le:ʃ↑? ʔiħna ra:fʕi:n ʕale:k daʕwa ʔinta tastaħiqha?
   We sued you. Don't you know why? You deserve it
2. Dakhil: >ʕALA ΣNU:?<

>FOR WHAT?<

3. Muziaa: jastaħiqha

He deserves it

4. Ali: qaddamt bara:mdʒ w humma jhadʒmu:ni:

They attack me for shows I hosted

5. Dakhil: ʔagullak ALI, ʔinta ʔiʕla:mi w (.) ha:j ʃlo:n tdxul >sstodio< rasan↓?

Look ALI, you are a media man. How could you enter >the studio< right away?

(02:00)

6. Dakhil: HAM ɣalatˁ minnak tˁabʕan

What you are doing is wrong, TOO

7. Ali: ha:↑?

Really↑?

8. Dakhil: wallah

Of course

9. Ali: bas mu: ɣalatˁ min ʕidhum jwaggifu:ni: bilba:b? =

Is it not wrong that they stop me at the gate? =

10. Dakhil: = ʔi: ɣALA:::Tˁ naʕm bas mu: tsawwi: ɣalatˁ bilɣalatˁ

Yes, it is WRO:::NG but you cannot correct a mistake by the same

11. Ali: ʔusta:ð, ʃasawwi?

Dear, what could I do?

12. Dakhil: majsˁi::r >ʃlo:n majsˁi:r<!

Not acceptable, >not acceptable<

13. Ali: ʔUSTA:Đ, dʒe:tlhum bilslu:b dʒe:tlhum bitˁtˁurq. MAJXALLU:NI

DEAR, I have tried ((to solve the problem)) with them properly

and tried to be polite in various ways. They never let me in.

14. Dakhil: MA; LA:ZM MA: ʔADʒI: ʔAI MAĦTˁTˁA MA: ʔADʒI:

THEN, ONE WOULD NOT COME, ONE WOULD NOT

COME TO ANY STATION

In this extract, we see an example of impolite behavior in Ali's interruption of the interview. Ali starts complaining about the unjust decision to ban him from entering the station where he used to run a program. By claiming his alleged rights, Ali "performs a socially unacceptable act that is contrary to a social code of behavioral norms" (Kasper and Kulka 1993, p. 108). Ali's violation of professional or institutional norms is recognizable as breaching the *Usuul* of how to claim or negotiate over someone's rights. Because of the conflict over rights, Dakhil is invited to take a stance and perhaps align with one of the disputing parties. He is expected to do so by changing his participation status from a ratified unaddressed side participant to a ratified addressed one. Muziaa's first two turns are designed in a way that disprefers any alignment supporting Ali against Dakhil's side. In line 3, in responding to the repair initiated by Dakhil, Muziaa implicitly rejects the repair initiation. Instead of providing the needed information (Schegloff et al. 197), she offers her opinion. By doing so, she simply does not bridge "breakdowns of intersubjectivity" (Schegloff, 1992), as requested by Dakhil. In line 2, when Dakhil asks Muziaa

"FOR WHAT?", which is a trouble source, she does not repair this trouble by not providing needed information. She only says "he deserves it" which does not explain why he deserves it.

Likewise, in line 4, Ali produces a defensive explanation but provides needed information for Dakhil's repair. Both sides' narrations may not be reliable as a ground for evaluation in a mediator role. Dakhil comes to make his (evaluative) decision about the ongoing interaction that he himself can witness. In line 5, Dakhil forms an act of censure towards Ali by invoking a range of background expectancies vis-a-vis the norms of *Usuul* in that particular event. By saying "Look ALI, you are a media man. How could you enter >the studio< right away?", he invokes a set of professional norms of conduct within the journalistic community of practice (Mills, 2003), reprimanding Ali and implying he should have been aware of his interruptive and improper behavior as a professional member of that particular category. Here, he makes visible a set of "seen but unnoticed" and "familiar scenes" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36) of which every media person should be fully conscious. He does not specify those background expectancies, however. Rather, he categorizes Ali as someone who holds membership in that particular relational network. Here, the norms constitute the first-order morality as there is a known relational history between Ali and Dakhil: he knows that Ali is a media man and they are friends, as well. Dakhil's invocation also constitutes second-order morality in the sense that those invoked norms are recognizable by members of the relational network. Kádár and Haugh (2013) did not mention that in some cases the boundaries between layers of the moral order cannot be separated, as in this example. To understand and interpret what Dakhil means by those invisible background expectancies, we must notice the reflexivity of that particular appearance, namely look at Ali's prospective response to Dakhil's categorization practice in order to find out how he perceives it. This uptake of Dakhil's

categorization is displayed in Ali's reasoning in line 13, "DEAR, I have tried [to solve the problem] with them properly and tried to be polite in various ways. They never let me in". Here, he expresses some of those *Usuul* rules, which are inferred by Dakhil's categorization. In doing so, Ali not only defends himself, but also reflectively displays his awareness of the perceived social norms as well as his understanding of Dakhil's action. Ali's conceptualization shows moral implications of *Usuul* in that particular activity.

Dakhil's practice of category-bound entitlement (Watson, 1978) reflexively highlights the oddness of Ali's action. As Garfinkel hypothesized, the recipients' reactions towards breaching social norms should "tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained" (p. 187). Dakhil's criticism of Ali's inconsistent behavior constitutes *Usuul* of that particular setting which is reconstituted or conjointly achieved in interaction with Ali. In line (10), he offers a maxim stating that mistakes cannot be corrected by further mistakes. Here, he shows misconduct on both sides; they both have missed *Usuul*. Such mundane reasoning shows how participants make sense of their actions (Potter, 1998, p. 249) and how they transform interaction or everyday life into an "assessment activity" (Goodwin, and Goodwin, 1987, p. 9).

4.2.5 INVOKING ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the key concepts in im/politeness in interaction is accountability. In this section I investigate how invoking accountability constitutes a discursive moral practice for offending others and defending self. As explained earlier, Watson (1978) argues that when it comes to blame exchange and attribution, participants provide "competing accounts" (p. 105). Buttny (1993) states that,

> When our actions are seen to fail or offend others, then we need some way to manage the discrediting consequences of such conduct. As moral agents, communicators can be held accountable by others according to local social and moral orders. (p. 46).

In accordance with breaching experiments and Watson's (1978) notion of "competing accounts" and on the basis of examples studied in this dissertation, it seems that the participants' practices of invoking accountability fall under two main terms which describe one's own act as accountable and another's as unaccountable.

The necessity of studying accountability in non-cooperative communications, particularly emerges from the idea that accountability "constitutes one of the everyday moral practices through which communicators offer assessments of their own and others' conduct, and ultimately, of their character and social relationships" (Buttny, 1993, p. 46). Accounts function as remedial actions (Goffman, 1971) by, for example, changing impoliteness to humor and offence to unintentional actions (Buttny, 1993, p. 46).

How do accounts function as a conversational practice in impoliteness? Research shows that accounts are invoked in circumstances of social disequilibrium. Scott and Layman (1968), for example, believe that accounts are invoked when a person is accused of having done something that is "bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible ways, untoward" (p. 47). Accounts are also used to prevent offensive actions or serve as what Goffman (1955) calls "face-saving practices" such as "the action of blaming and exoneration" (Horton-Salway, 2001, p. 159).

When illustrating Garfinkel's conception of accounts, Heritage (1988) explains that Garfinkel's breaching experiments were based on the assumption of the victim's accountability and demanded explanations of the impolite actions that were part of those experiments. In Garfinkel's theory, those norms reflexively display the recipients' 'implicit understandings' of ongoing actions and their normativity (p. 128). Heritage (1988) divides accountability into two types: "a taken-for-granted level of reasoning through which a running index of action and interaction is created and sustained … the level of overt explanation in which social actors give accounts" (p. 128). Kádár and Haugh (2013) call the first type a *normative accountability* and the second *moral accountability* (p. 119).

4.2.5.1 NEGATING POSSIBLE ACCOUNTS

One practice of invoking accountability occurs when a recipient depicts the speaker as lacking accountability. To be perceived as normal, an act may have different alternatives based on which it might have been performed. The recipient may choose one of them to negate in order to evaluate an impolite act as abnormal. This is I call *negating possible accounts*. This can be explained more in the following way:

In order to do X you must have Y but you do not have Y therefore you are not entitled to do X

To understand this practice let's take a look at the following example.

Example (8)

1. Haitham: jaʕni: ħabe:na ʧtɣul wjja:na: mθlma: Hafiz jiʃtɣul

   We would like you to work with us like Hafez

(0.2)

2. Rida: jaςni: $\int$lo:n? $\int t\int t\gamma$ul? =

I mean how which work? =

3. Haitham: [= jaςni: ndizzak

[= We send you

4. BN: [jaςni: ʔaku muza:jada:t $\int a\gamma$la:t ndzzak ςala: mudara:ʔ $\int$i: bςala:qa:tak

[I mean through your connections with managers you can win biddings

(Turns removed)

5. Rida: ma: ʔaqdar walla:h tςðru:ni:. ʔa:ni: ma: ʔaqdar ha $\int\int a\gamma$lah =

I can't. I swear, please excuse me. I can't do this job =

6. Haitham: = le:$\int$ ma:ku: $\int$i: bi:ha? ʔaxa:f $\int$nu:?

= Why? Nothing is wrong with it. You are not okay with it?

You are not okay with it?

7. Hafiz: xe:r xo: ma:ku: $\int$i:? =

Tell me, is there something ((does not sound right))? =

8. Rida: = ʤama:ς t$^{\varsigma}$raħu: ςalajja ga:lau nri:d t$\int t\gamma$ul wjja:na w kað:

= They made me an offer and suggested that I

work with them… etcetera.

9. Hafiz: ʔi: $\int$aku: bi:h?

Yeah. What is wrong with it?

10. Rida: >^{o}la:, la:,< ma: ʔaqdar ʔa:ni: ʔabu karra:r^{o} tdri: jaςni: ʔa:ni: ʔhhh[

>^{o}No, no< I cannot Abu Karrar^{o} you know I am ahhh[

11. Hafiz: [ʃnu:?

ʃnu:? jaʕni ʃnu:? lʕe:b bi:ha:? hassah ʔa:ni: da:ʃtɣul wjjahum

[Ah what? what? I

mean what is wrong that? See, I am working with them

12. Rida: ʔa:ni: tafa:dʒaʔt hassah bi:k tafa:dʒaʔt =

I am surprised by you now. I really am =

13. Haitham: = jaʕni: nta ʃnu: ʃa:if nafsak ʔaħsan min Hafiz?

= Well, do you think you are more famous than Hafez?

14. Rida: ha?

ha?

15. Haitham: ʔaħsan min Hafiz tʃu:f nafsak?

Do you think you are better than Hafez?

16. Rida: ºlaʔ, hija mu: qadˤijat ʔaħsan min Hafizº. Hafiz ʔaxujah =

ºNo. It is not the case that I am better than Hafezº. Hafez is my brother.

17. Haitham: = laʕd ʃnu:? tʃannak mara:dˤ:. jaʕni: ʃa:ijf nafsak fad ʃi:

Then what? You sound as if you are not satisfied thinking

you are a big deal ((Raising his hands upwards)).

18. Rida: ʃwajjayah

A second

19. Haitham: fanna:n jaʕni ʕa:di: [mu: fad ʃi:

You are an actor [not a big deal

20. Rida: [ºlaħðˤah laħðˤah nta smaħli: ʃwajjayah.

ʔawwalʃi: nta ga:ʕid hna:nah ma: ʕindi: mawʕid wjja:kº

[ºWait, wait, let me explain a little bit. First of all, you are sitting here and I do not have any appointment with youº.

21. Haitham: ʔe:h

ah.

22. Rida ºfaʕale:k ħtarm dʒdʒalsaº

ºTherefore, you must respect my meetingº.

In this exchange, Haitham and his wife offer Rida a presumably great opportunity to work with them: "We would like you to work with us like Hafez". Rida declines it. Since an act of rejection is dispreferred, Hiatham takes the negative side of the dispreference, asking for sufficient accounts by saying "You are not okay with that?" in line 6. But before Rida responds, Hafiz, who has just returned from a phone call, asks Rida about the ongoing interaction. Hafiz also attempts to motivate Rida as well to accept the offer by saying, "what is wrong with it?". Rida continues rejecting the offer. Hafiz seems unconvinced by Rida's accounts, as well, showing that he is working with the offerors. By saying, "what? what? I mean what is wrong that? See, I am working with them" Hafiz solicits more accounts from Rida and encourages Rida to accept the offer. Rida, however, reveals that he finds Hafez's approval to work with them shocking when saying, "I am surprised by you now. I really am". Retrospectively, this turn explains that Rida indeed perceives the offer as lacking morality. Once again, Haitham misinterprets Rida's rejection by presenting a further account when saying, "do you think you are more famous than Hafez?" which is embarrassing for Rida in Hafiz's presence.

To get Rida involved in a conflict, Haitham continues questioning Rida's rejection. In line 13, Haithm asks Rida "do you think you are more famous than Hafez?", which may be impolite since it projects restricted options. Rida is expected to say yes or no. In line 16, Rida responds "ºNo. It is not the case that I am better than Hafezº. Hafez is my brother". Here, he thinks that comparing him with Hafiz is off topic in this conversation. In line 16, Haitham portrays Rida as arrogant for continuing to reject the offer. This looks offensive because it imposes on someone to accept an offer. In line 20, Hafiz responds by questioning Haitham's presence in the meeting: "ºWait, wait, let me explain a little bit. First of all, you are sitting here and I do not have any appointment with youº". By saying this, Rida reflexively denies any preparation or relationship with Haitham. This turn (20) functions as a logical premise for formulating a conclusion (Sperber, and Wilson, 1995) which appears in Rida's utterance in line (22): "therefore, you must respect the meeting". Rida invokes this expectation: "in order to do X you must have Y, but you do not have Y therefore you are not entitled to do X". If Haitham does not have any relationship or appointment whatsoever with Rida, he cannot behave the way he does. Iraqi social customs dictate that he should keep the formality and distance between the two of them.

It is quite clear that Rida has been offended by Haitham's imposing remarks. The offence arises from his deliberate misconception of Rida's (presumed) insufficient accounts. Rida explicitly holds Haitham accountable for not realizing *Usuul*; the absence of any social relationship or an official account to meet with Rida should have been a sufficient reason to prevent Haitham from acting inappropriately. Rida shows that they have missed the moral expectations of *Usuul* with respect to relational involvement. When no relationship of any kind exists, one must maintain formality as manifested by politeness. The function of politeness, sometimes, is restricted to safety

and social avoidance. In the following example with another individual, the necessity of having a relational history is clearly expressed with respect to the same scenario.

Context: two interactants make an offer to an actress that she finds inappropriate.

Example (9)

1. Hala: ma:↓ bi:ha ʃi: tara huwwa [kulla [kulla ʔusˁu:li:
   Do not worry. It [is all legal according to Usuul
2. Haitham: [ʔinti ʃmstafa:dah? ʃmstafa:dah ʔinti? =
   [You will benefit from it. What are you earning now?
3. Saba: = ʔi:, >bas ʔa:ni: ma: gtlak ʔa:ni: ʔaʃtaɣul
   bittidʒa:rah<! (h) ʔa:ni: (h) kunt (h) xutˁtˁa:rah dʒe:t
   ʔatna:qaʃ ʔinta dare:t xutˁtˁa:rah dʒe:t ʔatna:qaʃ wijja:
   Hafiz w ʕindi ʕamal
   = Okay, but I have not said that I work as a
   businesswoman (h). You realized that I am just
   a (h) guest and am here to discuss an artistic work with Hafiz.
4. Haitham: ʔa:ni: mtqasˁsˁid tdʒi:n ʔinti. Hafiz ʃwajja ga:m [madri: ʃbaʕ flu:s
   I insisted on including you. After earning a huge
   amount of money, [now Hafiz turns his back on us.
5. Saba: [qasˁdi: mu:
   ʔinta raʔsan xatˁtˁat::↑t w nuaddi::↑ch. La:zm mqa:bi:lak
   ʃnu: ʃnu: ħaja:tah jaʕni: mnu:::

6. Saba: [I mean, you are trying to finalize everything unilaterally. You should have information about your recipient's identity and life first.

To negatively evaluate their action, Saba tacitly forms an act of other-criticism by referring to a possible account: "but I have not said that I work as a businesswoman". Here, she implies that Haitham's act of offer would have been accounted for if she had told him that she would work as a businesswoman. However, since this did not occur, Haitham does not have reasonable grounds for the offer. When responding to Haitham's insistence in line 6, "you are trying to finalize everything unilaterally. You should have information about your recipient's identity and life first", she explicitly states that they have no relationship, and Haitham should have had a common ground with her in order to be able to make the offer. This should also explain Rida's response to Haitham in the previous example. Briefly, Saba tries to show that their actions lack moral reasonableness. On the contrary, Haitham tends to present his actions in an appropriate moral framework.

4.2.6 THIS IS NOT HOW YOU CONDUCT X

One of the evaluative practices in analyzing impoliteness is finding fault in other's conduct. When someone acts in a certain way with respect to a particular activity type (Levinson, 1979), the recipient finds fault in his conduct by appealing to how an act could have been performed differently. This can be done by showing the right way of performing a specific act. Finding fault in other's conduct implies other-criticism. In the following example Al-Khalidy is a prankster who claims that he was working in the current television station. Now he has been fired and banned from entering the station because of a candid camera program he used to show. That program

caused the station social embarrassment and other legal complications because of which he has been fired. Now, he wants to explain his problem to the boss, but they do not let that happen. As a result, Al-Khalidy wants to enter the studio in any way. He interrupts a show where Haider is being interviewed. Al-Khalidy enters the studio, suddenly complaining about how he has been banned from meeting the boss of the station, and he claims that he is determining his legal rights pertaining to being fired by the station.

Example (10)

1.	Al-Khalidy:	((jaqtaħim l-ɣurfa)) ʔinta sˁa:ħbi: ((li Haider))
		((Breaking into the room amid the hustle and bustle with the guards between intrusion and prevention)): you are my friend ((to Haider))
2.	Haider:	ħabi:bi: nta xu:ja Ali, ʃlo:nak ʕumri:?
		My dear, you are my friend, how are you my friend?
3.	AL-Khalidy:	sˁa:ħbi: nta ma:lak ʕala:qa. ʔa:ni ʔaʕruf ʃasawwi:
		bi:hum ((l-lmuði:ʕate:n))
		My friend, you keep away. I know how to deal with them ((the anchors))
4.	Muqadimah:	ʔitˁlaʕ BARRAH
		Get out of here
		((the guards trying to kick Al-Khalidy out and he resists))
5.	Haider:	ha:i ʃnu:? La:, la:, la:,↓ ʃnu: ʕalla:wi?
		What is this? No, no ,no. Ali what is this?
		((turns removed))
6.	Ali:	((mitaqaddiman lilʔama:m)) sawwe:t barna:madʒ rafaʕu

ʕalajjah daʕwa. Sawwaw ʕalajjah ħadʒb ʕala: lmaħtˁtˁah.

Ja:bah xal ʔaʃu:f mudi:rkum

((Approaches)) Because I hosted programs, they prosecuted and banned me from entering the station. They should let me see the boss.

7. Haider: hassah ʔo:gaf ʔawwal ʃi. Taʕaːlʔihda w xal

nʃu:fak (maʕa btisa:mah)

First of all, you should cool down then approach

and let us greet and see you.

8. Muqadimah: hwwa ʔuslu:b ʔiʕlami: ha:ða↑?

Is this a media style?

Ali breaks the background expectancies by interrupting the program unexpectedly. Here, we see a clear contradiction between claiming someone's rights and the practice he employs in claiming them. Ali himself is a media man for which he is held accountable. Ali's inappropriate practice, reflexively holds himself accountable and subject to negative evaluations (Mitchell and Haugh, 2015). Haider criticizes Ali's action in a friendly manner by invoking the *Usuul* of how one should or is expected to advocate for rights. In explaining this set of background expectancies, he uses the expressions 'first of all,' believing that Ali misses some normal (polite) manners in advocating his rights. By this practical reasoning, Haider discursively constitutes the moral order of *Usuul* and evaluates Ali's actions negatively.

4.3 Defending one's own conduct

Another evaluative and defensive practice is claiming the rightness of one's own conduct. Jefferson (1985) used the notion of 'defensive detailing' in conversations where a participant sets up some sort of case as a defense mechanism by providing a detailed description of what had taken place in the case of troubles telling. Drew (1998) found that in doing moral work participants tend to describe the wrongdoing of the other explicitly while describing their own wrongdoing implicitly in terms of "(im)propriety, (in)correctness, (in)stability, (in)appropriateness, (in)justice, (dis)honesty, and so forth" (p. 295). The defensive practice found in my data is that when faced with criticism, the participants tend to show that they have not done X (or in an X-manner) when X constitutes inappropriate conduct, or that they have done X when X is appropriate conduct. Drew calls these kinds of practices "condemnatory moral work" (p. 322). Sometimes they combine the two aspects of self-defense and other-criticism in the same turn as in the following example.

Example (11)

1.	Abu Ahmed:	ʔusta:ð, jaʕni: ʔa:ni: smaʕt min Nur jaʕni: =
		zodʒha jiskun ʔihna:nah ʔihna:nah ʃlo:n?
		Dear, I, I heard from Nur that her husband would
		live here in this same house ((The bride's house)). How?
2.	Abu Nur:	= ʔi: ʔi: ʔaku: hichi fkrah liʔannu: jaʕni: jibqa
		bas ʔa:ni: w >Sarmad< =
		Yeah, yeah, there is that idea because, you
		know, only Nur and Sarmad will remain ((in the house))

3. Abu Ahmed: = jaʕni: ʔiħnah ham mntˁi:nah marah ʔu ham jigʕud

ʔihna:nah. ʃnu: qa:bil jaʕni: dkto:r hwwa ʃnu:?

We have given him a woman and a house!

Why? Is he a doctor or what?

4. Taaha: ja:↑bah qa:bil hassah ʃra:ħ jisawwi:? qa:bil jaʕni:

BAJIG NA:HIM huwwa? jibu:gha↑? ʕala sunnat ʔalla w rasu:lah.

My dear, what do you think he is doing? Has he stolen her? In accordance with the religious law ((marriage))

Abu Ahmed, opposes the idea that Hafiz will stay at the bride's family's house after he marries her and censures the bride's family members who agreed on such a deal. Not only does he censure them, he also attacks Hafiz when arguing that he is not worthy of such a treatment as he is not a doctor. Taha, the matchmaker, finds Abu Ahmed's act offensive to the same extent as an act of stealing. He explains that they do not steal the bride. On the contrary, they are proposing according to religiously established conventions. The first sentence of the utterance makes sense of Abu Ahmed's previous action.

In another example, Zaman, the bride's cousin stipulates a prenuptial agreement for approving the engagement. This time, the guests mention *Usuul* to demonstrate the validity of their proposal as follows:

Example (12)

1. Zaman: >ʔinta la: tzʕal mn -ħachi↑<. ʔa:ni ʔari:d dˁama:n bnt ʕammi:

>Don't get angry<. I want a guarantee for my cousin

2.	Ali:	ʔa:ni we:n ra:ħ a:xuð bnt ʕammak jaʕni:? Hafiz lʕe:bi.
		ʔaku: waħid majuʕruf Hafiz lʕe:bi↑? BAS l-ʕamaljjiah sˤaʕba
		Where do you think we will take your cousin?
		Hafiz Laebi, is there anybody who does not know Hafiz Laebi↑?
		It is JUST that the process is kind of difficult ((to announce right away))
3.	Zaman:	ma:ʃi ma:ʃi ºalla:hh Kareem alla:hh Kareemº
		Okay, okay, º God will help God will help God will help º
4.	Ali:	Ze:n, >ʔu baʕde:n ʔu baʕde:n< ʔa:ni: radʒul maʕruf
		wnna:s tuʕrufni:. ʔiʕtabirni: ʔa:ni: dˤama:n
		And then I am a well-known person, and you know me.
		Consider me as a guarantee
5.	Abu Nur:	KULLAK DˤAMA:N KULLAK DˤAMA:N
		You are all guarantee you are all guarantee
6.	Ali:	>ʃnu: l-muʃkilah jaʕni:<?
		>I mean what is the problem<?
7.	Abu Nur:	kullak dˤama:n
		You are all guarantees
8.	Ali	ʔa:ni: daxil minalba:b biʃakl ʔusˤu:li
		I have entered from the door according to Usuul

According to stereotypes, Zaman is insulting the guests by stipulating a prenuptial agreement. His stipulation implies the lack of trust between the two sides despite the fact that marriage is built

upon mutual trust between parties. Now, let us take a look at the participants' understanding of Zaman's rude remarks. Ali responds to him by explaining that their proposal is not an act of taking-away and that Hafiz is reliable because he is a well-known figure. They cannot declare the marriage for a period considering the complication of Hafiz's familial situation since he is already married and would like to keep the new marriage secret. Eventually, Ali also explains that they are proposing in a customary and correct manner according to *Usuul*.

From the societal level of morality and a stereotypical perspective on the engagement ceremony, Zaman's question seems very rude in a session where the guests have come to make new relatives through marriage. That is the metaphor for marriage in Iraqi culture. Asking for a guarantee in such a situation would be very rude because it undermines the most important element in marriage, which is trust. Doubting trust in the process would lead to negative inferences with respect to the guests' entitlements. This is another layer of the offence. Disagreements are usually presented indirectly in marriage ceremonies even if the bride's side decides to decline for any reason. But how do the guests respond? Or how do they perceive the rude question? Criticizing Zaman in line 2, Ali draws two inferences. First, he responds by asking where he may take the girl away, implying that what they are doing is far from ill-intentioned to be reassured by guaranteeing its success. Second, he talks about Hafez's identity by displaying his fame. This leads to two inferences:

1. He shows that Hafez, since he is famous enough, should play a role in facilitating the marriage negotiation.
2. Ali expresses that Hafez cannot hide, meaning, no guarantee is needed.

By claiming the rightness of their proposal, Ali implies that what Zaman says reflexively yields these sorts of negative meanings. He brings up the possible accounts and then negates them. In line 4, Ali comes to talk about his qualified identity and urges Zaman to render him as a guarantee for he is a well-known figure. In this turn there is an indirect understanding that Zaman has disrespected Ali's identity, as well. This understanding is evident in the bride's father's remedial acts (Goffman, 1971) in turns 5 and 7, which show that the father realizes that the guests feel disrespected. Conversationally, the time of the father's self-selection as speaker is significant; it shows that there is indeed a problem. In line 8 Ali gives another accountability by defending the rightness of their performance. Here, instead of negating a possible accountability, he presents the rightness of their action by appealing to the morality of *Usuul*, which entails negating the possible accountability that has never taken place.

5. ANATOMY OF IMPOLITE CONVERSATION

This chapter discusses the dynamics of impolite conversation. It shows the different stages in the progression of impoliteness. When arguments occur, they are subject to counter arguments, or the participants may choose to de-escalate. As explained earlier, impoliteness is argumentative in nature (cf. Eelen, 2001, p. 37). Argumentativity needs to be reflected in conversational sequences and in the way participants design their turns. This chapter presents this argumentative characteristic of impoliteness, illustrating how pranksters offend their targets continuously and how the targets react toward these continuous offences gradually.

A prank consists of continuous impoliteness; the pranksters use conversational sequences as a vehicle for pushing the targets to a certain degree of emotional reaction on the one hand. On the other hand, impoliteness has consequences. It is a conversational or sequential phenomenon in the sense that impolite social actions are always expected to trigger follow-up moves on the recipient's side. Participants usually disapprove of each other's impolite actions and reconstruct what they say in a prospective or retrospective manner. The examples in this dissertation illustrate that the participants usually negotiate over impolite actions and pragmatic meanings in either a mitigated or exasperated way (cf. Fanshell & Labov, 1977). Throughout this negotiation various degrees of impoliteness manifest.

One of the limitations imposed by the difficulty of collecting naturally-occurring data in impoliteness is that over-impoliteness, like over-politeness, has received relatively scant attention (Culpeper, 1998, Juhani Rudanko, 2006). One of the theoretical advantages of studying candid camera is that it makes visible the sociolinguistic mechanisms of impoliteness in general, and

realizations of over-impoliteness in particular. This sort of hostile interaction would be almost impossible to obtain otherwise, not only because of its technicality but also because it would be stringent for the analyst. The candid camera programs have been designed, for example, so that the conflict between participants often ends in a physical altercation. In this chapter we will also see instances of over-impoliteness accompanied by emotional actions on the recipient's side.

Having said that, I will investigate the anatomy of conflict conversation based on the degree of offence on both the recipient and producer's sides. The corpus of data which informs this dissertation allows for the investigation of organizational patterns of specifiable conversational segments. In this chapter I will address the anatomy of impoliteness responses in candid camera programs through the following finer-grained questions:

1. How does impoliteness start or what might cause and/or lead to impoliteness? I will be investigating the recipient's initial orientation against the producer's initial disputable or offensive actions.
2. What is the recipient's reaction towards continuous (and intentional) impoliteness?

5.1 Literature review

Theoretically, dividing conversation into identifiable segments can be part of the overall organization (Levinson, 1983) of an interactional linguistic study. Researchers use different names for identifying the overall organization of conversation (cf. Robinson, 2013, p. 258). A great example of such conversational fragmentation is opening and closing practices. Levinson points out that some types of verbal exchanges such as telephone calls "tend to have clear beginnings and

carefully organized closings" (p. 309). Splitting a conversation into specifiable sections facilitates theoretical purposes and contributes to understanding the dynamics of impoliteness better.

As discussed earlier, the discursive approach to im/politeness interprets im/politeness as a phenomenon that occurs over chains of turns in conversation as opposed to isolated utterances in the classical approach (Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Watts 2003, 2005; Locher 2004, 2006; Locher and Watts 2005; Mills, 2011). Technically, one of the key differences between politeness and impoliteness is that the latter is a sequential phenomenon *per se*; it is dynamic (Bousfield, 2008). Yet, impolite conversations may start from disputable exchanges and (potentially) end in hostile physical activities.

In this chapter the focus will be on the sequentiality of impoliteness. One of the key concepts of impoliteness as social practice is that interpretations of impoliteness are built through conversational prior and next turns. According to Kádár and Haugh (2013), this 'cumulative' understanding exists "both within and across interactions" (p. 112). Culpeper and Haugh (2014) explain how the dynamics of interaction work both sequentially and incrementally as follows:

> Incrementality with respect to pragmatic acts refers to the way in which speakers adjust or modify their talk in light of how other participants receive the progressive uttering of units of talk. Sequentiality, on the other hand, refers to the way in which current turns or utterances are always understood relative to prior and subsequent talk, particularly talk that is contiguous (immediately prior or subsequent to the current utterance or turn). (p. 185).

One of the mechanisms for addressing such dynamics is *adjacency pairs* (Schegloff, 1984b) and another is *projection* (Schegloff, 1984) or *predictability* (Levinson, 1983) which encompasses all kinds of human actions, verbal and nonverbal (Streeck, 1995, Streeck & Jordan, 2009). A simulative (offensive or disputable) action, for example, projects a remedial action which projects a refusal action which projects further action such as sustaining the remedial action or a counter-offence that may lead to further adversative moves and so forth.

Recognizing the necessity of expanding their tools of analysis beyond adjacency pairs (Sacks, 1972), researchers usually identify three basic phases in argumentative conversations in terms of their sequential organization: initial event, opposition, and reaction (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981, Genishi & DiPaolo, 1982, Genishi & DiPaplo, 1982, Maynard, 1985, 1986, Schiffrin, 1987, Bousfield, 2008,). Eisenberg and Garvey argue that the conversation analytic notion of adjacency pairs is not productive for investigating longer segments of discourse types. Instead, they proposed that routinized or ritualized discourse types "based on rules concerning appropriate social behaviors" are more practical for identifying longer interactional segments (p. 150).

Similar to Eisenberg and Garvey's model (1981), Boggs (1978) followed Hymes (1962, p. 41) in using *routines* (cf. Boggs & Watson, 1978, p. 376; Watson, 1975, p. 53; Ohta, 1999, p. 1495) as a basis for investigating verbal disputes. Boggs studied the development of verbal disputes among Hawaiian children and came up with a pattern of sequences of arguments. Labelling patterns of dispute exchanges, Boggs formulated what he called "contradicting routine" in his model and found three sequences of disputes as follows:

1. assertion/ claim/ allegation → contradiction
2. → challenge → supporting argument/ allegation/ appeal to authority

3. → insult → counter-insult/ threat/ trail (pp. 330-331).

Boggs, further, illustrated that these sequences may work in various ways as explained in the following chart:



Boggs' (1978) model of the development of verbal dispute

According to Boggs' model, a problematic turn (assertion/ claim/ allegation) may project a contradiction or a challenge (sequence number two). Once a recipient challenges a troublesome turn, the speaker may support his assertion or appeal to authority. These two sequences may lead to the third sequence which means that appealing to authority or supporting an assertion may be followed by an insult on the recipient's side. An insult may project a counter insult on the speaker's side. Insult may end with an act of threat or trial. In Boggs' model, threats or trials include verbal and nonverbal actions (p. 332).

Rudnako (2006) indicates the need of a *scale* for investigating the *degree* of impoliteness by paying more attention to "the content and the form of the attack, as well as to the context and the circumstances in which it is mounted, with account taken of the intentions of the speaker" (p. 838). Researchers in the literature, however, have always encountered challenges in doing so, since taking offence is contingent upon many contextual factors.

I believe that instead of investigating the content of isolated speech acts, it would be better to pay close attention to clusters of actions. Investigating clusters of action can be conducted by

comparing actions with one another retrospectively and prospectively. Brown and Levinson (1987) accentuated the crucial role of sequence when they mentioned that a face-threatening act can be achieved over a series of actions. When performing an act of criticism, a "boss asks piece by piece whether it has been done, receiving a string of negative answers. No more need be said" (p. 233). The pranksters deploy conversational sequences as a vehicle for covering the approximate amount of time allocated to each show. They use various sequential techniques developed in the literature of conversation analysis to deliver their provocation.

5.2 Outline of the anatomy

The data upon which this research is built yield three recurrent patterns of impolite conversational segments. In retrospect, we saw in Chapter Three that the pranksters' goal is "putting people in difficult, often emotionally challenging situations" (Hill, 2007, p. 197). Pranksters achieve this goal by what Culpeper (2011) called 'causing offence', which Haugh (2015) complemented with the notion of 'taking offence'. *Causing offence* and *taking offence* are two social actions that together can make sequences of impoliteness (p. 36).

Causing offence may lead to disaffiliative acts. Those disaffiliative acts may also lead to further contradictory acts, leading to a sequence of controversies. This means that "those persons registering or sanctioning offence in an interaction, whether explicitly or implicitly, can themselves be held morally accountable for this taking of offence" (Haugh, 2015, p. 36). However, those controversies do not come out of the blue. We can observe when a controversy starts and how it ends. Based on what is said above, I am going to distinguish the moves of causing offence from the ones of taking offence in this chapter.

5.2.1 CAUSING OFFENCE

According to Culpeper (2011), causing offence and taking offence occur when an act "infringes expectations/beliefs that are strongly held and emotionally sensitive" (p. 3). In this study, causing and taking offence are associated with breaching those normative expectancies of *Usuul* held by Iraqi participants. In this chapter, the practices of causing offence are distinguished from those of taking offence. Causing offence comprises three potential stages as follows.

5.2.1.1 Offence initiation

This stage contains initial impolite actions. The initial provocations may not necessarily be offensive, but they may be understood as what Goffman (1971) calls "virtual offence" (p.109) which is a possible offence in the recipient's understanding. Or they can be characterized as arguable (Maynard, 1985, p. 3). I prefer the term provocation since it looks more compatible with pranks. Provocation has received scant attention in impoliteness research. I take provocation as "an action or speech that may be intentional and may stimulate a reaction, which is often, but not necessarily, violent" (Boudana & Segev, 2017, p. 1). As it was explained earlier, provocation or impoliteness is contingent upon the recipient's understanding whether he takes offence out of it or not.

5.2.1.2 Insistence

A key idea in this phase is intentionality. As a first-order understanding, in investigating intended impoliteness "we need to focus on occasions when participants themselves display an orientation to actions as impolite" (Hutchby, 2008, p. 238). When a speaker insists on initial impolite act, this means that the act was intentional. When an impolite act occurs, it is expected to

be remedied by the offender himself or at the recipient's request. However, not abiding by remedial work is insisting on or confirming the offence (cf. Goffman, 1971). According to Goffman, a virtual offence has "a cautionary effect, detailing what everyone concerned must be careful to avoid confirming" (p. 109). In this chapter, we will see various examples in which the pranksters initiate a provocation and insist on continuing it even after the recipient's disaffiliative reaction. Insisting on a provocation triggers stronger degrees of reaction which I refer to as response here.

5.2.1.3 Aggravation

Aggravation represents a higher degree of offence compared to the initial offences. Merely repeating or confirming the same initial offence, however, may count as an aggravation as stated above. Here, the recipient is invited to take stronger reactions. Initial analysis of the data displays that in this stage recipients usually show stronger reactions. Aggravation, here, includes those first-pair parts that are accompanied by emotive reactions and, thereby, characterized by over-impoliteness. In other words, it comprises any continuous offence intended to obtain what Brown and Levinson (1987) called the 'maximum efficiency' (p. 97). Here, I use the maximum efficiency to denote causing great offence, such as emotional reactions.

5.2.2 TAKING OFFENCE

Participants take offence not only at intentional impoliteness but of unintentional impoliteness, as well (Culpeper, 2011, p. 5). In general, the practices of taking offence are included in the practices of other-criticism (see Chapter Four). According to Mitchell and Haugh (2015), taking offence involves the practices of casting negative evaluations against inappropriate social actions. They also link the practice of taking offence to those evaluations that are "mediated

through the broader socio-interactional context and the implications for their ongoing relationships" (p. 213). In this chapter, taking offence includes any disaffiliative action on the recipient's side in response to realizations of impoliteness which include, but are not limited to, the following moves.

5.2.2.1 Pursuing offence (Follow up)

This stage represents the target's confusion. He may request clarification of what is happening before taking any stance (which is the second stage, that of response). Clarifying confusion can be performed by delaying a response. Initial provocations project disaffiliative acts on the recipient's side. Disaffiliative acts (including dipreferred acts) "tend to occur in marked format", and "they tend to be avoided" (Levinson, 1983, p. 333). As such, disaffiliative acts are usually characterized by a delay (p. 334). Response to a provocation, which may be a dispreferred act, can be delayed by the recipient, in particular when the two interlocutors are close friends. There are other factors that may lead to delaying a response, for initial offensive acts can be subject to many emergent circumstances such as misunderstandings, remedial actions, and potential resolutions. Suspending evaluation does not imply an acceptance of the impolite act. (Bousfield, 2008, p. 185). Terkourafi (2001) found that recipients

> on occasion suspend judgement until they have more evidence to decide whether politeness or impoliteness/rudeness is intended. . ., they would seek further clues (body language, subsequent turns) to understand how it was meant . . .. What respondents' replies suggest is that judgements about politeness or impoliteness/ rudeness are not always automatic but may be reached after some deliberation about the speaker's intention. Crucially, information from all channels (verbal and

> nonverbal) will be taken into account during this process. At the same time, their replies highlight the fact that participants can generally suspend judgement about politeness or impoliteness/rudeness only temporarily. (p. 45)

This phase is characterized by delaying response on the recipient's part until he obtains clarification from the producer about a provocation. To delay a response or suspend judgement, the recipient usually questions the accountability of the initial offences. Usually, there are two types of questions: semantic, such as the meaning of 'what is said' and pragmatic or 'what is meant' (Grice, 1975). By virtue of these types of questions, recipients carry out various remedial actions. Remedial actions are requested by the recipient if the offender is not willing to initiate them, himself (cf. Goffman, 1971). Those remedial actions include "accounts, apologies, and requests" (p. 109).

5.2.2.2 Response

This phase displays how the recipient deals with an offence depending on its severity and other contextual factors that contribute to the recipient's response. Data show that a response usually follows the offender's failure to fulfil his moral obligations by disregarding the recipient's remedial attempts. In this phase, response excludes the remedial practices presented in the first phase. Response to an offence may be a similar offence. In short, response is dealing with inappropriate acts quite seriously (cf. Mitchell and Haugh, 2015, p. 213).

5.2.2.3 Emotive actions

Emotive actions performed by the recipient encompass practices that may be over-impolite, and which are meant to be the ultimate goal of the provocation. Emotive actions represent how the recipient deals with impoliteness emotionally. The following chart explains these different phases.



Figure 5: Anatomy of impolite conversation

Some explanatory remarks about the outline:

1. This model is prototypical and yet adjustable according to the participants' discursive moves in interaction. It is based on the degree of offence which is dependent upon many interactional variables and the recipient's own interpretation or understanding of an offence. The following hypotheses are predictable:
    a. An initial provocation may be followed by a response (with no remedial action)
    b. An initial provocation may be followed by an emotive action (with no remedial nor responsive actions).

c. Moving between these options is contingent upon the recipient's interpretation of the speaker's act. For example, a recipient may find an initial provocation very impolite and in turn react with an emotive action.

d. Although the act may be offensive, the recipient may condone it and avoid any dissensions that he does not wish to engage in. This means that the recipient may not commit to this outline at all. An example of this is that sometimes a recipient urges a speaker to calm down least they attract the attention of bypassers. He may accept to some extent whatever the speaker utters, even insults. However, these instances may not happen regularly or are not expected.

2. After the third phase, the continuation of conversation may become a challenge for participants. With the possibility of reconciliation, there are two possibilities; if participants choose to continue one of them may offer a concession (Vuchinich, 1990). Otherwise, they may solicit collaboration from an outsider (Maynard, 1986) or unratified participant (Goffman, 1979, 1981). In candid camera shows, the pranksters usually reveal that the provocations were part of a prank in order to avoid physical confrontations.
3. The first phase is important because the subsequent actions may be formulated according to the initial events.
4. One distinct feature of this sketch is that it discerns the degree of the offence. That is to say, the existence and the location of the phases of response on the sequential scale depend on the degree of the offence.
5. This sketch encompasses both the offender and offended parties' actions altogether.

For space limitations, this chapter cannot cover all the options with examples and it will consider the main hypothesis instead. The following sections will elaborate on these options more.

5.3 Initial provocations

Initial provocations include the pranksters' first attempts to get the targets involved in an argument. Those initial provocations from which impoliteness can develop encompass any disputable acts claimed by one party and opposed by the other (cf. Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981). Pomerantz (1978) uses the term "unhappy incident" to describe disputable actions that project a sequence of attributing responsibility. For Schegloff and Sacks (1977) the antecedent events are 'repairable' or 'trouble source' speeches (p. 363). Goffman (1981) also uses the term 'faultiables' to encompass faults that are not technical (p. 225).

In this study, antecedent events are the initial actions that may breach the moral order from which a recipient may *take offence,* and yet a series of adversative acts may follow. Not every antecedent act may be offensive. Haugh (2015) differentiates between impoliteness and offence, stating that "being impolite is not necessarily the same thing as giving offence" (p. 36). As such, I take the recipients' objection as a criterion for characterizing antecedent acts. Locher and Watts (1992) state that "'impolite' or 'polite' should thus be understood as judgements by participants in the interaction in question. They are, in other words, first order concepts rather than second order, theoretical ones" (p. 79). Here the participants' first-order emic understanding becomes helpful methodologically. All these various phases are identifiable only by relying on the participants' interpretations.

Following Goffman (1971), the recipient's objection of an antecedent event would be either a request for remedial work or for a response (p. 218). The first possibility represents the recipient's repair initiation and the second represents what I call *response*, which is the recipient's second move. Both of these responses may constitute the recipient's negative evaluation in terms of the moral order. As such, antecedent events stimulate the recipients to produce either a reaction or a request for remedial actions.

Initial offences form the locus of a series of impolite sequences. Their effect for the sequential progress of impoliteness emerges from the idea that initial offences leave an impact on the subsequent turns (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981, p. 152). For example, the recipient may refer to the offence when it comes to the moral order. The exchange below represents part of a negotiation that occurred during an engagement session at the bride's house. Hafez represents the role of the groom who is officially proposing to marry the girl. Abu Ahmed plays the role of the bride's cousin who initiates a series of disagreements to deter the negotiation. Taha is the matchmaker who facilitates the negotiation process between Hafez and the bride's family. He has come with Hafiz to talk on his behalf in the formal session. After the controversies, Hafiz asks whether Abu Ahmed hates him as a consequence of his disagreements, but Abu Ahmed denies this. Then, Taha censures Abu Ahmed by referring to the latter's initial inappropriate actions.

Example 1.

1. Hafiz: ʔʃu ʔinta ħa:qid ʕalajja

   Do you hate me?

2. Abu Ahmed: LA:, LA:, MU: ĦA:QID ʔA:NI:

No, no, I do not

3. Taha mu: ʔawwal marrah baʕdna ʔllah bi l-xae:r w raʔsan ʔintu:

ʃnu: w maʕrf ʔe:ʃ. ʕala ke:fak.

The first time when we were still greeting, ((you started))

straight away who are you? And I do not know what! You should be careful.

In line 3, Taha describes what happened at the beginning of the conversation by saying, "The first time when we were still greeting, ((you started)) straight away who are you? And I do not know what! You should be careful". This example reveals that a recipient may still be affected by the initial provocations and even if he does not respond he may talk about it later for the purpose of evaluating and blaming the recipient.

5.4 Initial hypothesis

When faced with offence, recipients show a tendency of avoiding engaging in an impolite conversation right away. In his remedial exchange, Goffman (1967) proposes two conversational moves in cases where someone's face has been damaged: challenge, "by which participants take on the responsibility of calling attention to the misconduct" (p. 20), and offer, by which "the offender, is given a chance to correct for the offense and reestablish the expressive order" (p. 20). Using either of these two moves, an offender can correct his misconduct.

What is concerning here regarding Goffman's notion of challenging and offering is that sometimes the recipient is the one who gives the offender a chance to correct his impoliteness.

Numerous practices exist for inviting the recipient to correct his misconduct, one of which is to question the accountability or meaning of his impoliteness.

By requesting remedial actions, participants suspend their evaluations (Terkourafi, 2001). In the following sections I shall examine the practices of suspending evaluations and requesting remedial actions under the name pursuing offence. Suspending evaluations include what is referred to in discourse studies as follow-ups. Fetzer, Weizman and Reber (2012) describe follow-ups as follows: "Follow-ups are conceptualized as communicative acts (or dialogue acts), in and through which a prior communicative act is accepted, challenged, or otherwise negotiated" (p. 4).

One method of pursuing offence by suspending evaluations is to find out whether an impolite act is intentional. Determining intentionality by itself is a social practice achieved through, for example, questioning (Gibbs, 1999, p. 89). Gibbs addresses the practice of checking intentionality as follows:

> But how do people make judgments of intentionality? Perhaps the way of determining people's intentions (and to figure out the contents of their minds) is to ask others what they intend to do. . . a simple way for determining whether somebody is doing something intentionally consists merely of asking Why are you doing X? or Why are you X–ing? If the person is aware that they are doing X, and if they give some plausible account that they are doing X in order to bring about Y, then they are acting intentionally. (p. 89).

Pursuing an offence involves the participants' reflexive awareness (Kádár & Haugh, 2013) of the moral order; the recipient intends to find out that, as he anticipates, the producer is aware of the moral implications of what is said. Gibbs (1999) points out that "talk about intentions makes

it appear as if these mental states are part of our conscious awareness" (p. 89). Above all, questioning an initial offence constitutes a metapragmatic practice vis-à-vis social norms.

Chapter Three explained that, according to the tradition of conversation analysis, an initial impolite act proffers a dispreferred next act. Pomerantz (1984) called the actions that cause offence or evoke negative feelings in the recipient (such as criticism) 'withholdable.' (p. 80). She further pointed out that "criticizing a coparticipant may engender a return criticism" (p. 101). Since a response to an inappropriate act such as criticism is a dispreferred act, the recipient may withhold a response to later sequences (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 79) and initiate a repair through questions like "what" or "hm?" (p. 71), which display negative evaluations such as "reluctance or discomfort" (p. 72). This suspension may be contingent, however, upon the degree of the offence as will be illustrated in the upcoming sections.

Avoiding an initial impolite act does not imply accepting it. Negative evaluation can be present even when conducted nonverbally as in the example below. Not responding to offence may be a form of deflating, a social practice in which the recipient of the offence does not adhere to the offender's hidden agenda. For the pranksters, not obtaining a response reflects a failure to provoke the target.

Sometimes requesting remedial actions can be performed through repair-initiation. Repair "refers to the process available to speakers through which they can deal with the problems which arise in talk" (Liddicoat, 2007, p. 171). In the following example, Hammudy interviews a pool-shop owner, Mohammad. A prankster named Sahir, meanwhile, is playing pool aggressively in the shop by shouting and annoying others by making too much noise. Hammudy asks Mohammad how often fights may occur in the pool bar. His question follows Sahir's yelling.

Example 2

1. Hammudy: ʔaku tsˤi:r ʕarkah?

   Do you happen to have unhappy incidents (fighting) in your shop?

2. Mohammad: la:, wallah ma: ʕindi:. lmu: xoʃa:t m: ʔatˤbbba

   Not really. I do not. I do not allow troublemakers to enter my shop

3. Sahir: hai: tiħchi ʕalajia. mu: xoʃa:t mu:?

   Oh, you are talking about me. Who is a troublemaker?

4. Mohammad: ha:?

   ha?

5. Sahir : mu: xoʃa:t wjjana:?

   Are we troublemakers?

6. Mohammad: wallah ma: ʕruf. Jisˤi:r ʕale:k ma: ʕale:k. wallah ma: ʕruf

   I do not know whether it applies to you or not. I do not know!

7. Hammudy: mu: wjjia:k, mu: wjjia:k, mu: wjjia:k

   Not you, not you, not you.

In this excerpt, the 'virtual offence' is located in line 2: "I do not allow troublemakers to enter my shop". Sahir who has already been acting up problematizes this 'virtual offence', assuming that Mohammad insinuates to him when saying 'troublemakers'. He initiates a repair in lines 3: "Who is a troublemaker?" and 5: "Are we troublemakers?". The repair fails because Mohammad does not provide enough information concerning who he might mean by "troublemakers". By saying, "I do not know whether it applies to you or not", Mohammad does not negate the fact that he may

mean Sahir. Realizing the eminence of the situation, the host, self-selectively offers a repair in the last line to prevent further escalation: "Not you, not you, not you". Hammudy's repair prevents an aggravated next action on Sahir's side. This example explains the necessity of repair initiation in conversation when taking offence is contingent upon the offender's answer whether or not he meant to offend the recipient. In what follows, I will present the practices of both causing and taking offence.

5.5 Practices of taking offence

5.5.1 PHASE ONE: REALIZATIONS OF INITIAL OFFENCES

5.5.1.1 Requesting clarification

Data show that one of the prevailing reactions to initial impolite actions is requesting clarification. Recipients may not prefer to engage in an impolite exchange until they find out that the actions are meant to be offensive. As such, the recipients may initiate a repair or request remedies as a first response to antecedent impolite events hoping that they can succeed in repairing the whole situation. Maynard (1985) believes that the initial impoliteness may not be argumentative if they are successfully fixed with repair (p. 8).

When encountering impolite social acts, the recipients first check the meaning of an offensive utterance as in Sahir's example above. Employing the conversational practice of repair, they question the intelligibility of the following meanings (Grice, 1957) as illustrated earlier:

1. What is said: utterance meaning
2. What is meant: speaker's meaning

In the example below, Jawad plays a prank on Inaam, an actress. During the interview, Abd enters the studio, arguing with Jawad about the fact that Jawad's car has been blocking Abd's car for a long time. Abd is complaining that Jawad has not moved his car. In response, Jawad utters the first utterance presented below.

Jawad disrespects Inaam by using an impolite idiom: "we might get rid of the interview," which implies he is belittling the recipient. In return, Inaam performs an act of request for clarification through repair initiation as follows:

Example 3

1. Jawad: glna: xal nxbuz l-liqa:ʔ w be:n ma: tdʒi: nta
   We said that we might get rid of the interview before you return
2. Inaam: >ha:i ʃnu:? ha:i ʃnu:?< ʃnu: nxbuz l-liqa:ʔ?
   >What is that? What is that? < What is get rid of the interview?

In this example, Jawad uses the word "nuxbz", which literally means "to bake", and can be translated as "get rid of", a phrase which seems quite offensive to Inaam. "nxbuz" is a conventional expression known within the Iraqi cultural context for belittling someone or his qualifications in such a way that arouses humiliation. Through repair initiation, Inaam negatively evaluates Jawad's behavior. It is difficult to differentiate between repair initiation and issues of morality. Presumably, Inaam does not have a problem with understanding what is said but, as this example illustrates, she may question what is meant as she seems confused.

5.5.1.2 Mentioning the activity type

As a reaction to antecedent events, recipients sometimes mention which activity type (Levinson, 1979) they are engaging in at the moment (Gumperz, 1983). Jefferson (1984) uses the expression "invocation of the status quo" as a conversational practice on the recipient's side to move out of troubles-talk (p. 47). After the performance of antecedent potential offences, a recipient may depict and yet evaluate the producer's inconsistent behavior by referring to the activities they are doing in order to perform reminding, alerting, and showing his bewilderedness toward ongoing actions. These actions are inherently evaluative as in Salaam's response below during his interview with Jawad.

Context: In the following interview, Jawad, a host, is trying to make Salaam, a movie star, appear foolish by denigrating the latter's contribution in one of the television series. In return, Salaam gets indignant and asks Jawad explicitly what he is doing to him. They know each other and have worked together in that television series. When talking about the series, Salaam seeks Jawad's co-narration. Jawad, however, describes Salaam's contribution as insignificant because the latter participated in only two episodes.

Example 4

1. Jawad: ʧam ʕamal ʃtaɣalt has-sanah?
   How many art projects have you taken on this year?
2. Salaam: baʕdni: mstamirr bʕamal. bas lʕa:m ʔʃtarakt
   ħawa:laj ʔakθar min ʕamal
   I am still working on one. But last year

I participated in more than one artwork

3. Jawad: ja: ja: hn?

What, what are they?

4. Salaam: ʔaku: ʔaʕama:l baʕd ma: ðˁaharat. ħadˁirtak ʃtaɣl wjjaia

bʕamal ʔismah "Nugra Salma:n" ʔaw muʕtaqal[

Some of them are not completed yet. You have

worked with me in an artwork named

Nugra Salman [

5. Jawad: [ʔi: l-muʕtaqal.

Ha:i ʃtaɣalt jumkin bi:h ħalqte:n

[Oh yeah Nugra Salman in which you

probably worked in one or two episodes

6. Salaam: ʔsta:ð Jawad, ʔiħna ʕaldʒaw. ʃnu:s-sa:lfah?

Dear Jawad, we are on air. What is the matter?

One method of co-constructing meaning in conversation is through co-narration (Norrick, 2000). Co-narration in conversation functions as a social practice for rapport management (Spencer-Oatey, 2000), by virtue of claiming group membership through sharing the same goals, desires, and wants (Norrick, 2000, p. 154, Brown and Levinson, 1987, pp. 103-104). In this excerpt, in line 4 "You have worked with me in an artwork named Nugra Salman" Salaam solicits co-narration from Jawad, seeking his positive contribution. The latter, however, fulfills the co-construction by adding some information, but in a negative and yet offensive way that implies denigration: "oh

yeah Nugra Salman in which you probably worked in one or two episodes". Salaam therefore problematizes Jawad's co-narration in the last turn by mentioning their status quo and the activity type they are doing. By saying, "Dear Jawad, we are on air", Salaam pursues Jawad's initial offence, namely, denigrating Salaam. Salaam's utterance "Dear Jawad, we are on air" implies that what Jawad is doing is neither appropriate nor acceptable.

5.5.1.3 Questioning accountability

Sometimes recipients tend to question the accountability behind offensive acts. In the following exchange, Yasser is the host of the show, and Bassim and Lolita are two guests. After a series of disagreements, Yasser and Lolita engage in an impolite conversation. As such, Yasser dismisses Lolita and Basm accuses Yasir for the failure of the show.

Example 5

1. Basm: ʔinta sˤu:chak
   This is all your fault
2. Yasser: ha:ʔ
   Ha?
3. Basm: sˤu:chak
   your fault
4. Yasser: le:ʃʔ
   Why?

Basm accuses Yasser by attributing the show's failure to him. Yasser, however, questions the accountability of Basm's accusation using the generic repair initiator *why*. Schegloff et al (1977) state that "other-initiations use a group of turn-constructional devices to initiate repair. One type is *Huh*, *What*?" (p. 367). These devices are generic in the sense that they do not specify the nature of the trouble (Liddicoat, 2007, p.189). Asking 'why?' is asking for an account of Basm's accusation. Questioning the accountability of an action may always involve its evaluation.

5.5.2 PHASE TWO: RESPONDING TO OFFENCE

We now turn to investigate an escalated phase of impoliteness. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) mention that strategies of reactions to opposition include insistence and mitigation versus aggravation on the speaker's side (pp. 159-160). In the second phase the reactions are more intense after the failure of the offender to perform remedies for his potential offence.

As explained earlier in this chapter, one of the significant outcomes of remedial work is that it enables recipients to distinguish incidental from intentional impoliteness (cf. Bousfield, 2008 for intentional versus incidental impoliteness) so that they can come up with a suitable response. Intentional impoliteness invites a response on the recipient's side. In other words, intentional offence is dispreferred for the recipient and yet a response is always anticipated. Someone's reaction may increase in its degree of strength when he realizes that an aggressive act has been directed at him intentionally.

Linking causing offence to intentionality, Culpeper (2011) associates issues of impoliteness and intentionality with second-order impoliteness (p. 50). When a recipient holds a speaker accountable for an offence, he thinks that the agent's intentional offence involves his utilization of what Mitchell and Haugh (2015) call "the socially mediated capacity to act", which

encompasses the following background expectancies: "1. knowing one has the ability to act, 2. knowing that these actions may affect others (and self), and 3. knowing that one will thus be held accountable for those actions" (p. 207).

Culpeper et al. (2003) developed a model of impoliteness response that is based on the recipient's reaction and is more akin to speech act theory. In their model, when faced with offence one can choose to respond or not to respond. When responding, he can accept the offence or counter it in an offensive or a defensive way. The following chart explains their model further:



From Culpeper et al. (2003, p. 1563)

My data show that the options for dealing with an offence are more complicated. In order to know how recipients deal with an offence, we have to take a closer look at the local management (Levinson, 1983) of conversation. One feature of handling response to impoliteness in context is that response is emergent. Taking offence is an emergent process. Sawyer (2005) states that "social causation is always mediated by the interpretations that individuals hold" (p. 208). This understanding is congruent with first-order impoliteness. For example, a recipient can elect to not invoke remedial work but to move to an extreme response (counter offense) if he finds out that the initial event is quite offensive. The point is that, since understanding impoliteness as social practice is situated in the participants' evaluation, it is difficult to categorize responses to impoliteness. The

Culpeper et al. model is predetermined, and it lacks features of emergence and co-construct. This means that there should be more flexibility in the recipient's choices.

The following section shows the recipient's evaluative practices involved in taking offence after the failure of remedial actions and/or repair initiation. Generally speaking, one distinct feature of the second phase is realizations of conversational rearrangement. The recipients' practices exhibit their attempt to check where they are and whether they need to start over or change the way they interact with one another.

5.5.2.1 Locating offence

To locate an offence, a participant may describe the ongoing actions for the purpose of attribution (Pomerantz, 1984). Drew (1978) states that participants usually do not take a speaker's description as "merely describing the scene" because routinely, … the descriptive work which speakers do is reported as 'telling a story (or a joke), 'warning', blaming, 'justifying'" (p. 3). Potter (1996) noted that what he calls 'formulations' which are "actions done in talk that 'package' the previous interaction, perhaps specifying its nature and upshot, in a way that prepares for future interaction" (p. 48). Formulation involves reflexive awareness; it is "both about some piece of interaction and also a contribution to that interaction: that is, it is reflexive" (p. 49).

Descriptive evaluations can be delivered by means of metapragmatic remarks which "are one of the explicit ways in which members discuss criteria for verbal appropriateness" (Blum-Kulka, 1997 p. 180). Participants' description of what is happening at the moment forms their reflexive awareness (metapragmatics) that locates the offence. When someone, for example, insists on offending another, the recipient may explicitly say, *you are doing X* when X describes an

inappropriate action. To explain descriptions by using metapragmatics, let us take a closer look at the previous example between Jawad and Salaam.

Example 6

1. Jawad: ʧam ʕamal ʃtaɣalt has-sanah?
   Jawad: How many artworks have you done this year?
2. Salaam: baʕdni: mustamirr bʕamal. Bas l-ʕa:m ʔʃtarakt
   ħawa:laj ʔakθar min ʕamal
   I am still working on one. But last year
   I participated in more than one artwork
3. Jawad: ja: ja:hn?
   What, what are they?
4. Salaam: ʔaku: ʔaʕama:l baʕd ma: ðˤaharat.ħartak ʃtaɣl wjjaia
   bʕamal ʔismah "Nugra Salma:n" ʔaw muʕtaqal[
   Some of them have not been finished yet. You have
   worked with me in a work named
   Nugra Salman[
5. Jawad: [ʔi: l-muʕtaqal.
   Ha:i ʃtaɣalt jumkin bi:h ħalqte:
   [Oh yeah Nugra Salman in which you
   probably worked in one or two episodes
6. Salaam: ʔsta:ð Jawad, ʔiħna ʕaldʒaw. ʃnu:s-salfah?

Dear Jawad, we are on air. What is the matter?

7. Jawad: la:, ħalqte:n ɣe:r ʃtaɣalt wjia:k? ʔa:ni ʔadri: bi:k nta sˁawwart bi s-sidʒn ɣe:r? hjia kul ha:ða ʃ-ʃuɣul xamstaʕʃ maʃhad ħalqte:n. ʕala kullin, ʔiħna mu: bsˁadad ha:ða l-maudˁu:ʕ

No, two episodes. Did not I work with you? I know that your scenes were in jail, right? All that you did was fifteen scenes, two episodes. Anyway, this is not our point, here.

8. Salam: ʔsta:ð Jawad[

Dear, Jawad[

[ʔari:d l-basˁmah

9. Jawad: [I need your best artwork =

10. Salam: = ʃnu:? ʔo:gaf. ʔnta datntaqisˁ minnj: jaʕni? =

= What? Stop. Are you disparaging me? =

By saying “Oh yeah Nugra Salman in which you probably worked in one or two episodes”, Jawad denigrates Salaam’s artwork. In return, Salaam refers to their current situation, “Dear Jawad, we are on air,” and he shows his bewilderment toward Jawad’s behavior by saying, “What is the matter?”. In his breaching experiments, Garfinkel (1963) found that one of the reactions represented by recipients of breaching experiments was bewilderment. Salaam’s warning, “we are on air”, is a description of the ongoing activity. Jawad insists on his opinion that Salaam worked only two episodes. Salaam is trying to respond, but Jawad interrupts him with another request: “I need your best artwork”. By interrupting Salaam, Jawad wants to change the topic. Salaam gets

angry and says, “What? Stop” as an indication that he disaffiliates with what Jawad is doing. To negatively evaluate Jawad’s behavior, Salaam uses metapragmatics, asking, “Are you disparaging me?”. Here, Salam demonstrates his awareness of what Jawad is thinking about, which is holding the intention to disparage Salaam, as if saying, ‘I know what you're doing to me’. This descriptive question is evaluative in nature, meaning, it does not seek information. Instead, it delivers a negative evaluation. This example shows how the participants use metapragmatics to locate the offence.

5.5.2.2 Warning

Data show that when faced with a repeated offence, a recipient warns the offender to stop or change the ongoing inappropriate actions. Request to discontinue the ongoing actions resembles a number of practices discovered by Jefferson (1984) concerning ‘boundarying off’ or moving out of troubles talk such as ‘conversation closure’, and ‘conversation restart’ (pp. 51-53).

Warning is inherently critical and thus evaluative. According to Searle (1969), a speech act of warning involves an event that may take place in the future and that is not going to be in the recipient’s interest (p. 670). Warnings reflexively exhibit the recipient’s negative evaluation of the offender’s behavior. Moreover, warning can be interpreted as indicating an escalated situation in which the warning may be associated with some strong degree of evaluation or tension. In the example below, Jawad interviews Ahmed who is from Hillah, a small city in central Iraq. Ahmed, who has been targeted by Jawad, strongly warns Jawad in a threatening manner, raising his index finger to imply that he will not accept further offences. In Iraqi culture, there is an ideology used by people from Baghdad towards people from other cities. Some Baghdadis believe the people from other cities to be less educated than they are. They express this ideology through names such

as *Shrugi* or *Mohafazat*, both of which mean people from other cities. The use of these words is extremely offensive and humiliating. In the following example, Jawad behaves ideologically with Ahmed, using the word *Mohafazat*.

Example 7

1. Jawad: ʔinta muħa:faðˤa:t ja: ħabibi:
   My dear, you are *Mohafazat* ((not from the capital Baghdad))
2. Ahmed: ʃbi:ha: muħa:faðˤa:t ja: ʔusta:ð?
   What is wrong with that?
3. Jawad: ʕala ra:si: =
   You are welcome
4. Ahmed: = laʔ ʔardʒu:k Jawad ((rafiʕan ʔisˤbuʕ s-saba:bah muhaddidan))
   NO, please, dear Jawad ((raising his index finger))

Jawad offends Ahmed by characterizing him as someone who is from outside Baghdad, and thus not educated. Ahmed, however, takes great offence by warning Jawad strongly to stop talking in this manner. Even though Jawad produces a remedial action, namely the polite remark, "You are welcome", Ahmed does not accept Jawad's remedial action since the degree of offence is already too high. Ahmed uses the word 'no' to refuse Jawad's polite utterance. He does not utter the threat or say what he is going to do if Jawad will not stop. A practice of warning in Iraqi culture is using the word 'please' with certain gestures such as raising one's index finger.

5.5.2.3 Return action

By return action, I mean responding to an offence with another offence. In responding to an offence, a recipient may use such actions as negating, denial, counter offence...etc. Responding to an offence or attack sometimes requires either an offensive or defensive action (Culpaper et al, 2003, p. 1562; Bousfield, 2008, pp. 193-194). Sometimes, however, distinguishing offensive from defensive counter attacks in situations of impoliteness proves quite difficult, because one implies the other one. In the example below, Yasser, after being offended by Kazem's statement, employs a conventional expression to both defend himself and offend Kazem, as well.

Context: Kazem and Yasser are two interviewees who have been invited to participate in a special television program. In the program, they have been asked to discuss their personal lives, revealing everday details. As a prankster, Kazem wants to get Yasser angry. He reveals to Yasser his knowledge of some of Yasser's personal traits, offending the latter.

Example 8

1. Kazem: ʔiða: ma tddai:na flu:s jizʕal. wa ʔiða: tgu:l lah ʔinta ʧaðða:b jizʕal, wa ʔiða: ntˁa:k mawʔid jixlif bi:h
   If you do not lend Yasser money, he will break with you, and if you tell him you are a layer, he will break with you, and if he promises to come, he does not come.
2. Yasser: ʔilzam ʔi:dak ʃwajjiah
   Do not go too far ((idiom meaning lying sarcastically))

Kazem criticizes Yasser by listing three of his negative attributes. Seemingly, Yasser has been offended by Kazem's characterization of him. By saying, "Do not go too far", Yasser intends to display the invalidity of Kazem's characterization when characterizing him as a liar.

5.5.2.4 Terminating conflict

Terminating a conflict may not necessarily mean disengaging from interaction. To move out of a conflict, a recipient may change the conversation topic. This change could be implemented through various conversational moves, such as initiating a new topic or requesting the speaker to give up talking about the current one. Or they may choose to compromise. Attempts to compromise in a conflict can be carried out by either disputants or by a third party. According to Vuchinich (1990), terminating a conflict requires two kinds of agreement between parties: "consensus on matters of fact, judgement, obligation, rights, attitudes, feeling and so on", and "agreement on the speech activity that is to be pursued" (p. 119).

To avoid engaging in further unwilling adversatives, a recipient may elect one of the five practices of conflict termination explained by Vuchinich: submission, dominant third-party, compromise, stand-off, and withdrawal (pp. 123-132). Vuchinich, however, did not talk about the moral order that compels a participant to sometimes choose one of the practices mentioned above. In the following example, when Kazem becomes angry at Sayyed after serious conflicts transpire between them, Sayyed chooses submission to terminate the conflict as he ""gives" in and accepts the opponent's position" (p. 123). But in reality, Sayyed chooses submission because of the moral order since people are watching them.

Example 9

1. Sayyd: dka:fi: jallah ka:fi: ʃʧallabt ka:fi: minna l-ʕa:lam
   Come on enough, enough. Why you never stop? People are watching us ((pointing to people behind the scenes))
2. Kazem: sajjid, mu: ʔinta ʕindak dˁaɣtˁ ma: ʔagdar ʔatdʒa:waz
   Sayyd, you have blood pressure. I cannot encroach on you

Sayyed urges Kazem to stop arguing because people around them are watching. Kazem, however, is still talking harshly. Attempts to terminate a conflict may succeed or fail. Here Kazem refuses to give up since he is playing a prank against Sayyed.

5.5.2.5 Narrating the causes of the conflict

Participants usually disagree about who is responsible for starting the ongoing conflict. Sometimes they set up a blame-exchange sequence by narrating the initial causes of the conflict for the purpose of evaluation. Pomerantz (1978) found that there are two segments of attributing responsibility: "announcement of unhappy incident" and "attributions of responsibility" (p. 115). These two elements occur in the following example in which the two opponents disagree about who started the conflict.

Example 10

1. Kazem: hassah ʔinta mn sˁajjaħt bwadʒhi:[
   When you shouted at my face[
2. Ridha: [hassah ʔinta hassha mu: ħache:t

ɣabi:ʔ ʔa:ni: ntˤte:t widʒhat naðˤar fanjjiah

[You shouted at my face.

Did not you say stupid?

I just expressed an artistic opinion

Narrating the causes of the conflict involves attributing responsibility which contains a reference element to the initial moves (Pomerantz, 1978) as in Rida's last turn: "Didn't you say stupid?".

5.5.2.6 Denying

Chapter Three has shown that in making the targets appear foolish, the pranksters denigrate the targets' qualifications. To achieve denigration, the pranksters sometimes make false statements. In the example below, during their interview, Jawad belittles Basmah, an actress, by implying that she lacks professional acting skills and has received assistance from the directors who have given her roles. Basmah, however, denies this. Daniel is susceptible to argumentativity; Goodwin (1982) states that "one way in which argumentative talk can be constructed is by treating prior talk as statements about events that can be found to be true or false" (p. 82). The following example illustrates how Basma denies a statement made by Jawad about her professional skills as an actress.

Example 11

1. Jawad: bas t-tkajjiaʔti ʕala kta:f l-fannani:n

   You lack professional skills

2. Basmah: la: mustaħi:l. ɣaltˤa:n ʔinta

   No, impossible. No, you are mistaken

Jawad clearly and directly disparages Basmah by saying, “You lack professional skills”. An impolite act like disparaging projects a dispreferred next act. As such, Basmah denies Jawad’s allegation by negating it.

5.5.2.7 Pausing recording

One of the recurrent practices of taking offence in candid camera shows is displaying the pranksters’ inappropriate acts by pausing recording. My data show that pausing recording occurs in many occasions as a practice for stopping offence by means of direct request. Sequentially, the act of pausing recording takes place after the first phase. In the following example, after the first phase Jawad insists on offending Nzar by disparaging him. Taking offence from Jawad’s question, Nzar, however, stops the recording as a practice for evaluating Jawad’s behavior negatively.

Example 12

1.	Jawad:	Nzar ʕlwan jimaθθl liʔan maħħad jidz ʕale:h =
		Nzar ʕlwan acts because nobody works with him =
2.	Nzar:	= waggif t-tasˁwi:r. ʃnu: ha:i? ʃnu: maħħad jidz ʕale:h?
		= Hai:jah l-ʔasʔilah nta mxalli:ha: lo: ntˁo:k jja:ha:?
		Stop recording ((indicating to the camera)) What is this? What is nobody
		Offers him a job? Are these questions from you or somebody else?

We see that Nzar takes offence and yet reacts strongly and quickly which is evident in his latched response. Nzar criticizes the nature of the questions and asks who may have prepared them.

5.5.2.8 Seeking collaboration from third party

When a conflict reaches a difficult stage where participants cannot resolve it without making any concession, a collaboration from a third party is solicited and expected (cf. Maynard, 1986; Vuchinich, 1990). My data show that collaboration is either solicited by the conflict parties or initiated by a third party as a practice of 'outspokenness,' a recognizable enactment of "normative beliefs/values of a relational network or broader social group" (Kádár & Cruz, 2016, p. 265). The third party is usually the director of the program or anyone else if the event takes place on the street. Data show many examples in which the third party is the director of the program. Institutionally, the director is responsible for the success of the program. The following example, is a subsequent part of example 6 presented in Chapter Three. After a series of contradictions and controversies, Yasser, a prankster, wants to give Basm, a national soccer player, his wages for conducting the interview, an act that is very offensive for a national soccer player, as it constitutes an act of dismissal. Basm in turn not only refuses to take the money but also considers it offensive.

Example 13

1. Yasser: bas ntˁu: ʔudʒu:rah. ʔntˁu: ʔudʒu:rah. Xal jitˁlaʕ
   Give him his money, give him his money, and let him get dismissed
2. Basm: ʔaʃu: dʒa:i lba:bak
   You think I am a homeless?
3. Yasser: ʔi: ham ʔitˁlaʕ ʕa:di: jallah blajjah ʔudʒu:r
   Okay, get dismissed without money

4. Basm: chuk. We:n l-muxridʒ. Dxalli: jidʒi l-muxridʒ. Liʔan
ʕatabi: mu: ʕale:k hwa ʕala l-muxridʒ
((interjection)). Where is the director? Let us talk to him.
I blame him not you.

5. Jasir: la: le:ʃ ʕatabak mu: ʕalajjia ʃnu: qasˤdak?
ʔa:ni: dʒibtak we:n muxridʒ dʒa:bak?
What? What do you mean? I invited you not the director.

By saying "give him his money, and let him get dismissed", Yasser plays a prank against Basm during the interview. Basm finds the prank very offensive, as indicated by his question. Yasser insists on sending him out: "Okay, get dismissed without money". After Yasser's insistence, Basm believes it has become impossible to reach a compromise in this situation without a third party's intervention. Consequently, by saying, "Where is the director? Let us talk to him", he seeks collaboration from the third party. Here, he appeals to institutional rights. By saying, "I blame him not you", Basm holds the director responsible for the ongoing actions.

We see that only after the conflict reached an impasse did Basm request the third party's collaboration. This means that participants try to resolve the conflict morally as much as possible, but when they cannot resolve their dispute, they seek assistance from others.

5.5.3 PHASE THREE: REALIZATIONS OF EMOTIVE ACTIONS

Investigating emotion is linked to intentionality (Kádár, 2013, p. 111; Locher & Langlotz, 2008, p. 172). Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory is established on the fact that "what agents do

is related systematically to their intents" and this "systematic relation is presumed to be given by some rational means-ends reasoning" (p. 7).

In the impoliteness theories influenced by Brown and Levinson's theory, intention plays a vital role in attributing intentionality to impolite acts. According to Culpeper (2008), impoliteness "involves communicative behaviour intending to cause "face loss" of a target" (p. 36). Austin (1987) points out that being impolite means being intentional (p. 10). Bousfield (2008) differentiates between two types of impoliteness: intentional and incidental (pp. 67-68). Goffman (1967) states that "the offending person may appear to have acted maliciously and spitefully, with the intention of causing open insult. . ., there are incidental offenses; these arise as … unplanned but sometimes anticipated" (p. 14). Unlike the interactional approach, researchers of second-order impoliteness tend to attribute inappropriate social actions to the speaker's intention to threaten the recipients' face.

Within the development of im/politeness literature, researchers have discovered that im/politeness is germane to emotions. Spencer-Oatey (2005) included emotional reactions when investigating im/politeness, including joy (contentment/pleasure, pride), surprise (surprise/amazement), anger (irritation/annoyance, frustration), sadness (disgust/disapproval disappointment/displeasure, shame/guilt, embarrassment/insult/humiliation) (p. 116). Locher and Langlotz (2008) suggest that emotions in interaction manifest themselves at three levels, "(1) perceptible bodily symptoms such as sweating, blushing, turning pale, (2) non-verbal expressions such as facial expressions or gestures, and (3) verbally through intonation, interjections, emotion words, style differences, expressive speech acts, etc." (pp. 176-177). Finally, Kádár and Haugh (2013) investigate what they call emotive actions in relation to im/politeness. They identify

emotive actions as "cases where the usage of politeness is (at least partly) influenced by one's emotion rather than crystal-clear rationality" (p. 224). In many instances impoliteness constitutes a great example for emotional responses.

Unlike Locher and Langlotz, Kádár and Haugh do not specify what emotive actions are and how they are related to impoliteness specifically. They (2013) criticized Brown and Levinson (1987) for not explaining the nature of relationship between emotivity and rationality (p. 223). In contrast, Locher and Langlotz showed that when the normative expectations are violated, a recipient may judge the offender emotionally by sowing feelings such as 'hate'and 'shame', with which interaction may 'intensify' (pp. 176-177).

While emotions have many types and functions, for the purposes of this study, emotive actions encompass those actions that imply an intensified degree of response, such as loss of temper and self-control. Those emotions are reflexive. Not only do emotions show the recipient's understanding of an offence, but they also reveal to what extent the recipient has been affected. As such, those emotive actions are inherently evaluative. Cooley (2015) believed that each emotion has a 'target' "at which the emotion is intuitively directed" because "each emotion type has a characteristic way in which it evaluates the target" (p. 168).

Sequentially, those emotive actions occupy secondary positions in conversation. They represent an advanced level of aggression. Examples of emotive action are usually the ones located at the end of an interaction, such as threats and insults. This means they are performed as a consequence of at least two types of offence. First, very offensive actions that have great impact on the recipient. Second, actions that are repetitive whether offensive or not. Data show that when a prankster repeats or insists on an undesirable behavior, the recipient shows a strong emotional

reaction. To recapitulate, the examples show that emotive actions are produced by recipients as a result of:

1. Exhausting all of the peaceful means of negotiation
2. A relatively high degree of offence, which invites a strong reaction (when a recipient feels she is being significantly offended).

According to Kádár (2013), "feelings become significant when a given act aims to arouse a particular emotive reaction and affective effect" (p. 111). This is what exactly occurs between the pranksters and their targets.

In fact, those emotive reactions are the ultimate goal of the candid camera show. Once a recipient presents an emotive reaction, the surprising moment comes along after which the pranksters reveal that the whole situation was intended to be a practical joke produced specifically for the purpose of candid camera shows. This illustrates that emotive actions constitute the last scenes of the show. Conversationally, it is unlikely that the conversation will continue after emotive actions. In what follows, I present four instances of emotive actions.

5.5.3.1 Threatening

When a threatening act follows a sequence of conflicts, it will be an emotive action, especially those threats that are accompanied by emotions and physical qualities such as anger, pale color, shouting and gestures. The following example shows the end of the conflict between Yasser and Basm, which we saw in its other stages previously. Eventually, Basm becomes very angry and reacts emotionally.

Example 14

1. Yasser: tafadˤa ʔitˤlaʕ barrah

   Please, get dismissed

2. Basm: ʃu:f Yasser, ʔagullak ʃaɣlah. qasaman bilħusain ʔaʃi:lak waʔatˤaggak bilga:ʕ. tuʕruf le:ʃ↑? liʔannahu ha:ða: taʤa:wzak ma:ltak

   Look, Yasser, ((grabbing him by his shirt)), You know what?

   I swear to God, I will eradicate and lay you down on the ground ((raising an index finger at his face angrily)).

   Do you know why? Because of your encroachment.

Basm's emotive action is evident in his physical action of grabbing Yasser's shirt, in his vowing act, "I swear to God", as well as in his lexical choice, "eradicate and lay you down" and in raising his index finger at Yasser's face.

5.5.3.2 Expressing frustration

At some point within the third phase of emotive actions, a recipient may explicitly express his/her frustration as a result of the other's disturbing actions. In the example below, Kazem plays a prank against Solaf, an actress. As a result of a series of controversies, she starts crying and leaves the room.

Example 15

1. Solaf: la:, wallah taʕabt wjiah. ma: mtwaqqaʕa Kazem ʔinta hi:ʧ!

   No, I swear to God I got tired. Did not expect you Kazem to be like that

2. Kazem: wala: mtwaqqaʕ ʔinti hi:ʧ =

I did not expect you be like that, too =

3. Solaf: = la:, la:, wallah ma: jiħta:dʒ

ha:j ħʧa:ja za:jdah ma: ʔaqbalha minnak Kazem wallah ma: ʔaqbalha.

ʔinta ʃlo:n radʒdʒ?

No, no, I swear to God there is no need ((to explain)) ((crying))

((Leaving the location towards the door)). This is rude, and I will never accept it from you Kazem. I swear to God, I will not accept it. How are you a man!

We see that Solaf's emotive actions manifest themselves through a variety of actions. In the first line, "I swear to God I got tired. Did not expect you Kazem to be like that" she expresses her frustration because she never expected Kazem to treat her impolitely. Her utterance, "I got tired" could be interpreted as a phase marker. It presupposes that her frustration is a consequence of Kazem's prior behaviors, which have exhausted her. In addition, she cries and leaves the place. All these actions demonstrate her emotional state.

5.5.3.3 Terminating the relationship

Terminating a relationship with a friend as a consequence of impolite behaviors is performed through various emotive actions. In the following example, Jawad pranks Sattar, a movie star, during an interview. They strongly disagree about the questions asked by Jawad. As a result, Jawad accuses him of not being able to answer his questions. Sattar becomes very angry and offended by Jawad's accusation.

Example 16

1. Jawaad: ʔinta kulʃi: ma: tgder tdʒa:wb ʔusta:ð. jallha nkammil l-lqa:ʔ

   You are not able to answer any questions. Let us finish the interview.

2. Sattar: Ma:::. liqa:ʔ ma:ltak ham ma:ri:dah ʔu ma: ʔasmaħ lak.

   ʔu ha:j ʔa:xir kala:m be:ni: be:nak ʔu tlga:ni bi l-ʃa:riʕ

   la: tsallim ʕalajjia wa la: ʔasallim ʕale:k.

   No::. I do not want your interview and I do not allow you ((to behave improperly)). And this is going to be the last word between you and me. Hence, do not greet me when you see me down the street and I will not greet you.

We see that Sattar reacts emotionally; he disengages from the interview, disapproves of what Jawad is doing, and terminates their relationship. Saying "do not greet me when you see me down the street and I will not greet you" is a cultural expression for terminating a relationship in Iraqi Arabic. This example shows Sattar's emotional acts in response to Jawad's offense.

5.5.3.4 Physical conflict

Locher and Langlotz (2008) explained previously that one level of emotive action is nonverbal communication. Physical actions lie at the heart of emotional actions. The following example shows the last scenes of a candid camera show hosted by Kazem. He pranks Hiba, an actress, to the extent that the latter threatens him when he challenges her. Consequently, Hiba performs a physical action.

Example 17

1. Hiba: tˤabʕan ʔiħtra:man li-lmaudʒudi:n ma: ga:ʕid ʔaħtʃi

Of course, I do not respond because of the audience's presence

2. Kazem: ʃtridi:n tsawwi:n

   What are you going to do? ((Yelling))

3. Hiba: ʔasawwi:

   I will

4. Kazem: ʃtsawwi:n

   Doing what?

5. Hiba: wallah ʔatˁallʕ lak l-wadʒh θ-θa:ni:. dir ba:lak

   I swear, I am going to expose your real face. I am warning you

6. Kazem: ja: wadʒh θ-θa:ni:? (muqtariban)

   Which real face?

7. Hiba: dir ba:lak

   I am warning you

8. Kazem: ja: wadʒh θ-θa:ni:?

   Which real face?

9. Hiba: dr ba:lak

   I am warning you ((pushing the table with her foot towards Kazem))

At the beginning, Hiba expresses that she refrains from acting improperly because of the audience. Kazem challenges her by saying "What are you going to do" and shouting at her. Hiba warns him. The challenging-warning exchange repeats. By challenging her, Kazem motivates her to perform an emotive act for the purpose of the candid camera show. Eventually, in line 9, Hiba uses her feet

to push the table in front of her to hit Kazem. We see that her emotive act is an angry response to Kazem's challenges after a number of conflicts in the conversation.

5.5.4 FROM INITIAL OFFENCE TO EMOTIVE ACTION

It was mentioned above that the recipient's reaction varies according to his understanding of an offence. Here, I am going to present a single example that illustrates the flexibility of the recipient's reaction among the three phases explained above.

When the addressee believes that the offence is relatively high, he may move from the initial stage to an emotive reaction. If a recipient does not react to an offence aggressively, however, this may imply that the act was not very offensive. A fluctuation in the degree of offence reflects the recipient's flexible movements among the three stages of reaction. This means, for example, a recipient may react with an emotional act towards an initial offence. To explain the recipient's choice of response between the three phases, I will present an example below. In the following example, the prankster Ali enters the studio suddenly because of a previous problem with the administration. In the meantime, Maajid is conducting an interview. Maajid takes great offence at Ali's initial act.

Example 18

1. Ali: ((jadxul l-stodio fudʒʔatan))
   ((Enters the studio suddenly))
2. Anchor: Ali, Ali, ʃnu: lmuʃkilah?
   Ali, Ali, what is the problem?
3. Ali: ʔaħil lmuʃkilah

I am solving the problem

4. Maajid: ʔagullak, ʔagullak, ʔinta mutˁi:ʔ ʔiħna ga:ʕdi:n dansawwi: liqa:ʔ

Listen, listen, are you a donkey? You see that we are having an interview

In this excerpt, Maajid takes great offence at Ali's interruption. Instead of responding or even initiating a repair, he jumps to an emotive reaction by characterizing Ali as a donkey with a considerable amount of anger. In Iraqi culture, characterizing someone as a donkey implies his stupidity for not realizing how to act properly. As we see, emotive reactions are accompanied by a high degree of offence and negative feelings such as anger or frustration. In this example, the two initial phases have been removed due to the high degree of offence.

This chapter investigated the claim that impoliteness is a sequential, dynamic phenomenon. A number of considerations essential to any impoliteness theory have been studied. It shows how impoliteness develops among participants and how it is met with different degrees of offences and reactions. Researchers have overlooked the important role of the organization of repair, which is ubiquitous in impoliteness. Another such a phenomenon is over-impoliteness, a practice which has not yet been theorized largely because of data-related considerations.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

Impoliteness lends itself to interdisciplinary research. Various fields such as sociology, conflict, media, business, history, and others have investigated impoliteness (Culpeper, 2011, p. 3). Terkourafi (2015) describes both the negative and positive impacts of this interdisciplinary interest in im/politeness research; it is advantageous because those different fields contribute to im/politeness research. However, this multiplicity makes it difficult to understand the nature of impoliteness, and to unify different angles on the same phenomenon (p. VII).

Impoliteness as a research field is still in its beginnings. In fact, one can hardly find an article on impoliteness in Arabic. This dearth of research stems in part from issues of language ideology; researchers in the Arab World are still enchanted by Standard Arabic whereas im/politeness, as everyday activity, remains methodologically incompatible with studying Standard Arabic, since there are no native speakers of this register. There may be other reasons for the scarcity of im/politeness research in Iraqi and Arabic linguistics. However, these are not of interest in this research.

Part of the goal of the present research is to remedy the scarcity of sociolinguistic studies focusing on Iraqi Arabic. To the best of my knowledge, the current study not only represents the first empirical work to examine impoliteness but is also the first study that applies the literature of conversation analysis and ethnomethodology to Iraqi Arabic. This research also aims to contribute to the growing literature on impoliteness, in particular. The study addresses the following research questions:

- How do Iraqis perform impolite social actions and respond to them?

- What are the (social) grounds on which they build their evaluations?
- How do they conceptualize impoliteness? In performing all of the aforementioned actions, what are the linguistic practices speakers utilize for both doing and understanding impoliteness?
- What is the anatomy of impoliteness interaction in candid camera programs?

The investigation of these questions is distributed throughout the previous six chapters. Chapter One presented the rationale and background of the study. It briefly shows both classical im/politeness theories and presents how those theories have been developed to the discursive approaches. Chapter Two identifies methodological considerations as well as aspects of data, theory and analysis. Chapter Three illustrates how pranksters conduct impoliteness in order to enrage their targets. It explains linguistic practices used by the pranksters to implement the pranks. Chapter Four examines how participants evaluate those impolite pranks by either referring to or invoking aspects of *Usuul* recognized in Iraqi Arabic. Chapter Five traces the sequential progress of conflict conversation in which impoliteness is the main theme. It analyzes responses and disaffiliative reactions on both sides, the prankster and the target.

Collecting data has been an issue in Iraqi Arabic and impoliteness research, as well. The technological development motivates scholars to rely more on data available online. This development eases the limitations of data collection. There are a number of television programs available to anyone who wishes to investigate Iraqi Arabic. Analysis in particular allows us to take advantage of data from Iraqi candid camera television shows.

Candid camera involves pranks played by pranksters against targets who have been put in difficult situations for which they may behave improperly. In those pranks, a participant makes a

target lose self-control by acting genuinely impolite, hoping that the target acts improperly in response. The targets usually respond with emotional reactions that constitute entertainment for the audience.

Of course, there are serious concerns about data quality pertaining to experimental data. Some scholars of conversation analysis insist a use of what they call naturally-occurring data. Category of naturally occurring-data may not, arguably, apply to candid camera programs. However, the phrase naturally occurring data is subject to debate. Other analysts in different linguistic fields have pointed out the importance of data from reality television shows, especially in more recent linguistic scholarship, and have interpreted naturally-occurring data as inclusive of online data. In the impoliteness subfield, reality television data have been playing a vital role and constitute a primary source. For example, Kadar and Haugh (2013) have relied on myriad online resources and used data segments extracted from movies. They avoided discussing concerns about naturally-occurring data in their theory.

The scarcity of Iraqi studies includes issues germane to data. In sociopragmatic studies, scholars have mostly used the Discourse Completion Task (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989) by distributing questionnaires among university students (cf. Abdul Sattar and Che Lah, 2011). Candid camera shows offer sufficient data quality for investigating Iraqi Arabic. Those programs constitute good resources for the immediate needs of researchers who cannot obtain data in Iraq.

The second part of the First Chapter presented a literature review regarding the two turns of im/politeness theory. It explained that politeness studies commenced with Lakoff's (1973) theory then developed further by both Brown and Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983). What all these theories have in common is that they focus on the second-order politeness, i.e. they are

theory-driven as opposed to data driven. Within the first-order turn (Lakoff, 1973, Brown and Levinson, 1987, and Leech, 1983) appears a range of theoretical features such as reliance on speakers' intention, face, and pragmatic maxims, at the utterance level. The first-order theories have been criticized by the discursive approach of im/politeness. First, instead of interpreting intention as an analytical category, discursive theories view pragmatic actions and meaning as part of the participants' interactional achievements. Meaning can be construed prospectively and retrospectively in conversation. Second, instead of face, norms occupy a central position in those discursive approaches. Finally, the discursive approaches view that conversation is the loci of im/politeness as opposed to isolated utterances.

Scholars agree that the discursive approaches started with Eelen's (2001) robust work, *A Critique of Politeness Theories*, in which Eelen explicitly discusses the philosophical and theoretical grounds of im/politeness theories. The discursive approaches advocate for a broader notion of im/politeness; those theories conceptualize im/politeness beyond the scope of sociopragmatics and include interactional linguistics such as conversation analysis and discourse analysis. Two methodological points concern the discursive approaches. First, what is the researcher's position in conducting his research pertaining to im/politeness? Second, how can the analyst analyze data segments? Or how can we know what im/politeness is? The first concern is theoretical while the second is both methodological and analytical. Kadar and Haugh's (2013) theory answers these two questions by bringing micro- and macro analyses together within the analytical literature of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.

6.2 Findings

Chapter Three proves that *Usuul* is like a double-edged sword; the participants used *Usuul* not only for negatively evaluating another's impolite social actions but also for justifying and legitimizing their own impolite actions. Deploying social norms for doing impoliteness implies that those norms are not fixed and are open to argument. In other words, the pranksters pretend that their impolite actions are consequences of the targets' initial actions. In this case, the pranks become practices of self-defense.

The above criterion is what makes candid camera shows genuine and different from Garfinkel's breaching experiments. A closer look at Garfinkel's experiments shows that the experimenters were not pretending that their abnormal activities were legitimate by holding their antagonists responsible for acting as such. For Garfinkel, this (i.e., behaving abnormally) was a methodological advantage in the sense that conductors' actions were not understandable because they appeared as strangers to their family members, for instance (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 47).

To show that their pranks were serious and genuine, the pranksters had to prepare the groundwork for performing them. They did so by collaborating with one another in interaction. Here, collaborations do not necessarily mean interactional alignment between two or more pranksters. Rather, collaborations mean setting up a situation to facilitate achievement of the pranks. In many cases the two or more pranksters took opposite stances and argued against one another to invite the target to take a moral stance to engage in the conflict. In addition to preparing the ground for practicing impoliteness, the pranksters also organized the activities (pranks) in a special way so that avoiding making moral judgments becomes almost impossible. I called these two features (collaboration and special design) affordances of candid camera shows.

The pranksters utilized the kind of practices susceptible to or easily triggered by offence. Those practices include organizational features of conversation, such as interruption, holding the floor, teasing, and laughter. These phenomena facilitate delivery of the offence. They also employed other practices with negative personal effects, such as denigration, defamation, accusation, and provocative questions. To implement these offensive practices, the participants used various (verbal and nonverbal) communication modes.

One of the interesting features of candid camera shows is that the pranksters succeeded in driving the targets to initiate impoliteness. This was achieved in different ways, one of which is to set up an argument or a moral dispute between the pranksters to solicit the targets' alignment or moral stance later on. Another way is to create an atmosphere fraught with controversy and to blame or hold the targets responsible for what happened. This could be a methodological advantage of this type of data collection. This method has been exploited recently in social experiments in an American candid camera program, called *Primetime*: *What Would You Do*? produced by ABC[13]. In this program, the pranksters create an immoral event to observe how the bystanders and onlookers react towards the moral issue. Indeed, Kadar and Melvin (2016) studied this program in what they called "ritual outspokenness".

A great deal of repetition occurs in the pranksters' discourses. Those repetitions emphasize the pranksters' insistence on cornering the targets. In one of the examples in Chapter Three, Rida refuses the pranksters' offer to work with them after he has been solicited to accept the offer. The pranksters attack Rida repeatedly by demanding a good reason for his rejection. When Rida fails

[13] American Broadcasting Company

to provide an account, they start to portray him as arrogant. Johnstone (1991) found that repetition in Arabic stems from cultural and grammatical constraints. She believes that this repetitive character stems from the religious culture of argumentation about truth. To prove that something is true in argumentation, Arabic speakers resort to repetition as a rhetorical practice for justification (pp. 114-117). In Chapter Five this repetition has been studied under the term insistence.

The participants used not only verbal means of argumentation but also nonverbal practices such as laughter, gesture, posture, and facial expressions. Using nonverbal modes for delivering impoliteness may reinforce the degree of verbal impoliteness. Within verbal impoliteness, the pranksters employed what has been called challenges, including the kind of practices that attack the targets' qualifications, such as his personal attributes, career, and personal history. These topics are sensitive matters to doubt or question. Consequently, they constitute great sources of verbal offences.

Chapter Four discusses the social grounds of the participants' evaluations. The examples and analysis in this chapter show how participants refer to those social norms which involve *Usuul* in Iraqi culture when they are violated by the pranksters. This chapter primarily discusses the target's reactions towards the pranks and the linguistic practices they employ in evaluating impoliteness. The examples reveal that participants allude to different social and personal cultural norms. The normative expectations of the engagement ceremony, for example, exhibit a great deal of sociocultural norms such as the notion of guardianship and the details of *Usuul* of those conversations. In what follows, I present the most prominent findings in this chapter.

As explained earlier, *Usuul* is not a fixed notion; there are divergent understandings of it because the perception of social norms is governed by the participants' personal interpretation and

interest. Analytically, these divergent understandings crystallize into one fact: there is always negotiation about a particular instance such as impoliteness from the standpoint of evaluation. These "competing accounts" (Watson, 1978) are divided into other-criticism and self-defense. Other-criticism is associated with the targets' reactions, while self-defense is usually associated with those who offend the recipients. In fact, none of these two practices is exclusive to the recipient.

Overall, the examples in Chapter Four display that the participants employ various linguistic practices in accentuating the im/propriety of social actions and meanings. Sometimes they evaluate those actions explicitly by categorizing them into polite, impolite, rude, and inappropriate. When they categorize those actions or talk about their feelings and expectations, they are utilizing or demonstrating metapragmatics. Metapragmatics, here, has been conceptualized as reflexive awareness; mutual awareness of each other's intentional (internal) states, including thoughts, wants, intentions, feelings, and assumptions. As part of their daily routines, however, they invoke *Usuul*. In this chapter, questioning the reasons of a particular act constitutes an instance of invoking social *Usuul*.

Usuul sanctions the nature of interaction pertaining to interpersonal relationships. One aspect of what has been called "relational practice" (Fletcher, 1999; Holmes & Marra, 2004) is discerning the distance between the speaker and the recipient. According to *Usuul*, participants should address each other in a socially appropriate manner, not acting informally, for instance, when the situation is formal. Acquainted individuals hold moral expectations of one another. They will exhibit emotional reactions when these relational expectations are violated. In the example presented under *Usuul* of relationship, Inaam shows her serious reaction towards Abd's attack that

Inaam's career is over because of her age when she says, ">no no no but but but< you're my friend don't be rude". By saying this, she invokes those sanctions of friendship that should have restricted Abd from being rude. In other words, Abd violated Usuul of friendship when offending Inaam.

In evaluating social norms, the participants exercise their agency. According to Duranti (1994), agency involves the participants' realization of the effects of their actions, including issues of self-control, consequences of their actions, and others' evaluations (p. 453). Agency is associated with intentionality. A recipient may hold a wrongdoer responsible for his actions because he has used his agency by attacking the recipient, knowing the consequences of his actions. In accordance with Mitchell and Haugh (2015), this section shows that agency should be included in impoliteness research. Two examples are presented to explain how agency has been exercised.

Categorization is another practice used by Iraqis quite systematically. Categorization constitutes an effective way of invoking *Usuul* and its relevancies in a specific instance of impoliteness. This is due to the fact that categories are "inference rich" (Sacks, 1992). That is to say, once a target categorizes an act he brings the whole package of morality to the surface. This includes the socioculturally relevant information needed for understanding that particular instance. Watson (1978) argues that categories provide a "moral profile" of that particular instance. Jayyusi (1984) notes that those categories depict biographical knowledge and its moral implications. The examples suggest that *Usuul* can be understood using membership categorization analysis because this analysis invokes "presumed common-sense knowledge of social structures" (Hester & Eglin, 1997, p. 3). In short, membership categorization makes the situatedness of im/politeness clear to the analyst.

Chapter Four shows that accountability lies at the heart of impoliteness research; not only does it constitute a theoretical ground for understanding what impoliteness is but is also a powerful analytical tool for explaining how participants orient to antisocial actions. Social actions have to be accounted for, which means that for an impolite act to be intelligible it has to be performed within a specific context. Participants hold one another accountable for the propriety of social actions. Citing Mills (1940), Heritage (1990) states that

> accounts are often requested or offered when expectations are frustrated or denied and that, in these contexts, their function is to justify or excuse courses of action by reconciling them with expectations or portraying them in ways that are morally or normatively acceptable. (p. 24)

Moreover, accountability does not only involve justifying an antisocial action in terms of its morality, but also includes inquiries into the motivations behind social actions and meanings (p. Mills, 1940, p. 904).

One of the practices concerning accounts of social actions and meanings in situations of impoliteness and making an action intelligible is what has been called *negating possible accounts* in Chapter Four. *Negating possible accounts* means that when a participant (1) intends to justify the validity of his own action he negates its wrongness: I have not done X when X is a condemnable action, and (2) intends to morally condemn the other's action, he negates the rightness of that action as if saying: You have not done X when X constitutes a socially right action. The first action can be construed as a self-defense practice, while the latter as other-criticism. These two practices constitute two major ways of invoking *Usuul* in Iraqi culture, namely, the rightness of the self's own action and the wrongness of the other's by referring to social norms.

Chapter Five discusses the anatomy of aggressive interaction in which impoliteness is the main theme. It displays the dynamics or progressivity of impoliteness in interaction. Dynamics of interaction are co-constructed by both sides in impoliteness. The contribution of one participant is contingent upon the other's. Unlike politeness, which may not be problematic, impoliteness is almost always characterized by follow-up moves and discussions. In other words, impoliteness may have clear starting points and endings. Once it ignites somewhere, it has to end at some point regardless of the consequences.

In this chapter it has been argued that reactions to impoliteness at the beginning of interaction cannot be the same as they are at the end. Participants design and modify their reactions to impoliteness in line with the development of the situations and the degree of aggravation or mitigation. In other words, once impoliteness starts, it is likely to aggravate with an unhappy ending unless the participants elect to compromise the conflict. The examples show that recipients react to impoliteness in a piecemeal manner. Recipients may lose their temper when the pranksters recur the same offence, aggravate it, or show no sign of willingness to resolve it via remedial actions.

One term of conversation analysis is the overall structural organization of conversation (Levinson, 1983; Robinson, 2013; Heritage, 2005). According to overall structural organization, some parts of conversation are identifiable, such as the beginning and end. Heritage (2005) argues that in some institutional conversations, there is a beginning, a closing and an internal topic in between. Research in conflict conversation and argument has studied the development of oppositional moves from antecedent events to closing techniques. They have studied how an argument starts and develops.

Based on the examples extracted from data gathered for this dissertation, the participants' conversational moves have been divided into *causing offence* and *taking offence* (cf. Haugh, 2015; Culpeper, 2011). Causing offence is usually, but not necessarily, the prankster's action, while taking offence is the target's reaction. Causing offence encompasses any initial and/or arguable action that is not necessarily offensive on the prankster's side. But this initial action has the characteristics to cause offence later. Once a prankster produces such an action, the target may request a remedial action from the prankster, hoping that he can compromise the conflict. For the purpose of candid camera, however, the pranksters usually insist on their initial offensive (or arguable) actions. As such, the targets start to respond to the offence once the remedial work fails and once their confusion pertaining to the initial offence clears. Responding to initial offences usually represents a higher and tenser phase in interaction. Predictably, the pranksters either continue or aggravate their offence to upgrade it to the final level where they can reveal the purpose of their impoliteness. At this level, the targets usually show their emotive reactions accompanied by a high degree of frustration and anger. These stages are optional; the targets' choice of response varies according to situational factors and personal interests. For example, a recipient may choose to respond to an initial provocation with an emotive act accompanied by exasperation and insult as illustrated in the example about the donkey.

6.3 Suggestions for future research

Over the course of conducting this research, the most challenging difficulty I encountered was conducting a theoretical framework that would explain my findings. Like the discursive approaches in the investigation of im/politeness, one of the challenges posed by this research was

how to organize the various practices employed by the participants. One of the theoretical features of the classical theories of im/politeness is that they lend themselves to categorizing and organizing the different strategies of im/politeness. For example, in Brown and Levinson's (1987) model and other theories that adopted it, im/politeness have been divided into a number of strategies and super-strategies, such as positive im/politeness and negative im/politeness, each of which encompasses a number of linguistic strategies for doing im/politeness. Unlike these classical theories of im/politeness, there is confusion in the discursive approaches. In other words, there is no discernible theory in forming the discursive approaches. Instead, each theory provides a different pattern of analysis according to its theoretical goal.

The current study shows that the notion of *Usuul* in Iraqi Arabic is not fixed. Given its complexity, *Usuul* certainly calls for further investigation in future research. The sociolinguistic aspects of *Usuul*, in particular, demand deeper study How do social variables such as age, gender, and social class affect the conceptualization of impoliteness? *Usuul* can be studied more effectively by means of direct emic understanding, which can be done by interviewing lay persons' understanding. Another dimension of society in which *Usuul* needs further investigation is religious culture. Clearly, Iraq is known for its religious customs and conventionsas evident in the tension between Shiite and Sunni Islamic groups. A strong religious discourse exists in Iraqi society that has historically affected the nature of Iraqi culture and social structure. This is tightly connected to the third dimension of *Usuul*, which is historicity: *Usuul* itself has a long history in traditional Arabic texts. This can be traced in ancient Arabic texts alongside historical im/politeness, a branch of im/politeness research developed recently.

This study consists of three analytical chapters. In order to overcome the organizational problem, I intended to focus on the findings shown by the data. Accordingly, Chapter Three presents how impoliteness (pranks) has been plotted against the targets. It displays which practices the pranksters deploy for pranking the targets and in what ways. In Chapter Four, the problem became more challenging; there were various recurrent patterns of practice used by the recipients, particularly in their responses to impoliteness. It proved challenging, however, to bring together all those practices under one title. By zooming out and taking in the whole picture of the participants' actions, I found that they were either practicing self-defense and/or other-criticism. This was a good fit for *Usuul*; according to *Usuul*, someone criticizes another because the latter has violated recognizable social norms, and the other one defends himself because he views the case through a different lens. As such, *Usuul* is neither fixed nor negotiable.

6.4 General remarks

Now, in light of what has been achieved in the current study, the following question comes to mind: What does it mean to be impolite in Iraqi culture? This study shows that impoliteness is about making inappropriate linguistic choices. According to *Usuul*, there are identifiable appropriate linguistic choices in interaction that are congruent with social norms and personal expectations. An example of those linguistic choices is using the form of address [abu + proper noun] or [abu + a noun of son/daughter] in Iraqi culture when addressing someone. Calling someone by his first name without any form of address in Iraqi culture implies an etic understanding (outsider) or lack of public courtesy or intimacy. Preserving social customs and norms is a bottom line in Iraqi society because of its tribal nature. Iraqis cherish those tribal norms

including *Usuul*. I have observed that when someone rejects an offer or any merit *faðʕil* from an Iraqi person, he would tell him *jamʕawwad, ʔinta ʔibin ʕaʃa:ʔir*! 'Come on dude, you are a son of tribes' "Come on, you realize the tribal customs".

Impoliteness may bring shame to its speaker because it puts him against socially sanctioned rules by which everyone abides. Participants are held responsible for the realizations of those norms. The examples show that Iraqis refer to social norms even in institutional situations where rules are enacted regularly. For example, when an interviewee blames an interviewer he would censure him for violating the norms of hospitality like Bsim Abbas' utterance to Yasser in one of the scenes: *you are not supposed to treat a guest like that*. The practices of self-defense and other-criticism show that *Usuul* involves making the right choices when speaking or performing actions. In the engagement ceremonies, the targets defend themselves from criticism by utterances like: *when are you proposing according to the Islamic law*, which means that they have done nothing abnormal, or they say: *we have not entered from the windows*, which means that they are behaving according to social norms, or they explicitly invoke *Usuul* when saying: *we are proposing according to Usuul*.

Understanding impoliteness in light of social norms complicates it. When accused of violating social norms by being rude, participants display relatively strong reactions. The strength of their reaction is evident in their explanation of how those norms work and how their actions are in agreement with them. Sequences of violating social norms and defending one's self by explaining his realizations of them constitutes a deeper understanding of impoliteness. This direction of research, i.e. the normative study of impoliteness, is more complicated than speech act theory's conceptualization of impoliteness as realizations of the force of utterances. In the case of

normative studies, participants themselves do the interpretation and analysis of impoliteness and social norms. They do not merely talk about impoliteness. They explain the compatibility of certain actions with social norms and how those norms operate. This is evident in the language of their description.

Finally, the analysis conducted in this research and the findings display the crucial role of social norms of *Usuul* in Iraqi culture and their importance in interpersonal judgements. What is important in investigating impoliteness in light of *Usuul* is not viewing *Usuul* as collective of social and cultural sanctions. What is more important is what participants do by invoking *Usuul* when they have been pranked during candid camera programs. Is also displays that candid camera programs constitute great sources for finding out how participants determine and identify *Usuul*.

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